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ABSTRACT
The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
The Agenda-Setting Impact of Egyptian Nightly Television Talk Shows on Attitudes
towards Civic Engagement in Egypt
A Thesis Submitted to
The Department of Journalism and Mass Communication
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
by Sara Nassar El-Khalili
under the supervision of Dr. Hussein Amin
May/2011
The awareness function of the mass media is at the heart of civic engagement, which is
fundamental for a country in transition to democracy such as Egypt. This study examined the
agenda-setting impact of Egyptian nightly television talk shows on attitudes towards civic
engagement among the Egyptian elite.
This primary research linked agenda-setting theory to civic engagement. Through setting the
salience of news and creating sociopolitical awareness, agenda-setting establishes the first
step in civic engagement, creating an informed citizenry.
A primary content analysis of the three most popular Egyptian nightly television talk shows
before the Jan.25th revolution: Masr Ennharda (Egypt Today), Al Ashera Masa’an (10 PM),
and 90 Deqeeqa (90 Minutes), was conducted to measure the media agenda. A total of 78
episodes of talk shows were coded from October 6 to November 10, before the 2010
parliamentary elections. A primary survey was conducted among a purposive sample of the
Egyptian elite (356 participants) to examine the public agenda and the relationships between
exposure to talk shows, agenda-setting, and civic engagement.
The findings support an agenda-setting impact of Egyptian nightly television talk shows at the
first and second levels. Participants cited talk shows as their main source of information for
the news issues they listed. Respondents’ perceptions of the November 2010 parliamentary
elections also corresponded with talk shows’ framing of the elections. The first outcome of
the agenda-setting impact on both levels is sociopolitical awareness, which represents the first
and most basic level of civic engagement.
One of the primary findings of this study is the significant positive correlation between
perception of talk shows as civically engaging and attitudes towards civic engagement. This
study also found a positive relationship between exposure to nightly television shows and
attitudes towards civic engagement. A five-point civic engagement scale was created to
measure the overall level of civic engagement among participants, which found that the elite
sample surveyed is civically engaged.
This study proceeded with conducting qualitative interviews with experts, producing
recommendations for talk shows in order to play a more active role in fostering civic
engagement in Egypt.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Civic Engagement and Democracy
Citizen participation is the core of all existing and emerging democracies. The
freedom of citizens to participate in government and engage in their communities is
crucial to the success of democratic government. Democracy as defined by the
Encyclopedia Britannica means “rule by the people.” The origin of the term is derived
from the word „demokratia‟ in Greek. The word „demos‟ represents people and the
word „kratos‟ represents rule. Therefore, in a democracy, citizens rule. Ultimate
power lies in citizens who have the right to vote and elect people to represent them in
free elections. To participate effectively as citizens, democratic theory emphasizes
that citizens must be able to acquire sufficient political information to be able to
convey their interests, assess their problems and vote (Moy, 1998).
An informed citizenry is essential to bring about change in policy and society
in general. Hopkins (1992) emphasized that education represents the real drive for
mobilization. When people comprehend an issue and share information with others,
they can take action and influence policy. For citizens to take action, they have to be
informed first which is acquired through the mass media or direct engagement. The
term civic engagement describes how citizens participate actively in civic affairs. It is
about deliberations and activities intended for specific public issues or challenges
yielding social change (Adler and Goggin, 2005). Active citizenship and a strong
civil society encompass a lot of power and potential that aims at solving problems in
countries, whether they have established or emerging democratic systems (Edwards,
2004). When citizens collaborate and organize their collective effort at solving social
problems, they help in creating a stronger civil society. Civil society organizations,
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journalists and intellectuals advocate publicly for democracy through meetings,
demonstrations and the mass media.
For the Arab world, lack of civic engagement and political apathy constitute a
major problem. Not a single Arab country is considered a full democracy (Martin,
2010). Although revolutions have swept a number of Arab countries beginning with
Tunisia and Egypt and extending to Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, most Arab
countries represent variations of authoritarian rule. The Tunisian and Egyptian
revolutions succeeded at toppling the heads of their regimes and achieving many
changes as a result of citizen pressure. Although signs of optimism about the political
future of Arab countries exist, the road to democracy is rocky because they have a
long history of authoritarian rule.
1.2 Egypt‟s Political Environment
A look at the political environment in Egypt before and after the revolution
explains why civic engagement is essential to democratize the country which has a
population of 85 million with 34 percent under 30 years of age. The Egyptian youth
uprising that swept the country on Jan. 25 snowballing into a revolution that included
citizens from all walks of life is a result of growing public dissent piling up over the
past decade. Although Egyptians never took to the streets in millions as they did
during the Jan.25th revolution, they still expressed their frustration with the regime in
mass demonstrations over the past few years. The piling up of anger was obvious in
the increasing number of street sit-ins and demonstrations especially in front of the
Egyptian parliament and the deadliest demonstrations of 2008 in the city of Mahalla
over the shortage of bread (El-Shorbagy, 2010, personal interview).
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According to the 2010 annual report of Freedom House International (FHI),
Egypt scored 6 on political rights, just one point higher than the lowest score of 7.
The country also scored 5 on civil liberties. The freedom organization ranks countries
on a scale of one to seven, with one representing the top level of freedom and seven
representing the lowest. Egypt‟s low scores on both civil liberties and political rights
translate into a “not free” status by the freedom organization (FHI, 2010).
In his book Egypt and the Egyptians in Mubarak‟s Reign, Amin (2009)
described Egypt as being in “distress”. Amin explained that people complain about
corruption and deficiencies across several platforms including economic, political,
educational, cultural, and social platforms. In addition, Egyptian citizens also
complain about the general quality of life. Ever since he assumed power in 1981 after
President Anwar Sadat was assassinated, former president Mubarak had the
emergency law in effect (McGann, 2008). The government claims that the law is
implemented only in cases of terrorism and drug crimes. However, authorities make
use of the emergency law to clamp down on political activists and members of the
opposition. The same law is used to disperse and arrest peaceful demonstrators in
opposition to the regime.
Inequality and political misrepresentation plagued the country‟s democratizing
process for decades. Egypt‟s corrupt political system for years ensured that the former
ruling National Democratic Party, recently dissolved by a court decision after the
revolution, holds the majority of parliament. Despite the fact that Egypt witnessed its
first presidential elections in 2005 after former President Mubarak endorsed a
constitutional change, the former amendments restricted the nomination of non-NDP
presidential candidates. Under the 1971 constitution which was suspended by the
military council and amended into a temporary constitutional declaration after the Jan.
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25th revolution, a candidate must be nominated by a party that holds a minimum of
five percent of parliament seats, making it impossible for opposition parties to
nominate candidates. The recent amendments, however, allow candidates to run for
presidency. Women were also misrepresented in parliament as only 70 seats were
given to women in the 454-seat parliament. Coptic Christians also hold only 10
percent of parliament seats (FHI, 2010).
Listing many of Egypt‟s shortcomings on political and civil liberties before the
revolution, it‟s necessary to establish a strong civil society and active engaged
citizenry to overcome such problems and help transform Egypt into a full democracy.
The idea of civil society and its democratizing potential has been very popular over
the past 15 years. The European Union and the United States view civil society as
paving the way for democratizing authoritarian countries especially the Arab region
(Abdalla, 2008). Although civil society is regarded as the democratic catalyst in
Eastern Europe and Latin America, Abdalla (2008) doubts the western high
expectations that a strong civil society will eventually lead to successful Arab
democracies.
Abdalla justifies such doubts by citing examples of the former Egyptian regime‟s
tight control over NGOs in Egypt through strict policies and regulations that represent
a constraint to the autonomy of civil society. Egypt‟s Law of Association exemplifies
such constraints on NGOs. The Ministry of Social Affairs must approve NGO board
members. The ministry also has the right to dissolve NGOs on grounds such as
threatening national unity or receiving donations from foreign countries which
discourages citizens from being actively involved in the Egyptian civil society (FHI,
2010).
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1.3 Civic Engagement in Egypt
Low political participation and general apathy used to paint a gloomy image of
the political and social picture in pre-revolution Egypt. According to the EHDR
(2010) report, civic engagement defined by EHDR as “volunteerism, social integrity
and political participation” is very low among youth in Egypt with fewer than three
percent of youth participating in volunteer work. Charity work comprises 64 percent
of the nature of volunteer work among Egyptian youth. According to McGann (2008),
Egyptians contribute to the strength of charity organizations because Muslims are
obliged under religion to pay zakat or charity money every year. This form of
engagement becomes very obvious in the holy month of Ramadan where Muslim
charity is usually at its peak.
Other international Muslim and Coptic Christian communities also engage in
charities to develop Egypt‟s education, health system and help the country‟s poor. In
addition to charitable activities, a portion of youth provides training and assistance to
poor people through providing them with loans to start small-scale projects.
Volunteers also educate the needy in an effort to eliminate their illiteracy. Despite the
fact that there are positive signs of philanthropy with most civic engagement
revolving around charity in the Egyptian society, a fifth of Egyptians still live in
poverty (McGann, 2008).
As for political participation, youth membership in political parties is very low,
with only 2.2 percent active youth members. However, this is dramatically changing
after the Jan.25th revolution as many members of the youth are currently at the stage
of joining or establishing political parties. Although voter turnout has been very low
in past Egyptian elections, almost 18 million Egyptians took to the polling stations
after the revolution to cast a yes or no vote over a set of constitutional amendments.
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The experience and level of participation was unprecedented in Egyptian history.
However, only 18 million citizens voted out of the 45 million eligible voters. This
means that 27 million Egyptians didn‟t participate (Saleh, 2011).
Lack of participation in former elections is mostly attributed to the fact that
Egyptians used to have a general feeling of mistrust knowing that the election process
is tainted by fraud (Ibrahim, 2010, personal interview). Incidents of voter intimidation
in past elections also discourage voters. However, low voter turnout is not limited to
elections. According to official government statistics, only 25 percent of eligible
voters participated in the national referendum regarding the former amendments to the
Egyptian constitution in 2007 (FHI, 2010). Participation was minimal in the 2007
referendum despite the degree of importance of such amendments and how they
directly affected citizens' lives.
Although the majority of Egyptians shared lack of participation, general political
apathy and lack of political efficacy, most citizens still preferred democracy to any
other form government. The World Values Survey poll conducted in Egypt and other
Arab countries found that more than 85 percent of respondents consider democracy
the best option for effective government. Also, 80 percent of the respondents
expressed their rejection to the authoritarian regimes (Rutherford, 2008).
The 2005 Civil Society Index Report for Egypt described civil society as being
still at an “embryonic stage” (p.82). The report also described the Egyptian civil
society as being in a weak condition due to limited participation among citizens,
limited resources and a restrictive political environment. Although civil society
organizations have strong civic values, the promotion of such values is very limited
and doesn‟t have a significant impact on policy. Despite that, the year 2005 witnessed
a breakthrough for Egyptian civil society when its organizations were permitted by
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the former regime to monitor the 2005 parliamentary elections. This also reflected on
the media coverage which started to give enough exposure to civil society
organizations, highlighting their role as watchdogs, monitoring their reports and often
interviewing them. This significant role played by the media helped foster civic
engagement values in Egyptian society.
1.4 Media and Civic Engagement in Egypt
According to Amin (2002), media in Egypt need to overcome many political,
cultural and economic challenges to bring about change. Although the media is
currently witnessing more freedom after the revolution, issues such as occasional
cases of military torture of civilians are considered very sensitive, controversial and
out of discussion. Like other Arab media, Egypt‟s media struggled for years as it
functioned in “a censorial political culture” (Amin, 2002, p.125). However, Amin
(2002) asserts that new communication technologies will empower the media and
pressure regimes to change, making censorship an obsolete idea in an environment
where journalists find other alternatives for reporting.
Although Egypt went through decades of strictly authoritarian media where all
media institutions were strictly owned by the state, that system is starting to change.
The proliferation of independent media including privately-owned newspapers and
Egyptian satellite channels such as Dream and Mehwar transformed media in Egypt.
Such independent channels enjoy more freedom than state-owned channels but they
still broadcast from the state-owned Media Production City. Rugh (2004) describes
Egypt‟s media as going through a stage of transition, moving gradually away from
authoritarianism. The logic for classifying Egyptian media as “transitional” under
Rugh‟s four-type typology of the Arab media is a result of Egypt‟s media undergoing
many changes in the past decade. Rugh (2004) described the transition as shaky and
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didn‟t clearly indicate whether the transition will be heading toward a new democratic
media system. However, Egyptian media experts believe the media will open up,
corresponding with the democratization of the political system especially after the
Jan. 25th revolution (Allam, 2011).
Theoretically, freedom was guaranteed for the media under the former 1971
Egyptian constitution. As stated in Article 48 of Egypt‟s constitution: “freedom of the
press, printing, publication and mass media shall be guaranteed.” The same article
prohibited all forms of censorship by stating that “censorship of newspapers as well as
their control, suspension or suppression by administrative methods is prohibited”
(Egyptian Constitution 1971, amended 2007). However, despite such formal, legal
and constitutional guarantees, media content in Egypt was subject to government
control. Although private media existed in Egypt, it was subject to strict regulations
and state interference. Journalists were subjected to high fines and in some cases
prison sentences especially if they were charged with tarnishing the reputation of
Egypt or threatening national security (Rugh, 2004).
In October 2010, an outspoken government critic was fired from his position as
editor-in-chief of the independent daily Al Dostour newspaper which he also cofound, allegedly over an article that Mohamed El-Baradei wrote. Before being fired
from Al-Dostour newspaper, Ibrahim Eissa was also forced to quit hosting his nightly
television talk show Baladna Belmasri (Our Country in Egyptian) broadcast on the
private satellite channel OnTV. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) released a
statement expressing its concern over firing Eissa from Al-Dostour. CPJ reported it
was alarmed by “the deterioration of press freedoms in Egypt ahead of November's
parliamentary elections and next year's presidential vote” (CPJ, 2010). The former
government also suspended in September the popular talk show Al-Qahera Al-Youm
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(Cairo Today) hosted by journalist Amr Adeeb on the Orbit Showtime Network
(OSN). Adeeb was quoted by CNN Arabic as saying “political reasons” were behind
his show‟s suspension (CPJ, 2010). Egypt‟s Media Production City stated that OSN
owes the city EGP 5 million, claiming this was the sole reason behind the suspension
of the show without prior notice (Abdoun, 2010). The show and its host Adeeb went
back on air shortly after Egyptian revolutionists succeeded at overthrowing former
President Mubarak and his regime.
In addition to satellite channels and privately-owned newspapers such as Al
Dostour, Al Shorouk and Al Masry Al Youm, the internet is also playing the role of a
catalyst in paving the way for the democratic transition. Many experts refer to the
Egyptian revolution as the “Internet” or “digital” revolution. With internet users
soaring to 17 million in 2010 compared to 10.5 million in 2008 at a penetration of
21.2 percent (Reporters Sans Frontiers, 2010), it‟s becoming harder to suppress
freedom of expression or hold information from the public. Even with an estimated 6
million users in 2007, citizens were able to influence the media and policy agendas by
reporting police brutality and mass sexual harassment incidents on the internet within
the same year. Egypt‟s mainstream media denied the mass sexual harassment
incidents at first but when the news leaked to the world through the internet, the
media later admitted the incidents and reported the events.
In a separate incident where the non-traditional media set the policy and
mainstream media agendas, Egyptian blogger Wael Abbas exposed in 2007 an
incident of police brutality and posted the video of policemen torturing a minibus
driver on YouTube. The video sparked a "media feeding‐frenzy that ultimately forced
the government to prosecute the kind of conduct that has long been condoned”
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(Pintak, 2009, p.1). The policemen were accused of torture and were sent to prison,
which was considered a great victory for activists in Egypt.
In addition to the role played by bloggers and internet users in general in
liberalizing the Egyptian media, several television talk shows also appeared on stateowned and independent channels providing ordinary citizens with a channel that
carries their voices, opinions, as well as concerns. Emphasizing the watchdog role and
adopting a more liberal approach in discussing Egyptian affairs, television talk shows
play a role in spotting the government‟s inefficiencies (El Demerdash, 2010).
According to talk show host and journalist Moataz El Demerdash, ordinary citizens
resort to talk shows to voice their concerns and demand their rights. They turn to
television talk shows hoping for a solution to their problems. El Demerdash who used
to host 90 Deqeeqa (90 Minutes) which began broadcasting on Mehwar channel in
August 2006, said talk shows have inspired Egyptians to ask for their rights,
influencing the government to take action. He emphasized that change will take place
in Egypt overtime and will be witnessed by new generations.
Talk show coverage of Egypt‟s 2010 rain flood crisis sets the example of how
popular talk shows such as Al Qahera Al Youm and 90 Deqeeqa managed to mobilize
the public to help save the country‟s rain-flood victims. Al Qahera Al Youm hosted by
Amr Adeeb, raised EGP 50 million after launching a media campaign to rebuild the
flood-hit areas in Aswan and Sinai. Talk show hosts repeatedly called on citizens help
in any way they can. The result was that of collaboration between ordinary citizens,
civil society organizations and media. Such collaboration raised millions despite
government restrictions (Panel discussion, 2010) as Egyptian law prohibits collecting
donations before acquiring the approval of the Egyptian Ministry of Social Solidarity.
Violation of the law leads to a penalty of up to seven years in prison. However, in the
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case of the rain floods, the government let the media and civil society members
handle the situation because it didn‟t have the resources to handle the crisis on its own
(Panel Discussion, 2010). The rain flood crisis exemplifies how Egypt‟s authoritarian
media system is changing and how media empowered civil society in that special
case.
Even before the rain floods crisis, the power of citizens and media was
exemplified in 2008 when thousands of protestors marched to the streets of the
Egyptian coastal city of Damietta against plans to establish an Agrium petrochemical
site that would lead to environmental hazards affecting the health of the city‟s
residents (Hussein, 2008). The issue was heavily reported by the Egyptian media
especially television talk shows where several Damietta residents appeared voicing
their concerns. The media described the petrochemical site as the “factory of death”.
The issue of the Agrium site illustrates how citizens took collective action and
succeeded at enforcing their rights regardless of state and business interests. After
multiple petitions, sit-ins, and demonstrations accompanied by heavy media coverage,
the government took the decision to relocate the Agrium plant. The Damietta case
also illustrates how the media could empower citizens even under authoritarian
regimes. Active citizens in this case communicated their interests and needs through
media which gave enough attention to their legitimate demands, generating pressure
on the government to respond.
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1.5 Statement of the Problem:
Considering the relatively low level of citizen participation in Egypt even after
the revolution and the need to create a civically engaged society that would lead
Egypt in its democratic transition, it‟s essential to study if the media play any role in
fostering civic engagement and creating an informed citizenry. Active citizenship is
important to push forward the transition to democracy. To achieve real democracy in
Egypt, citizens have to be engaged and publicly heard through the mass media and
other forms of direct engagement. Egyptians need to be informed about political
rights and encouraged to practice those rights to lift their country up which has been
suffering from a state of decline for decades.
Media all over the world play a significant role in spreading awareness and
political knowledge among people. Such a role has always been attributed to the
traditional news media, especially newspapers. However, in Egypt, where the
mainstream media was mostly controlled by the government and traditional news on
state-owned channels still broadcast mostly protocol news and bows too much to
authority, Egyptians found new channels to voice their concerns. Mainly through the
internet and television talk shows. This study is concerned with the latter because the
television penetration in Egypt exceeds by far the internet penetration. Also, the
popularity of nightly television talk shows is rooted in their ability to break
sociopolitical boundaries by addressing controversial issues (Lee, 2002). Such ability
becomes very significant in a country like Egypt, where talk shows address
controversial issues holding politicians and officials accountable.
The proliferation of talk shows revived the interest of Egyptian citizens in
news and current affairs (Menassat, 2008). “Talk shows became the most popular
programs in the history of satellite channels, with each channel trying to be unique
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and exceptional, and covering the most controversial topics” (Menassat, 2008). The
significance of talk shows in creating political awareness in the Arab world is
discussed by Sakr (2007) who asserts that talk shows in the Arab world legitimize
disagreement on political issues which helps in establishing the groundwork for a
“pluralistic political culture”. Talk shows also address citizens‟ concerns and open
new channels of communication between the populace and the ruling elite (Lee,
2002).
This research study aims at examining whether television talk shows foster
civic engagement through creating sociopolitical awareness. The theoretical
foundation applied in this research is the agenda-setting theory. The theory is applied
to determine whether Egyptian talk shows influence the public agenda of news
priorities. Through setting the salience of news and creating sociopolitical awareness,
agenda-setting establishes the first step in civic engagement. Moon (2008) found that
the theory of agenda setting goes beyond the salience of issues and attributes to
include influence on action. When the media sets issue priorities among the public,
the public eventually starts thinking about these issues, and this process of thinking is
most likely to lead to action (Moon, 2008). Based on Moon‟s (2008) research which
linked the media‟s agenda-setting function to civic engagement in the US, it is
important to examine whether the agenda-setting function of a popular media genre
such as television talk shows in Egypt is linked to civic engagement attitudes. Having
an informed and engaged citizenry is important to the success of any democracy and
is crucial in the case of an emerging democracy such as Egypt. As Amin (2002)
emphasized there is a serious “need to build the foundation of a civil society” in order
to replace “fear with responsibility and censorship with freedom” (p.134).
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework
The current research on Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic
engagement applies agenda-setting as a theoretical foundation.
2.1 Agenda-Setting Theory
Introduced by Donald Shaw and Maxwell McCombs in 1972, agenda-setting
theory was the outcome of their seminal research study conducted during the 1968 US
presidential elections. The scholars‟ main hypothesis was as follows: The mass media
influence the priority or salience of news issues among voters during a political
campaign. The agenda-setting effect results from the press selectivity in reporting
news. By choosing what to report, the news media establish the priority of significant
issues in the minds of people, setting the initial step in opinion formation (McCombs
& Reynolds, 2009). McCombs and Shaw conducted their survey among voters in
Chapel Hill in North Carolina asking them to list the main news topics.
Simultaneously, the researchers content-analyzed the major sources of news that the
voters listed. The ranking of news issues was determined by the number of stories
dedicated by the media to each topic. The high correlation between the agenda of the
media and the agenda of the voters in that study supported an agenda-setting effect.
Hundreds of studies were conducted since the Chapel Hill study on similar
agenda-setting effects of the mass media, all providing a build-up of evidence in
support of the effect of the media agenda on the public agenda (McCombs &
Reynolds, 2009). Although McCombs and Shaw initiated the theory in their original
1968 Chapel Hill study, scholar David Weaver joined them in their one-year panel
study of the US presidential elections in 1972. Weaver was also the main author of
Media Agenda-Setting in a Presidential Election (McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver,
1997). The three scholars continued their research contributions and development of
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agenda-setting theory. Historically, origins of the thinking behind agenda-setting
theory dates back to the 1920s when Walter Lippmann summarized the agenda-setting
idea in the book Public Opinion, in the introductory chapter titled “The World
Outside and Pictures in Our Heads.” Although Lipmann didn‟t use the exact term
agenda-setting, he summarized the idea behind such an effect. “His thesis is that the
news media, our windows to the vast world beyond our direct experience, determine
our cognitive maps of that world” (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009, p.2).
Although Lipmann is considered the intellectual father of the theory, the core
idea behind the agenda-setting effect appeared in several writings also before the
Chapel Hill study. As cited in Severin and Tankard (2001), Lan, K. & Lang, G.E.
(1959) stated the same idea of the theory when they wrote that the news media have
an impact on the public attention to specific issues. They added that the mass media
build images and present objects influencing people‟s thinking and feelings. Also
cited by Severin and Tankard (2001) is the famous statement by Bernard Cohen
revolving around the same idea of agenda-setting. Commenting on the power of the
press, Cohen (1963) wrote that the press “may not be successful much of the time in
telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what
to think about” (Severin and Tankard, 2001, p. 222).
2.2. Levels of Agenda-Setting
The first level of agenda-setting tackles what‟s covered in the media or what
items are on the agenda of the mass media. The process by which the media focus on
specific issues ignoring others is called priming. The priming function constitutes the
first level of agenda-setting, which happens when the media establish salience or issue
priorities for the public. “The salience of an issue on the public agenda is defined by
the percentage of people who regard that issue as the MIP [most important] facing the
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state in a particular year” (Tan & Weaver, 2009). Therefore, the first level involves
the issues on the agenda or the list of topics in order of priority. Cited in Ghanem
(1996), Price and Tewksbury (1995) defined priming as “the tendency of audience
members to evaluate their political leaders on the basis of those particular events and
issues given attention in recent news reports” (p.5).
The second level of agenda-setting theory deals with how the media present or
frame issues as opposed to what the media present in the first level of agenda-setting
(Severin &Tankard, 2001). This level of agenda-setting which involves the framing of
issues deals with media attributes of each issue which consequently influence the
public agenda of attributes. Therefore, the second level of agenda-setting effects
“examines how media coverage affects both what the public thinks about and how the
public thinks about it” (Ghanem, 1997, p.3). Becker & McCombs (1978) examined
the attributes‟ agenda in the news media portrayals of candidates during the 1976 US
presidential elections. The researchers found a strong connection between the media
frames or portrayals and the public‟s description of the candidates which represents
the public‟s attributes agenda (cited in Ghanem, 1997).
The attributes of a topic are the frames or viewpoints presented by the media
for each issue. Frames are defined by Entman (1993) as the media‟s focus on some
sides of an issue while ignoring other sides. Framing focuses on the way issues are
covered making agenda setting at the second level an examination of how such frames
affect the public‟s perception (Ghanem, 1997). At the second level of agenda-setting,
media frames or attributes represent the independent variable. Ghanem (1997) broke
frames covered by the media into four main categories: topic, the presentation of the
topic, the topic‟s cognitive attributes and finally its affective attributes. The topic is
what‟s covered in the news item. The presentation is the size and placement of the
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news item. The cognitive attributes are the details included in the news item. The
affective attributes include the tone of coverage. Takeshita (1995), cited in Ghanem
(1997) defined the four dimensions on the attribute agenda as problem definition,
attributed causes to the problem, evaluations or moral judgments of the problem, and
finally the proposed solution to the problem.
Hundreds of research studies have applied agenda-setting theory. Although
most of the research conducted so far examined the agenda-setting affect during
elections, researchers have also explored the agenda-setting effect beyond election
studies. For example, Holbrook and Hill (2005) cited by McCombs & Reynolds
(2009) studied the agenda-setting effect of crime drama using data gathered from
experimental research. They found that viewers of crime dramas shared growing
crime-related concerns which consequently affected their opinions about the
president. In this case, crime dramas set the salience of crime issues among viewers
which affected their attitudes towards the president.
More recently scholars have extended the effect of the agenda-setting arguing
that the news media may also show people what to think. By establishing this salience
of news issues and influencing the public‟s picture of their surrounding world, the
news media may also influence people‟s attitudes towards these issues and
consequently influence action. When the media establish this salience, specific issues
become the center of “public attention, thought, and perhaps even action” (McCombs
& Reynolds, 2009, p.1). Future research on the agenda-setting theory application is
moving beyond studying the formation of media agendas to considering how it can be
applied by media to improve society (Severin and Tankard, 2001).
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2.3. Agenda-Setting and Democracy
Mass media play a pivotal role in the democratic process of any country
(McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 1997). The agenda-setting function of the media is
central to comprehend the dynamics of established and emerging democracies.
Tan and Weaver (2009) studied agenda setting by examining public opinion at
the level of the state and legislative policies. The researchers found a positive
correlation between the newspaper and public agendas in five states in the United
States over a period of 14 years. Citing Jones and Baumgartner (2005), the
researchers noted that the legislature acquire, understand and prioritize information as
a result of media exposure. The media also help in shifting the priority of policy
issues by giving attention to different topics over a period of time (Tan and Weaver,
2009). Therefore, the media influence policy, pushing for change in favor of the
public good.
Moon (2008) applied both the agenda-setting theory to media use and civic
engagement. Moon‟s dissertation entitled “Agenda-Setting Effects as a Mediator of
Media Use and Civic Engagement: From What the Public Thinks About to What the
Public Does”, examined both first and second level effects of agenda setting. The
researcher tested the impact of each level on cognitive and affective attitudes,
measuring attitude strength as opinion at the first level and the strength of emotions at
the second level. Moon‟s study extended the theory of agenda setting to go beyond
the salience of issues to include influence on attitudes and behaviors. After
conducting a content analysis of the New York Times and NBC‟s nightly news along
with analyzing secondary survey data on civic engagement applying the theory of
agenda-setting and the OSOR model, Moon concluded that setting the public agenda
influences the public to think about these issues and this process of thinking leads to
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attitude change and consequently action. Therefore, the findings of Moon‟s study
support that using media to seek information has a positive impact on engagement.
This influence is especially significant in newspaper usage (Moon, 2008). The
researcher linked agenda-setting effects to engagement asserting that the process
which begins with media use end up with potentially significant consequences that
lead to informed and possibly engaged citizenry.
The agenda-setting effect on attitude strength can be explained as follows:
“Since the mass media (from an agenda-setting perspective) tend to stimulate more
thinking and learning about objects and attributes in people‟s minds, one might
consequently expect that this increased thinking would lead to strengthened attitudes”
(Kiousis, 2005, p 7, cited in Moon, 2008, p.37). Because attitude predicts behavior,
any change in attitude leads to behavioral change. According to the theory of agendasetting in light of Moon‟s study, the news media influence people on what and how to
think about issues. This leads to a change in attitude strength which will further lead
to behavioral change or action.
The following two figures used in Moon‟s (2008) study illustrate how the
agenda-setting function of the media influences civic engagement.

Figure 2.3a First level agenda-setting impact on civic engagement
(Moon, 2008, p.43)
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Figure 2.3b Second level agenda-setting impact on civic engagement
(Moon, 2008, p.45) [sic]
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Chapter 3: Literature Review
3.1. Defining Civic Engagement
“Civic engagement is gaining an awareness of your civic role and participating
actively, nurturing competencies and civic skills to function as a citizen: One who
knows his rights or responsibilities and takes action in forwarding their rights and
responsibilities”
(Al Shimi, 2010)

The term civic engagement encompasses a broad variety of activities. The term is
divided into two words civic and engagement. According to the Merriam Webster
dictionary, the word civic comes from the Latin civis which means citizen.
Engagement means involvement or commitment. According to Adler and Goggin
(2005), the term civic engagement describes several diverse viewpoints of citizenship
and different types of activities associated with it. Adler and Goggin (2005) list
several definitions for civic engagement. The first on the definitions‟ list is
community service which emphasizes voluntary individual participation within local
communities. The second definition views civic engagement as a collective action
where individuals join hands acting as active citizens to influence their society. Some
scholars also merge this collective actions definition of civic engagement with
political involvement. Under this definition, civic engagement is seen as producing
collective activities that are political or involving governmental action
Thorson (2005) defines civic engagement as the participation of people in
their civic environment. This environment constitutes the “public sphere” where
people communicate their civic or public affairs leading to common goals. Therefore,
civic engagement is not limited to what‟s political. It encompasses people‟s social
environment in its entirety. It also includes all aspects that lead to democratic
citizenship from discussion to decision making. This also involves interest,
knowledge and attitudes about public affairs. As Thorson (2005) puts it, the question
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of civic engagement “must take into account at least four kinds of human response:
civic interest, knowledge, attitudes, and behavior” (p. 206).
Putnam (2000) divides the term into formal and informal civic engagement.
Informal societal activities include visiting friends and playing games. Formal social
activities involve more organized community and political participation. There isn‟t
any consensus between scholars over the definition of civic engagement, the term
mostly refers to how citizens participate and engage in their communities to improve
living conditions for themselves and for other people. Delli Carpini (2004) defines
civic engagement as “individual and collective actions designed to identify and
address issues of public concern.” Civic engagement can be divided into two forms of
participation, political and civic participation. The former involves individual actions
that aim at government such as voting or calling for a change in public policy. The
latter refers to voluntary activities that aim at helping others in a community (cited in
Thorson, 2005).
“Civic engagement doesn‟t only involve voting … it means other things like being
aware of social ills, being involved, and working with associations that improve our
daily life. It goes from associations that deal with motherhood to electoral
monitoring” (Hamdy, 2010, personal interview).
3.2. Media and Civic Engagement
Numerous research studies demonstrate a positive correlation between civic
engagement and media information use. News is considered the pivotal means that
connects people to the civic world. Studies which examined strategies of informationprocessing also support that the dynamic processing of information transmitted
through media has an essential role to perform in several aspects of political
engagement such as learning, interest and participation. Numerous studies found that
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attention to news had a positive influence on enhancing political knowledge, and
hence promotes participation (Kwak, Wang, & Guggenheim, 2004).
Boyd (2010) found positive correlations between adolescents‟ media use for
political information and civic engagement. The findings of Boyd‟s (2010) study
significantly associate media use with fostering civic skills and participation. In
addition, the findings also support that the use of television to acquire news is more
dominant than the use of the Internet for the same purpose (Boyd, 2010).
Similarly, Shah, McLeod & Yoon (2001) found positive influence of print,
broadcast and the Internet media news use on civic engagement. The study found that
the information use of the media is positively related to social capital as opposed to
the entertainment use which is negatively related with social capital. The researchers
also found that using the internet to exchange information had a strong influence on
interpersonal trust and hence civic participation when compared to the traditional
news media.
Political communication scholars assert that discussion of public affairs
among citizens is the foundation of democratic participation. Several recent research
studies have supported the normative theory of political discussion by finding a strong
correlation between political discussion and participation. Through political
discussion, citizens develop more knowledge and comprehension of political issues
and therefore become more integrated into their communities and more eager to
participate (Kwak, Wang, & Guggenheim, 2004).
Kwak, Wang, & Guggenheim (2004) analyzed the dynamics of political
discussion as an influence on mobilization. The analyses touched upon several
features of political discussion including the frequency, diversity and the desired
effect which includes the form of engagement and participation. The researchers
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found that frequent and attentive discussions of political issues among individuals, is
positively related to political involvement.
In his article Watching Television and Civic Engagement: Disentangling the
Effects of Time, Programs, and Stations, Hooghe (2002), examined the relationship
between watching television and political attitudes. Hooghe‟s findings emphasize the
need to examine programming preferences among viewers. The results of the study
demonstrate that the type of programs people watch and not just the time of television
exposure determine whether the impact on civic values and attitudes is positive or
negative. The researcher didn‟t find any evidence to support television‟s negative
effects. He found strong relations between the medium and attitudes towards social
capital. The findings of Hooghe‟s study support a positive relation between news
programming and such attitudes. Hooghe (2002) suggests that the amount of exposure
to television, political orientations and type of programs influence civic engagement.
Hooghe‟s (2002) findings also support a negative relation with regards to
entertainment programming and social capital attitudes. “This could imply that
commercial stations, especially, cultivate a less civic-minded value pattern among
their viewers” (Hooghe 2002, p.2). Several scholars disagree with the negative effects
that are attributed to television viewing, arguing that results of such studies are not
significant. Other studies demonstrate positive effects to television viewing.
Baum (2002) asserts that scholars have ignored the impact of the
entertainment media on political participation or policymakers, arguing that the soft
news media provide an alternative access to information to a large number of viewers
who wouldn‟t learn about sophisticated issues if it wasn‟t for their exposure to the
entertainment-oriented media. In other words, the presence of the soft news media
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offers a broader access to political and public information to a huge population
segment that refrains from tuning to the traditional news media.
Baum (2002) studied viewers‟ consumption of soft news in the entertainment
media and its relation with political knowledge. The study concluded that individuals
not interested in politics attend to public affairs and crisis news when presented in an
entertainment context or in a soft news format. Consequently, opinions of politically
apathetic audiences who tune to the entertainment media differ from the politically
active people who get their information from the traditional news media. Although
some scholars argue that the entertainment-oriented media is mainly concerned with
sensationalism, drama, gossip and celebrity news, Baum (2002) demonstrated that the
entertainment-oriented media also discuss significant political, public, affairs and
foreign affairs in the United States. Accordingly, “public scrutiny” is raised which
could possibly affect policy (Baum, 2002).
Entertainment and information can complement each other and are not
necessarily competing for audience attention. Citing Garber (1994), Lee (2002)notes
that adding drama to news might attract uninterested viewers who would ignore a new
story if it was strictly informative. Therefore, adding an element of entertainment will
stimulate viewers' thinking and hold their attention. Such wider penetration of
political knowledge transforms the politically disinterested public into an attentive
public especially during crisis situations.
There is an ongoing scholarly debate over the negative impact of television on
civic engagement. Scholars like Putnam (2000) blame television over the decline in
civic life in the United States. In his book Bowling Alone, Putnam argues that the
erosion in America‟s social cohesion is linked to the rise in television viewing with a
particular emphasis on entertainment programming. Putnam argues that the time spent
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viewing television replaces the time that people dedicate to political participation and
civic activities. In other words, television viewing reduces active citizenship leading
to a decline in civic engagement and political participation. Putnam blames television
for the civic participation decline in the United States.
According to Hooghe (2002), negative statistics on America‟s decline in voter
turnout from 1960 to 2000 support Putnam‟s argument. Statistics also show a 25
percent decline in civic group involvement among American citizens. Television
critic Neil Postman wrote that television was “amusing” Americans to “death”. Also,
after a series of studies on television‟s cultivation effects, George Gerbner found that
watching television cultivates insecurity among viewers especially those who are
heavily exposed to the medium. Such feelings of insecurity translate into distrust and
withdrawal from society leading to a general misperception of the world as a meaner
place than it actually is. Gerbner referred to this phenomenon as the “mean world
syndrome” (cited in Hooghe, 2002).
Although Putnam blamed television for the decline in civic engagement, he
asserts that other informational media usage promotes engagement. Newspaper
reading doesn‟t have a negative impact on cohesion and therefore may actually
promote civic engagement. However, statistics also depict a decline in the news use of
media. Other scholars agree with Putnam about the general negative role of television
but argue that television viewing may have a positive role if the medium is used for
seeking information. Some see television as giving viewers the opportunity to learn
about significant current events and political debates thus promoting awareness and
civic engagement. Watching informative content such as news and current affairs
programs may reinforce and promote political participation and civic engagement
(Hooghe, 2002).
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Norris (2001) stressed that research should not be limited to examining the
number of hours people spend watching television, authors should also take into
account the nature of programs people are watching. Norris (2001) associates
watching news on television with an interest in politics and an increase in political
participation. The researcher, however, emphasized that credibility does play a very
important role because people are more likely to be encouraged to participate if they
find their source of information credible (cited in Hooghe, 2002). Other researchers
assert that the channel people watch plays a role in triggering civic engagement.
According to many scholars, public broadcasting should mostly promote civic values
as opposed to commercial channels which are entertainment driven and thus reduce
civic engagement (cited in Hooghe, 2002).
Civic values are fundamental to the public sphere. Habermass sees a rational
public sphere as a key to civil society in a liberal democracy. A civil society provides
space for individuals to express, communicate, and debate their ideas freely. An
“idealized civil society” involves social movements that break the limits of their
specific spheres in an attempt to appeal to other spheres and gain their attention and
support. The structure of this ideal civil society is based on a series of bipolar notions
such as good and bad or democracy and counter-democracy (Alexander, 2000). In
1998, Alexander developed a set of “binary codes” that apply to liberal-democracies
on a universal level. The codes that characterize civil society‟s democratic discourse
include characteristics such as activist, autonomous, rational, reasonable, control,
realistic, calm and sane. The opposite set of codes in democratic discourse which
restrict civil society and hinder the freedom allowed by a democracy, include
passiveness, dependence, irrationality, hysteria, excitability, passion, unrealism and
madness (Alexander, 2000).
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3.3. Talk Shows
“Talk shows have increasingly become sites where news, entertainment, and political
power converge.” - Bernard Timberg
A large number of politicians either call or appear on television talk shows to
respond to citizens‟ calls and debate issues of public interest, establishing channels of
virtual communication between the general public and policy makers. Politicians‟
appearances on talk shows since the 1990s created wide interest in this television
genre, inciting communication scholars to study the political and social impact of
television talk shows (Timberg 2002). In 1997, Schumuckler quoted estimates of
American talk show viewers as reaching 14 million per day (cited in Johnson, Smith,
Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun, 1999).
Talk shows substituted traditional news by providing social, political and
public affairs information in a simplified entertaining way that is easy to grasp by the
ordinary citizen, forming an information-entertainment blend often referred to by
communication scholars as infotainment. This blend or infotainment is observable in
the increase of drama in news stories and the frequent appearance of political figures
on talk shows (Lee, 2002). Although the primary function of talk shows is to
entertain, many viewers see talk shows as an informative source on several issues and
many talk show hosts see their mission as providing information that serves the public
in an entertaining way (Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun, 1999).
The popularity of talk shows is rooted in their ability to break sociopolitical
boundaries by addressing controversial issues and holding politicians and officials
accountable. Talk shows address citizens‟ concerns and open new channels of
communication between the populace and the ruling elite. Many politicians appear on
talk shows to clarify their points of view on several issues. Most importantly, they
appear on such shows for exposure, publicity and to spread their political agendas to a
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wide audience (Lee, 2002). Politicians‟ appearance on talk shows dates back to 1968,
when former US President Richard Nixon appeared on Laugh-In, a variety show
(Moy, Xenos, and Hess, 2005). However, former U.S. President Bill Clinton was
named the first “talk-show President” after appearing as a presidential candidate on
Donahue, The Arsenio Hall Show, and MTV.
Former president George W. Bush and presidential candidate Al Gore also
appeared on many talk shows during their campaigns. In addition, when U.S.
President Barak Obama wanted to publicize for his new political and economic plans
to a significantly sizeable audience, he appeared on the “Tonight Show”, NBC‟s latenight television talk show (Lloyd, 2009). Reuters predicted that the president‟s
appearance on the late night television talk show “will give him a high-profile stage”
(Mason and Colvin, 2009).
According to television critic Robert Lloyd (2009), Obama‟s appearance on a
late night comedy talk show is unprecedented and is considered the first for a sitting
president. Lee (2002) asserts that by spreading out the political agenda and connecting
people to politics, infotainment may help in diminishing the disparity in political
participation among citizens (Lee, 2002). Therefore, infotainment may be perceived
as providing a democratizing impact by giving viewers unconventional options to
access political knowledge.
Infotainment media such as talk shows are considered a phenomenon that
serves as a significant source of news and political information that may sometimes
lead to a change in attitude (Moy, Xenos, and Hess, 2005). Many political candidates
have used such shows to emphasize their personality away from politics to reach and
attract potential voters. Moy, Xenos, and Hess (2005) studied the priming effects of
late-night comedy talk shows which have become an extension to the traditional news
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media as they include political information and may sometimes mobilize the public to
participate in politics. The researchers studied the effects of The Late Show with
David Letterman and the Tonight Show with Jay Leno during the 2000 US
presidential campaign to determine whether viewing late-night comedy shows
influenced how viewers evaluated the presidential candidates who appeared on the
show. Viewers of the shows based their evaluations of candidates on their character
traits after their appearance on the shows. The researchers found that viewing late
night comedy influenced viewers‟ perceptions of candidates Bush and Al Gore.
Moy, Xenos, and Hess (2005) applied the priming function of agenda setting
in their study of the effects of late-night comedy talk shows on viewers evaluations of
presidential candidates. The researchers examined the priming-effect to understand
how media content influences viewers‟ judgments and attitudes following their
exposure to the talk shows. Citing McCombs & Shaw (1972), the researchers defined
priming as excessive media coverage that increases the salience of a particular issue
among viewers.
3.4. Definition, History and Development of Talk Shows
A talk show is a “television show that is entirely structured around the act of
conversation itself” (Timberg, 2002, p.3). Different forms of talk shows share specific
basic elements: They all have groups of guests and they all include audience
participation whether a visible in-studio audience or an invisible audience (Tolson,
2001). Although conversations on talk shows seem unstructured, they are preplanned.
Many interviews on talk shows are prepared for in advance by carefully selecting
guests and screening questions (Timberg, 2002). However, regardless of such highly
structured interviews, conversations on talk shows still seem spontaneous and are still
characterized by immediacy and being in the present-tense.
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To differentiate between television talk in general and talk shows, Timberg
(2002) explains that television talk involves all kind of talk and is much broader than
talk shows. Television talk is seen on a variety of programming including cooking
programs, live court hearings, and beauty pageants. However, talk shows are
characterized by several other features. They are presented by one or more hosts who
guide their guests by setting limits, tones and directions of the conversation. The talk
show revolves around the host who speaks to millions of viewers as if speaking to
each individually. Once the talk show becomes a success, the host turns into a
celebrity. The host acts mostly as managing editor and exercises great control over the
show (Timberg, 2002).
Talk shows have become a valuable commodity for many parties. For
advertisers and executives, the host is the brand name that sells. For the hosts, the
more their talk shows become successful, the higher their salaries. In 1991, Johny
Carson of the Tonight Show received around 30 million dollars from NBC and Oprah
Winfrey‟s worth reached 900 million dollars in 2000 (Timberg, 2002). For the guests,
appearance on the talk show is based on the celebrity status and impact of the host
which brings them wide exposure. According to television critic Robert Lloyd (2009),
President Obama selected the Tonight Show in particular because it is “the Great
American Talk Show” and its host Jay Leno is “a kind of president of the United
States himself” (Lloyd, 2009).
Munson (1993) traces the roots of talk shows to the coffeehouse gatherings of
people in 18th century England. Such salon-like gatherings involved talk about a
variety of issues including news, arts and philosophy. The development of printing
supported this talk tradition as magazines carried commentaries by writers who
participated in the coffeehouse discussions. Magazine names such as “Town Talk”

31

and “Chit Chat” which emerged during this period reflected the influence of ordinary
citizen talk. This talk tradition remained and developed until the spread of radio on
the late 1920s.
According to Munson (1993), the first radio talk show was aired in 1921.
Radio historians noted that the talk show‟s main theme was farming as it was
transmitted over WBZ for rural dwellers of Springfield, Massachusetts in the US.
Radio talk shows diversified in content as the medium itself grew bigger reaching
wider audiences. However, talk shows in the late twenties lacked the interactivity
between the host and audience that is popular today. Back then the talk show focused
on the host talking to the audience about his daily experiences followed by interviews
with experts on a specific topic.
More forms of talk shows with more room for audience participation started
appearing in 1933 (Munson, 1993). Such shows were more tied to people‟s problems.
For example, The Voice of Experience talk show which broadcast from 1933 to 1940
encouraged audience members to donate to poor people. The program‟s host was a
social worker named Dr. Marian Sayle Taylor and her method reflected the economic
problems of that period. The interview format or “man on the street” talk shows also
emerged during that period, introducing a new form of spontaneous interviews with
people (Munson, 1993).
The popularity of a talk show is built on the host-audience relationship. The
more the host establishes rapport with his audience, the higher the show‟s popularity.
Other key factors that determine the show‟s popularity include “audience participation
and emotional involvement” (Scott, 1996, p.86). For example, radio call-in shows
attract many audience members to call the show and engage in the discussion. Other
viewers experience this form of engagement vicariously through listening to other
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callers. In television talk shows, a big portion of the interaction is limited to the guests
or the in-studio audience. However, some television talk shows still provide room for
callers to interact with the programs such as Larry King who welcomes call-ins (Scott,
1996).
The expansion of audience participation talk shows was rooted in the growing
importance of public opinion during this period as people were interested in finding
out what others think. However, this period of audience participation didn‟t survive
past the 1940s. This is because when World War II erupted, these shows were
censored by government officials for fear of opinions that may disrupt public order.
As a result, interest in radio talk shows plunged as the program‟s lacked their
informality and spontaneity.
This period referred to as the golden age of radio soon ended not only because
of lack of interest in censored talk shows but also as a result of the audience shifting
away to television (Munson, 1993). Television talk shows emerged out of the success
of radio talk shows. The early generation of television shows migrated from radio to
television in the late 1940s. Although such shows were not exactly talk shows, they
are considered the beginnings of television talk because they featured short interviews
with celebrities in addition to variety shows (Scott, 1996).
In his book Television Talk: A History of the TV Talk Show, Timberg (2002)
provides a detailed account of the historical cycles and development of television talk
shows which emerged in 1948. Timberg (2002) divides the history of television talk
shows into five cycles or periods. The first cycle (1948-1962) was marked by
experimentation that extended into the early 1950s, consolidation from the mid to late
1950s, and network control dominated by CBS and NBC. The founders of television
talk shows were the successful radio hosts whose reputation as successful radio star
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hosts attracted advertisers, raised funds and paved the way for their new television
shows. The founding talk show hosts include Edward R. Murrow and Arthur Godfrey
from CBS, Dave Garroway, Arlene Francis, Steve Allen and Jack Paar from NBC,
and Mike Wallace from DuMont. These founders came out of a variety of radio
traditions such as news, variety talk, humor, live theater, quiz shows and sketch
comedy.
This period was a time for experimenting and creating new form of talk shows
suitable for the television industry which boomed during that era. During the period
from 1948 to 1953, television penetration in the United States boomed expanding
from one percent to 53 percent. Towards the end of the 1950s, television‟s penetration
climbed reaching 90 percent. The founders of television talk shows all went off the air
by 1962 due to lack of independence and tensions with corporate directors who were
submissive to advertising and government pressure. For example, Jack Paar walked
out of The Tonight Show after network supervisors censored a “harmless” joke from
his show without prior notice. Edward R. Murrow also walked out of CBS because his
investigative reports were considered problematic by network executives (Timberg,
2002).
The second cycle (1962-1974) marked the increase in network consolidation
and power creating new challenges. The three large networks joined forces. Network
executives exercised strict control of the talk shows content for fear of upsetting
advertisers and sponsors. Video tape provided network directors with more power and
control over live programming as they can run recorded shows on videotape as live.
Talk show hosts like Barbara Walters, Johnny Carson, and Mike Wallace who had the
skills to sustain and manage their careers in this new corporate system emerged as
stars during that period. Although the networks had the biggest market share of talk
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shows, some nationally syndicated talk shows managed to emerge and survive besides
the networks during that period. Television during that period played a powerful role
in American politics. The presidential debates of 1960 between Nixon and Kennedy
were “major television talk events” (Timberg, 2002, p56).Towards the end of the
1960s, late-night talk shows became very popular and more profitable providing more
competition from syndicated shows to the networks.
The third cycle (1974-1980) is a period of transitions. Independent stations,
PBS, syndicators and cable acted as a real challenge to network dominance in the
industry. Syndicators produced the shows and sold them to stations and networks.
New production technologies and low costs attracted investors to produce the
syndicated talk shows. The early 1970s marked a rise in talk about civil rights,
women‟s public and political participation, the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam
War. A series of talk shows tackled these issues often influencing each other to
compete and provide their audiences with the news on demand. Talk shows changed
during that period with on air confrontations and critical debate on the rise, as the
control of networks loosened due to competition from syndication, independent
stations and cable.
The fourth cycle (1980-1990) is described as the post-network era. New stars
of television talk shows rose to fame through national syndication instead of
networks. Names like Oprah Winfrey, Arsenio Hall, Sally Jessy Raphael, and Geraldo
Rivera appeared through such national syndicated shows. Such new star hosts marked
the new wave of recognition to previously misrepresented social classes. Winfrey and
Hall were African Americans and Raphael and Rivera were Hispanic Americans.
Their presence changed the scene in the talk show world. Talk shows were no longer
limited to representing the White middle class. This era marked an interest among
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television marketers to seek out new audiences including women and different ethnic
and racial minorities and represent them on the shows. The representations of
minorities and women were still very stereotypical (Timberg, 2002).
The fifth cycle (1990-1995) featured news content as entertainment. During
this period, the lines between news and entertainment started to blur. New formats of
talk shows appeared as a result of the cable expansion such as reality programs and
infotainment. Many talk show products appeared such as sports talk, comedy, news
talk, and specialized talk shows covering topics such as health, homes, cooking and
religion. In the early 1990s, most talk shows were produced by cable or syndication.
Talk shows expanded vigorously and producers had to develop new ways to keep the
old shows fresh. Talk shows were integrated with other communication forms such as
websites. Major talk show hosts like Oprah and Rosie established their own
magazines (Timberg, 2002).
Timberg (2002) notes that each cycle in the history of talk shows carries with
it cultural and economic changes that shape the television industry as well as the
genre itself. New formats of television talk shows are seldom to appear but
modifications of talk show subgenres take place to stay abreast of new developments
in the broadcast industry. Such developments carry with them several changes
including blurring the traditional lines separating news from entertainment, starting
from the 1980s.The content of television talk shows, is influenced greatly by the
programming schedule. The time of the day determines the nature of the show,
whether its entertainment or news-orientated, because different parts of the day mean
different audiences that the show must appeal to. Timberg (2002) divides the talk
show genre into three main subgenres: late-night, daytime, and morning talk shows.
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Late-night entertainment talk shows follow the format of The Tonight Show
hosted by Jack Paar and Steve Allen from 1954 to 1961. This popular type involves a
celebrity host talking with a single primary guest with secondary guests close by. This
form of talk shows is rooted in friendly, informal and humorous chats between the
host and his guests. David Letterman added new innovations to the late-night
entertainment talk show format by adding political satire and stand-up comedy. Jay
Leno and other hosts followed Letterman‟s approach in hosting late-night talk shows.
The second subgenre, the day-time talk show was found by Arlene Francis
who started this format as a forum for education and providing service to the public
through discussing family, home, women issues and public concerns. The daytime
audience-participation talk show is based on the format of The Phil Donahue Show
broadcast from 1967 to 1995. Donahue‟s television show is based on the success of
his Conversation Piece, a call-in show broadcast on Radio from 1963 to 1967. The
show‟s format is based on the interaction between the studio audience and guests.
Audience members comment or address questions to celebrity or expert guests,
creating an interactive type of program.
Viewers of daytime talk shows are mostly non-working women staying at
home. Shattuc (1997) noted that because daytime talk shows attract a large audience
of female viewers, they provide women with the opportunity to express their opinions,
share their problems, and discuss their private lives in public. Shattuc emphasizes the
effect of daytime talk shows on feminism. Famous followers of Donahue‟s successful
format include Oprah Winfrey who appeared in the 1980s attracting more viewers and
wide interest in daytime television talk shows. However, as the form became more
popular it attracted imitators to shift from content that serves the public to purely
entertainment and tabloid commercial standards. Such daytime tabloid talk shows
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include Jerry Springer, Rickie Lake and other reality talk programs. As for the
morning show, it adheres to a magazine format like that of Dave Garroway‟s Today
Show of 1952. The morning show presents a mixture of news and entertainment.
3.5. An Overview of the Political Impact of Talk Shows
The significance of television talk shows lies in the fact that the genre is the
center of substantial public discussion and scholarly debate, which produced opposite
opinions regarding the nature and significance of these programs (Tolson, 2001, p.3).
Previous studies produced two different views of talk shows (Lee, 2002). Some
scholars describe the kind of talk on talk shows as “trash talk” while others regard
them as valuable channels for public discourse. Critics see them as producing nothing
but heated debates that only serve an entertaining purpose, failing to reach the
functions of politically oriented journalism. Whereas, supporters of talk shows see
them as channels for public opinion expression and democratic deliberation (Lee,
200).
Critics of the controversial TV genre argue that talk shows „desensitize‟
viewers‟ perception of human sufferings, raise naïve opinions about complex issues in
society, and distort the audience perception of reality (Tolson, 2001). Abt and
Seesholtz (1994) argue that talk shows cross the lines of traditional structures of
social order, stating that the genre blurs the lines between reality and fiction, personal
and public, and normal and abnormal (cited in Tolson, 2001). They assert that talk
shows undermine moral and traditional values by providing exposure to abnormal
subcultures such as presenting homosexuals or deviants. By breaking social stigmas,
talk shows make what‟s out of the ordinary seem acceptable (Tolson, 2001).
According to Tolson (2001), some scholars associate talk shows with
fakeness, sensationalism, and misrepresentation of reality. In 1999, the Guardian
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reported that the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) suspended a researcher and
two producers of the talk show Vanesssa following a disclosure that some guests were
fakes. In the United States, the Jerry Springer show was the center of attention and
criticism when the talk show was held responsible for influencing the murder of a
homosexual who appeared on the show in 1995. The family of the victim filed a
lawsuit against Time Warner and Telepictures Productions. In this particular case, the
talk show was held responsible for influencing someone to commit murder
representing an extreme case of allegedly exploiting participants and subjecting them
to danger (Tolson, 2001). A national debate in the US concerning tabloid talk shows
hosted by Jerry Springer and Ricki Lake erupted in the mid-1990s. A “talk summit”
led by the former US secretaries of health, education and human services was
organized with the talk show hosts and sponsors urging them to control the talk in
their shows (Timberg 2002).
On the other hand, supporters of the controversial television genre see talk
shows as a public forum on political and social issues (Johnson, Smith, Mitchell,
Orrego, & Yun, 1999). Ordinary citizens can contact the program and voice their
concerns or express their opinions through phone or email. Talk shows offer
audiences a chance to publicly express their opinions, making the genre unique in its
discursive dynamics. The popularity of talk shows is rooted in the enjoyment of
seeing and hearing ordinary citizens engage in informal types of talk (Tolson, 2001).
Participation by ordinary citizens is a key element of talk shows. Therefore, the genre
provides a channel for opinion expression influencing public opinion formation
(Glynn, Huge, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan, 2007). Nevertheless, critics of talk
shows regard infotainment as affecting the seriousness of political talk and trivializing
politics.
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Lee (2002) noted that critics also argue that using entertainment in news
supersedes significant information because infotainment weakens reasonable political
discussion. However, such criticisms are based on the perception that entertainment is
competing with information for attention (Lee, 2002). A study of a radio talk show in
Hong Kong conducted by Lee (2002) found talk shows extremely critical of the
government and people in power to the extent that talk show hosts in Hong Kong
represent the public by speaking on behalf of them (Lee 2002). Therefore, talk shows
are a blend of both views. They can be a forum for public opinion and an entertaining
medium at the same time. Results of the Lee‟s study support that talk shows provide
listeners with information on politics and the chance to express their opinion and
voice their criticism of policy (Lee, 2002). In addition to seeing or hearing the voices
of ordinary citizens, talk shows act as significant sources of news, playing a role in
forming an “informed public opinion” and thus promoting “active democratic
citizenship” (Glynn, Huge, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan, 2007, p.13).
Young and Tisinger (2006) studied the effect of late-night comedy on young
television viewers. The researchers examined whether young viewers use late-night
comedy talk shows as a substitute for traditional news sources. They also studied the
role the programs play in providing political information during election time.
According to the study‟s findings, young people tune in to late night comedy shows
which play an obvious role in U.S. presidential elections. Late-night comedy talk
shows seek to play a significant role in politics (Young and Tisinger, 2006). The
researchers explored a report published by the Pew Research Center (2000) about the
information sources U.S. citizens use during election time. The report demonstrated
that 34 percent of respondents aged 18 to 29 receive political information from latenight talk shows (Young and Tisinger, 2006). The press and other news programs
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picked the report and released stories and commentaries on the role late-night shows
play as a source of political news for America‟s youth.
Davis and Mares (1998) studied the effects of viewing talk shows on
adolescents because this population is thought to be the most vulnerable to these kinds
of shows (cited in Tolson, 2001). Testing four effects types, the researchers surveyed
a number of 282 students at high school. Their study contradicted with the earlier
findings of Abt and Seesholtz. Their results supported only the hypothesis that “talk
shows might distort viewers‟ sense of reality” (Tolson, 2001, p.10). In other words,
teenagers tend to overestimate teen-related problems in reality. However, findings of
the study showed that exposure to talk shows encouraged teens to take issues more
seriously, promoting „moral judgment‟.
Glynn, Huge, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan (2007) studied the influence of
daytime talk shows on political opinion formation, using the agenda-setting and
cultivation theories as a theoretical framework to their study. To determine the effect
of talk shows on political opinion formation the researchers conducted a telephone
survey of 596 adults. The researchers tested the relationship between talk show
viewing and viewers‟ support for government help in family problems. They
specifically selected family issues because previous content analysis studies of
daytime talk shows showed that this theme of discussion is the most recurrent topic of
discussion (Glynn, Huge, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan, 2007).
In addition, they also tested the relationship between perceptions of reality in
talk shows to viewers‟ support for government help in family issues. Findings of the
study support the researchers‟ hypothesis that talk shows influence political opinion
formation. There is a positive relationship between exposure to talk shows and
forming political opinions. The researchers also found that the more the perception
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that talk shows present real issues, the higher the influence on forming political
opinions among viewers. With regards to the cultivation effect of talk shows, the
researchers found that heavy viewing of such shows results in a mainstreaming of
opinions. Despite viewers‟ different political orientations, liberal or conservative, the
more viewers are exposed to the show and the more real they perceive it, the more
their opinions become consistent (Glynn, Huge, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan, 2007).
Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim (2004) studied the role of talk shows in political
engagement among young adults. The researchers selected their sample based on a
2004 Pew Center survey which indicated that adults under 30-years-old seek
nontraditional media sources for political information. Young viewers are believed to
be more influenced by exposure to talk shows due to their heavy exposure to the
entertainment media, low interest in politics, and lack of follow up on political issues.
The survey also suggested that Americans are more likely to watch talk shows instead
of network news during election time. Therefore, the researchers tested the
relationship between talk show viewing and several forms of political engagement
including political efficacy, trust and voting possibility (Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim,
2004). They conducted a secondary analysis of a national phone survey of 1,600
respondents. Findings of the study show that talk shows influence young adults‟
political engagement. The researchers also studied whether source credibility plays a
role in young people‟s political engagement. The findings support that viewing talk
shows and trust in the show messengers influences voting likelihood (Kwak, Wang &
Guggenheim, 2004).
Ross (2004) studied the effect of election call-in programs on public
participation in the politics. The researcher conducted a case study on Election Call,
broadcast on BBC radio and TV for almost two weeks before Britain‟s general
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elections in 2001. The mission of the program is to target the apathetic British public
to achieve a higher voter turnout. Although the voting turnout barely reached 60
percent, it was much higher than expectations. The researcher studied the impact of
Election Call because it promotes dialogue between politicians and audience callers.
About 250 callers contact the program each day, 12 of which get on air to ask
politicians their questions (Ross, 2004). According to Ross (2004), television
represents the “real public space in which politics occur and through which citizens
comprehend the political process” (p.786). Viewers, listeners and participants in callin programs perceive the talk show genre as a “public sphere” where different
opinions are expressed and alternative voices are heard (Ross, 2004, p.786).
Ross (2004) surveyed audience callers because some scholars argue that
citizens who call such programs are not representative of the population because they
might be politically active in the first place. Findings of the study demonstrated that
regardless of their political ideology 92 percent of the callers felt they were
representing the public in general or speaking on behalf of other fellow citizens when
they posed questions to politicians on the program. In addition, 76 percent of the
callers took the decision to call the program in order to voice a “pubic disquiet”,
dissatisfaction or cynicism about policies, and politicians‟ lack of interaction with
people and from the public‟s real world (Ross, 2004). Also, 54 percent of the callers
wanted to speak to a specific politician or party member in particular. Only 10 percent
of the callers said they called to express their anger over a personal incident (Ross,
2004). Regardless of being critical of politicians and expressing criticism on air,
callers felt positive about their interaction with politicians on the show. Also, 82
percent of the respondents said Election Call contributes to the process of democracy
because it allows interaction with politicians, a chance for public engagement, holds
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politicians accountable, clarifies positions on policies, and allows the dissemination of
issues that are not very popular.
Several studies that conducted content analyses of late night talk shows found
consistent results in terms of content tone on political figures and political issues,
which is mostly negative (Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim, 2004). A study conducted by
Niven, Lichter, & Amundson (2003) found that leading political personalities
including presidential candidates and the president are common targets for jokes on
late night television talk shows (cited in Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim, 2004). Moy &
Pfau (2000) also found that talk shows provide negative coverage of politicians and
Young (2004) found that most talk shows focus on the shortcomings of presidential
candidates (cited in Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim, 2004). Cited in Ross (2004), Barker
and Knight (2000) argue that negative media messages are more significant in
producing attitude change than positive media messages. Several media studies
suggest that the audience tend to agree with the views of the program presenter (Ross,
2004).
Baum (2005) examined the impact of interviewing candidates running for
presidency on television talk shows. To determine the reasons behind the talk shows
coverage of the presidential elections and the candidates‟ choice to appear on
entertainment talk shows, the researcher selected the 2000 U.S. elections as a case
study. Baum conducted a content analysis of talk shows coverage of the elections.
Furthermore, the researcher carried out a survey to explore the impact of such
interviews on political attitudes and voting. Results of the study reveal that talk show
viewers who lack political awareness tend to prefer the candidate from the opposition
party compared to viewers who are not exposed to talk shows and who also enjoy
more political awareness.
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Davis and Owen (1998) found a positive correlation between exposure to
daytime talk shows and the viewers‟ estimation of teen related problems. Their
findings showed that daytime talk show viewers overestimate the frequency of teen
pregnancy, runaways, and sexual activity. Testing an agenda-setting effect, the
researchers found that the agenda of talk shows influenced the public agenda (Davis
and Owen, 1998).
Hamo (2006) studied the democratizing impact of Israeli talk shows. The
researcher analyzed lay or anonymous guests‟ discursive positioning on the popular
Israeli talk show Live. According to Hamo (2006), US studies on participation in talk
shows found that marginalized persons purposively seek the chance to appear on talk
shows to have their social problems heard in public. However, what lay people often
risk is misrepresentation and a limited participation. Simon-Vandenbergen (2004)
studied the discursive positioning of lay participants on British television talk show
and found that they were represented as “inferior in the public sphere” (cited in Hamo
2006).
Similar results were found by Penz (1996) after studying daytime talk shows
in America and finding the participation of lay persons to be very controlled by the
program host. The researcher examined several dimensions of the dialogue including
speaking turns (cited in Hamo 2006). Hamo (2006) examined the social roles of lay
people analyzing power relations between the talk show host and the guests. The
researched examined natural and institutional discourse. The findings of Hamo‟s
study indicate that anonymous guests‟ access to public discourse in talk shows is
curbed by limitations and control. According to Hamo (2006), the findings of the
study provide a cynical look at the talk shows‟ potential for democratization.
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According to Munson (1993), talk shows tackle a wide-range of topics
including significant political discussions, anecdotes, and touching personal stories.
Talk shows function differently in different cultures (Thompson, 2004).
Instead of creating a worldwide liberal-democracy model, talk shows in different
countries create a special democratic model for each society. Thompson referred to
studies comparing talk shows in the United States America and Germany. The data
revealed varied content based on the cultural differences between democratic
societies. Talk shows in America center around the host‟s personality, but German
talk shows are hosted by moderators and do not carry the name of an individual host
like American talk shows. Also, American talk shows present the personal
experiences of ordinary guest, experts and celebrities. Whereas, guests on German
talk shows represent the group point of view and not the individual. Both American
and German talk shows are similar in the fact that they voice national debates
(Thompson, 2004).
Studying the participation of audiences on television talk shows, Livingstone
and Lunt (1994) see such shows as giving people a chance to engage in a public
discussion that is rooted in experiences and feelings. In addition, talk shows provide
the ordinary public with an opportunity to dare the power of experts (cited in Lee,
2002). Leurdijk (1997) examined talk radio in the Netherlands and found that they
illustrate the contradiction between people‟s experiences and the official policy (cited
in Lee, 2002).
Livingstone and Lunt (1992) who analyzed European shows to determine why
ordinary people would want to appear on such shows wrote that talk shows are a
“cultural forum in which the viewer-as-citizen may participate in public debate”. Talk
shows influence societies through empowering ordinary citizens and marginalized
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people. For example, Gamson (1999) noted that homosexual guests used their
appearance on talk shows to win public exposure and serve their cause. It‟s clear that
talk show participants grab the chance to present their individuality and define their
identities. Livingstone and Lunt (1992) and Gamson (1999) agreed that there three
types of guest who appear on talk shows: The political citizens who discuss political
and social issues, the victimized guests who bring money to these shows through their
highly viewed stories and the individuals who aspire for exposure to achieve selfactualization.
Trepte (2005) studied the motives behind viewers‟ participation in television
talk shows as guests. The researcher analyzed audiences of German talk shows
applying the theory of symbolic self-completion to determine the reasons why guests
participated in the shows. The researcher found that realizing one‟s self is a primary
motive behind viewers wanting to participate as guests. Other reasons include
therapeutic talking and confessing on talk shows. Trepte (2005) conducted two
studies. The first research study was conducted by interviewing more than 60 viewers
of talk shows. The second study involved an experiment with exactly 33 participants.
Findings of the study suggest that individuals who wish to participate as guests on talk
shows do so because they strive for “self-realization and self-symbolizing.”
Dixon and Spee (2003) analyzed talk on the Flemish talk show Jan Publiek,
applying two theories namely speech act theory and Bakhtinian genre theory. The
researchers wanted to test the assumption that television talk shows provide “ordinary
participants” with the chance to express their opinions, identities and feelings to serve
their own aims, contributing to democratic discourse. The researchers are optimistic
about the type of therapeutic discourse often implemented through television talk
shows such as Oprah Winfrey or Jan Publiek. When ordinary people on the show start
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narrating their personal stories, a conscious and active discussion follows which
transcends beyond the boundaries of the television studio leading to off air
discussions that engage citizens. Dixon & Spee (2003) assert that such scenario is
democratic.
Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun (1999) agree that former studies on
talk shows demonstrate that viewers use them to seek advice. This excessive existence
of expert guests endorses the idea that talk shows are a means of advice to their
viewers. The researchers assert that research studies must be conducted to measure
the effectiveness of advice delivered by experts on talk shows. Because television talk
shows are influential, researchers must be concerned with their content to examine
what‟s being presented to the audiences. Because talk shows describe themselves as
public forums that transmit significant information to their audiences, assessing the
quality of experts and content of their advice is very important. The researchers note
that quantitative research conducted on the content of television talk shows is very
limited. Analyzing educational topics on talk shows, for example, is very important.
Such topics tackled by talk shows highlight the genre‟s public service function.
Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun (1999) point out Oprah Winfrey‟s vow to
focus on significant issues to help her viewers. However, the researchers also note
that topics presented on talk shows are selected mostly to entertain and attract
audiences rather than educate them.
Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun (1999) conducted a content analysis
of 78 transcripts of eight television talk shows. The primary research question is to
determine the percentage of participation of experts by counting their speaking turns.
The researchers also coded the qualifications of experts to determine whether they
were credible enough to offer viewers advice. In addition, the nature of advice itself
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and whether it solves people‟s problems or clarifies issues was also coded. Results of
the study showed that experts were used in one half of the sample of talk shows
examined in the study. This supports that experts are an integral part of talk shows. As
for the qualification of experts, the research found that 29 percent of the experts are
well trained with high academic degrees and 31 percent of the experts included
writers and lecturers. Therefore, the research found that the experts were qualified to
give advice to the public.
Zhong (2004) conducted a case study on The Future Starts Now talk show that
is part of the Dialogue series on China Central Television (CCTV), to investigate
whether the show promoted real dialogue. Zhong (2004) defines real dialogue as a
discussion between several parties that allows for a free exchange of ideas in order to
achieve common grounds of understanding. After reviewing recorded conversations
of the show to examine both form and presentation, the researcher found that the
program employs a hierarchical model of communication. Central speakers are given
more time, turns, rights to speak, and better physical presence in relation to the
supporting speakers and studio audience. Opinions lack in diversity and are primarily
in agreement with the official agenda (Zhong, 2004). The way the show is structured
divides the speakers from the studio audiences emphasizing the former as an authority
on information and the latter as speechless and passive recipients of information.
Zhong (2004) asserts that the CCTV dialogue series failed to engage the audience in a
participatory form of communication that is supposed to be liberal and democratic.
Carpignano, Andersen, Aronowitz, and Difazio (1990) suggest that talk shows
blur the space between the program and the audience, transforming the traditional
public and creating new forms of audience participation (cited in Tolson, 2001).
According to Tolson (2001), the work of Carpignano and his colleagues invokes that
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the talk show genre is involved in constructing new kinds of public spheres. With
reference to Habermass‟s public sphere, Tolson (2001) questions whether talk shows
present a new public forum which allows diversity of opinion through debate and
discussion.
The diversity of opinion is evident in the genre‟s ability to deliver voices, such
as those of women, which were marginalized in the classical public sphere. According
to Habermass (1984), a public sphere is a forum that is not controlled by special
interests and where public opinion can be created through rational discussion and
debate “within an informed and democratic community of citizens”. According to
Blumler and Gurevitch (1995), rational political debate is necessary for a working
democracy (cited in Lee, 2002). Therefore, talk shows create an “electronic public
place” in which discourse is exchanged and topics are discussed beyond any official
political plan (Tolson, 2001, p.16).
Livingstone and Lunt (1994) argue that talk shows perform confrontations
between ordinary people or the audience who tell their personal stories and experts
who frequently use institutional talk that only reflects what other experts are saying.
The fact that ordinary people speak for themselves grants them credibility and
authenticity, challenging the rationale of experts who speak for others. The
researchers argued that instead of creating a public sphere or a place in which public
opinion can be created, talk shows create an “oppositional public sphere”.
Developed by Negt and Kluge (1990), the oppositional sphere refers to an
environment where different discourses circulate and oppositional voices are
expressed but without reaching a consensus. Tolson notes that although talk shows
allow viewers to actively participate in discussions, a common conclusion or a clear
popular opinion or decision that transcends the boundaries of the program is unlikely.
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Consequently, the genre‟s role in the formation of a public sphere cannot be
established.
The public sphere is not restricted to a specific place or medium but rather an
outcome of a flow of public discourses throughout multiple channels which might
include talk shows. Tolson (2001) draws the line between audience access to the mass
media and influencing “civic public opinion”. Although there are cases that support
the impact of talk shows like the impact of Oprah Winfrey‟s announcements on
certain issues, the issue under debate is managed and controlled by the program host.
Therefore, audience participants don‟t enjoy the absolute freedom to express their
opinions or narrate their stories unless their information fits the show‟s agenda.
According to Ross (2004), television represents the “real public space in
which politics occur and through which citizens comprehend the political process”
(p.786). Viewers, listeners and participants in call-in programs perceive the talk show
genre as a “public sphere” where different opinions are expressed and alternative
voices are heard (Ross, 2004, p.786).
3.6. Television Talk Shows in the Arab World and Egypt
“Talk shows on Arab satellite television stations have been a forum for
rollicking criticisms of Arab regimes and sharp discussion of taboo topics especially
shows where listeners can call in with un-censorable opinions”
-The Associated Press (2008)
The establishment of private Arab satellite channels in the 1990s brought a
series of television talk shows which capture the interest of Arab viewers who are
hungry for an independent media. According to Lynch (2006), Al-Jazeera‟s talk
shows provide the Arab public with a space to openly debate issues. Political debates
on talk shows cultivate contention and a pluralistic political culture. In 2003, Lynch
argued that the format of Al-Jazeera‟s talk shows negates the idea that the television
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medium creates a passive audience. Although state-television may not create an active
audience because it only focuses on protocol news covering meetings and visits of
heads of states, Arab television “political talk shows spark energetic arguments
among viewers and seem to be encouraging critical argument” (Lynch, 2003, p.65).
Lynch (2006) studied Al-Jazeera‟s most significant talk shows to assess the
impact of Al-Jazeera talk shows on Arab politics. He analyzed 976 episodes of five
programs between 1999 and 2004. The researcher also created a separate database for
programs discussing Iraq and analyzed their content. According to Lynch (2006),
political talk shows reshaped the features of public opinion in the Arab World. The
advent of Al-Jazeera news channel encouraged the emergence of a new environment
of political debate in which new voices are heard that are in disagreement with the
dominant regimes in power. A new public that challenged existing policies also
emerged. The channel offers multiple viewpoints on issues of discussion and call-in
programs portray the worries shared by ordinary Arab citizens. Lynch found that in
1999 alone, most talk shows on Al-Jazeera were critical of lack of democracy in the
region.
Al-Shami (2005) conducted a content analysis study on Al-Jazeera‟s talk show
Minbar Al-Jazeera. His findings are in agreement with Lynch in that most of the
issues raised by the talk show discussed Arab political reform. The total number of
audience participation through phone, e-mail and fax reached 971 over a period of one
year with 84.2 percent call-ins. The results show a huge gap in participation among
genders with male participation reaching 95.7 percent and female participants at 4.3
percent. Most of the issues raised by the talk show revolved around Arab political
reform, Iraq and Sudan. Abdel-Razek (2004) conducted a content analysis to describe
the coverage of live Arab television talk shows. The researcher found that talk shows
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heavily discussed social issues and political issues in the Arab world. Most issues
revolved around women rights, human rights, women in Islam, and illiteracy.
Youssef (2008) studied the agenda of two Egyptian television talk shows. In
her unpublished master‟s thesis titled “Role of Private and State-owned Television
Talk Shows in Setting the Agenda of Social Issues among the Egyptian Audience”,
the researcher explored the agenda-setting effect of Al-Ashera Masa‟an talk show
broadcast on the privately-owned satellite channel Dream 2 and Al Beit Beitak
broadcast on the state-owned terrestrial and satellite channels. Youssef (2008)
content-analyzed two months of talk show programming and conducted a survey
among a purposive sample of talk show viewers in Cairo. The results showed a
positive correlation between the talk show agenda and the viewers' agenda. The
results also supported an intra-media agenda-setting influence between privatechannel talk shows and government-channel talk shows. Survey data revealed that
around 98 percent of respondents watch talk shows to follow up on Egyptian affairs.
Around 77 percent of respondents watch talk shows broadcast on Arab satellite
channels including the Al Jazeera‟s Opposite Direction and Orbit‟s Ala Al-Hawa and
Al-Qahera Al Youm.
Fathallah (2003) studied the exposure of the Egyptian elite to Arab television
talk shows. The researcher used a non-random sample distributing his survey among
200 Egyptian professors at four universities. The findings show that 86.2 percent of
respondents watch Egyptian television talk shows because they cover local issues.
Respondents also cited that talk shows provide an in-depth analysis of local issues.
Viewers also cited lack of freedom and low credibility among the drawbacks of talk
shows.
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Mahmoud (2007) who studied Egyptian youth‟s dependency on talk shows in
acquiring knowledge about Egypt‟s societal problems also found that Egyptian youth
are highly dependent on talk shows as a source of information on social problems. A
big percentage of respondents noted that talk shows on private satellite channels enjoy
more freedom and discuss a variety of issues compared to talk shows on state-owned
terrestrial channels. The results showed that 91 percent of the respondents said they
found talk shows useful in learning about society problems. With regards to the
popularity of talk shows, Al Bait Beitak (defunct) topped the responses as the most
useful show followed by Al Ashera Masa‟an.
The link between talk shows and political awareness in the Arab world is
discussed by Sakr (2007) who asserted that talk shows in the Arab world legitimize
disagreement on political issues which helps in establishing the groundwork for a
“pluralistic political culture”. Therefore, it‟s essential to study the relationship
between exposure to television talk shows and political engagement in Egypt. Mirazi
(2010, personal interview) asserted that talk shows on Egyptian television channels
are an effect of Al-Jazeera.
Many talk shows offer oppositional voices to the existing regimes and tackle
sensitive social issues and taboos. According to AP (2008), one viewer called the talk
show Al Ashera Masa‟an criticizing Egypt‟s former president Mubarak and
wondering if the president is aware of soaring prices and other public concerns. AlJazeera‟s talk show Al Ittijah Al Moákes (Opposite Direction) discussed police
brutality in Egypt and several other Arab countries. In addition, a call-in talk show on
LBC discussed the case of a Saudi woman who was raped by a gang but was sent to
jail for going out with a man who is not related to her. The talk show shed light on
sensitive and controversial issues dealing with Islamic law in Saudi Arabia. Ahmed
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Moslemani, who hosts Al Tabaa Al Oula (The First Edition) on Dream TV, was
quoted by AP (2008) as saying talk shows provide citizen callers with the chance to
humiliate their government. “These talk-shows were like a disaster to the
government” (AP, 2008).
Awareness of the impact of talk shows is evident in the amount of debate
concerning talk shows and the nature of talk they deliver. Arguments for or against
appear often in the local press or in online articles. Several talk shows aired on private
satellite channels sparked waves of discussion or criticism in the local press. For
example, a former talk show broadcast on Dream TV hosted by Hala Sarhan came
under immediate flak after an entire episode dedicated to the discussion of sexual
masturbation. Sarhan was also charged with harming the reputation of Egypt after she
interviewed several Egyptian prostitutes on her talk show Hala Show aired on the
Saudi-owned Rotana Cinema satellite channel (Shehata, 2007). The case erupted after
the alleged prostitutes appeared on a talk show named 90 Deqeeqa claiming they were
not real prostitutes. The young women said Sarhan allegedly paid them to appear on
her talk show as real prostitutes. Dream TV also faced criticism after its live broadcast
of Mohamed Hassanein Heykal speech at the American University in Cairo in which
he discussed Egyptian political heritage (Menassat, 2008).
The proliferation of talk shows in Egyptian privately-owned and state
television which started in 2007 revived the interest of Egyptian citizens in news and
current affairs (Menassat, 2008). “Talk shows became the most popular programs in
the history of satellite channels, with each channel trying to be unique and
exceptional, and covering the most controversial topics” (Menassat, 2008). El Sherif
(2010, personal interview) noted that the talk show format existed in Egyptian state
television in the sixties. However, the content changed dramatically because the new
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format of talk shows presents a diversity of opinions and discusses issues that were
considered taboos in the past.
Breaking such taboos started with Hala Sarhan‟s first talk show Ya Hala,
which was “the Arab world's first American-style talk show” broadcast live on ART
(Arab Radio and Television Network) in 1991. The now defunct show shocked the
mostly conservative Arab audience when it started discussing sexual issues which
were considered taboos in the Arab world. Sarhan was quoted by the Associated Press
as saying she was the first “Arab woman to utter the word „sex‟ on television”
(Hendawi, 2001). The talk show also discussed Arab government‟s relations with the
United States, which was also considered a sensitive topic of discussion in the
nineties.
According to El Sherif (2010), television talk shows criticize the government,
police and sometimes the president which is unprecedented in the history of Egyptian
media. Talk shows proliferated in the Egyptian media following the success of Al
Qahera Al Youm talk show which first appeared on the Saudi-owned Orbit Network.
The show was introduced by Orbit following the success of Ala Al Hawa (On Air), a
live call-in talk show which hit the airwaves in 1997. After years of Ala Al Hawa‟s
and Al Qahera Al Youm‟s success, state-owned and privately owned Egyptian
channels adopted the format. The first nightly television talk show that appeared on
Egyptian state-owned television is Al Beit Beitak which now changed its name due to
legal and copyright issues with the producing company into Masr Ennaharda. Two of
the pioneering and popular talk shows that appeared on privately-owned Egyptian
satellite channels are Al Ashera Masa‟an on Dream TV and 90 Deqeeqa on Mehwar.
According to Hamdy (2010), not only did talk shows revolutionize Egyptian
mass media by approaching taboo topics, they also provided a platform to all political
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and social ideologies by approaching a multiplicity of issues daily. Talk shows are
also “Egypt-centric” with most of their news content covering Egypt‟s relationship
with others and community problems. Such a focus on local affairs was missing in the
traditional media. Therefore, talk shows filled that vacuum by delivering day-to-day
Egyptian news to people at home. Talk shows implement a journalistic informative
approach but in an entertaining way (Hamdy, 2010, personal interview).
Now every private satellite channel has its popular talk show. Although talk
shows enjoyed relative freedom of expression and did tackle taboos and criticize the
government, according to the Associated Press (2008), such on-air criticisms
provoked Arab governments to issue restrictions on Arab television talks shows in
2008. The Egyptian government, for example, went further to prevent new talk shows
from hitting the air. Al Sa‟a or Clock TV cancelled a new talk show after objections
from the Egyptian government which didn‟t want new critical voices (The Associated
Press, 2008). To put that into effect, Arab information ministers approved a “Charter
of Principles” in 2008 to regulate Arab satellite broadcasting. Many experts believe it
was to silence these talk shows.
The charter restricts criticisms of leaders and warns against airing content that
would harm the reputation of a country or disrupt its social peace (The Associated
Press, 2008). Critics of the charter say it was adopted to curb freedom of popular
television talk shows, such as Al Qahera Al Youm, Al Ashera Masa‟an, 90 Deqeeqa
and El Beit Beitak (90 Minutes, episode, 2008). On the other hand, supporters say it
was developed to regulate television programming and set rules that they deemed
essential. After months of debates, some Arab countries including the United Arab
Emirates and Lebanon abandoned the charter. Although it was never really put into
effect, it took a big share of media debates at that time. Talk shows started to enjoy
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more freedom relatively until a few months before Egypt‟s November 2010
parliamentary elections.
To plan ahead for the parliamentary elections, the former Egyptian
government cracked down on independent media including talk shows. The state
suspended Al Qahera Al Youm talk show and found ways to remove outspoken
government critic and journalist Ibrahim Eissa from his position as editor-in-chief of
Al Dostour newspaper as well as from hosting his nightly television talk show
Baladna Belmasry. Other talk shows started to exercise some self-censorship for fear
of a similar fate. A special committee was also established by the former minister of
information a month before the elections to monitor media performance during the
elections. Television talk show host Mona El Shazly of Al Ashera Masa‟an received a
warning from the committee after hosting two journalists who mildly criticized the
former ruling NDP. This pre-election period is considered by many a setback for the
freedom of independent media in general and television talk shows in particular.
Mirazi (2010) asserted that in the few months before the 2010 parliamentary elections
talk shows were asked directly by the government to host government officials. The
also exercised a form of self-censorship for fear of following the fate of Adeeb and
Eissa (personal interview).
On the other hand, after the Jan.25th revolution talk shows are witnessing an
explosion in freedom of expression with one exception or red line remaining: the
ruling military council. Although some talk shows still question army officers on air,
many exercise self-censorship realizing that it‟s not smart to turn the people against
the army at this critical stage in Egypt‟s history. Yet, military council members made
their first live television interview on the popular talk show Al Ashera Masa‟an and
appeared later on many talk shows, realizing they will be reaching millions of home
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viewers. Egypt‟s new Prime Minister Essam Sharaf also gave his first televised
recorded interview to two talk shows: Al Ashera Masa‟an and Akher Kalam. Some
talk shows such as Akher Kalam and Baladna Belmasry started to integrate social
media tools such as twitter to reach out to the audiences who send their questions to
the host directly via twitter. Such shows gained immense popularity after the
revolution at a time where the popularity of many talk shows along with their hosts
plunged in the eyes of the public. It was simple, talk shows that supported the
revolution gained sky rocketing popularity and talk shows which took the
government‟s side lost their popularity and their credibility.
Talk shows which gained popularity like Akher Kalam and Baladna Belmasry
continue to play an important role in exposing corruption of the former regime and
thereby exerting pressure on Egypt‟s transitional government and military council to
press charges against such allegedly corrupt officials. A few episodes of Akher Kalam
hosted by former Al Jazeera correspondent Yusri Foda on OnTV recently (May,
2011) lead to the removal of Egypt‟s chief forensics doctor. The doctor was involved
in writing a forged report on the killing of blogger Khaled Said at the hands of two
plain clothes policemen in Alexandria last year. Akher Kalam hosted the doctor who
reiterated the same lies about Said‟s death which angered the public. The show
exposed more information and interviewed many experts who witnessed corruption at
the forensics department.
OnTV‟s other popular nightly talk show Baladna Belmasry hosted by Reem
Maged was also given the credit for helping remove former Prime Minister Ahmed
Shafik who was appointed by Egypt‟s ousted president Mubarak early during the
revolution. Protestors were pressuring for the removal of Shafik who was removed
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hours after he appeared on Baladna Belmasry where he showed little knowledge of
the abuses of Egypt‟s former state security.
Although shows such as Akher Kalam and Baladna Belmasry gained more
popularity after the Jan.25th revolution, the popularity of many shows and presenters
plunged because they sided with the regime during the 18 days of the revolution.
Egypt‟s popular talk show Masr Ennaharda broadcast on Egyptian state television,
repeatedly showed celebrities crying over Mubarak and calling on the protestors to
evacuate the square because they are destroying the country. Presenters of the show
Khairy Ramadan and Tamer Amin refrained from calling the Egyptian uprising a
revolution. Public anger was rising against Egyptian media corruption and lack of
credibility witnessed during the revolution. However, soon after Mubarak stepped
down, official media started appealing to the angry public by calling the Jan.25th
uprising “our revolution”.
Demonstrations in front of Egyptian television called for the removal of
ERTU‟s top management and anchors perceived by the public as the regime‟s
mouthpieces. After weeks of pressure, former information minister Anas El Fiqi was
charged over allegations of financial and administrative corruption and is currently
awaiting his trial in jail. Masr Ennaharda celebrity hosts Ramadan and Amin were
also removed and a new team of young hosts took over. Despite such change in hosts,
the show was suspended as its popularity continued to plunge. Masr Ennaharda was
replaced with the new talk show Betawqeet Al Qahera (Cairo Local Time) hosted by
Hafez Mirazi.
Siding with the regime was not unique to the state media, as some television
talk shows on private channels followed suit. Mehwar‟s 48 Hours talk show was also
heavily criticized after hosting an alleged protestor from Tahrir Square saying that the
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protests are funded by Iran. The alleged protestor‟s identity was later revealed and she
was a journalist working for a state-owned newspaper. Several campaigns were also
launched on Facebook calling for the removal of many talk show hosts.
The controversial coverage of talk shows is not unique to the revolution.
Although Egyptian television talk shows have considerably replaced the traditional
news for many viewers, these shows still used to operate within restrictions set by the
country‟s authoritarian rule. Fathy (2008) commented on the talk show coverage of
the sixth of April 2008 strike that took place all over Egypt. The strike was organized
at the grass root level demanding higher wages and denouncing shooting inflation
rates.
In Al-Dostour newspaper, Fathy (2008) wrote that talk shows received
instructions from state security to tone down their coverage of the sixth of April
strike. The “oral instructions” included framing the strike as a fiasco and blaming it
on a few deviant opposition groups. Compared to the coverage of news agencies and
satellite television news of the strike, talk shows failed to present a credible account.
They also failed to portray the reality of the situation, leaning more towards the
official point of view (Fathy, 2008).
Describing 90 Deqeeqa‟s coverage of the strike as a “media suicide”, Fathy
(2008) noted that the first story on the show‟s agenda was Egypt‟s Khamasin winds
that usually lead to a sand storm. The show then hosted a parliament member
representing the former ruling NDP to talk about the failure of the strike. As for the
coverage of Al Ashera Masa‟an, the author noted that talk show host Mona El-Shazly
tried to maintain a balanced coverage by broadcasting reports on the strike. But like
90 Deqeeqa‟s former host Moataz El-Demerdash, El-Shazly toned down her talk
about the strikes. Moving on to Al Qahera Al Youm hosted by Amr Adeeb, Fathy
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wrote that Adeeb framed the post-riot destruction of Al Mahalla as the responsibility
of some rebellious protestors, ignoring the role of security in aggravating the situation
by clashing with the demonstrators.
Although the coverage of the state-owned television talk show Al Bait Beitak
remained pro the former regime as expected, talk show host Mahmoud Saad‟s
comments came as a surprise to Fathy (2008). Saad attacked the current government
and called its ministers “failures”, demanding that a government responsible for such
incidents should resign (Fathy, 2008).
Other media commentators also explored the coverage of talk shows of the
same riots that erupted in Mahalla. Pintak (2009) emphasized that talk shows on
Orbit, Dream and Al-Mehwar channels didn‟t broadcast graphic images aired by other
channels such as Al-Jazeera. According to Pintak (2009), the managers of such
channels said they received warnings from the government to “tone down their
coverage and to make sure their talk shows included a heavy representation of the
government‟s viewpoint.”
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Chapter 4: Methodology
The current research study applies a triangulation of research methods by
using two quantitative methods and one qualitative research method. To apply agenda
setting theory, the media agenda was examined by conducting a content analysis of
three television talk shows. To examine the public agenda as well as the correlation
between exposure to talk shows and civic engagement, a survey was conducted before
the 2010 Egyptian parliamentary elections. The qualitative methodology involves in
depth interviews with media experts to examine their perception and futuristic outlook
on the role of television talk shows and civic engagement in Egypt. The research was
conducted before the Jan 25th revolution.
4.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses
There are three research questions and four research hypotheses in this study.
4.1.1 Research Questions
The research questions are answered by the qualitative part of this research.
RQs:
RQ1: How do experts perceive civic engagement in Egypt?
RQ2: How do experts perceive the role of Egyptian nightly television talk shows
in fostering civic engagement in Egypt?
RQ3: How do experts perceive the strategies that Egyptian nightly television talk
shows should implement to foster civic engagement in Egypt?

4.1.2 Research hypotheses:
The four research hypotheses are covered by the quantitative part of this study.
The quantitative methodology is based on a content analysis of television talk shows
to examine the media‟s first and second level agendas and a survey to test whether
talk shows have an agenda-setting influence on the public agenda of news priorities.
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The survey also examines whether there is a relationship between exposure to
Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement attitudes among viewers.
Hundreds of studies conducted worldwide support first-level and second-level
agenda-setting effects of the media. In addition, studies conducted on talk shows in
Egypt also support an agenda-setting impact of talk shows on the Egyptian public
(Youssef, 2008). Accordingly, the following two hypotheses were formulated:
H1: Public perception of news priorities is most likely influenced by Egyptian
nightly television talk shows‟ news agenda.
H2: Egyptian nightly television talk shows‟ portrayal of Egypt‟s parliamentary
elections is likely to influence viewers‟ perception of the parliamentary elections.
Several research studies support that exposure to news and sociopolitical
information is positively correlated with civic engagement (Kwak, Wang, &
Guggenheim, 2004). A number of studies also support a positive impact of talk shows
on political knowledge and participation (Baum, 2002). Accordingly, the following
two hypotheses were formulated:
H3: The more the public perceives talk shows as promoting civic engagement,
the more positive attitudes the public will have towards civic engagement.
Moon (2008) emphasized that an agenda-setting impact of the news media is
linked to civic engagement. Accordingly, the following hypothesis was formulated.
H4: There is a positive relation between exposure to Egyptian nightly television
talk shows and civic engagement attitudes.
According to this hypothesis the more the public is exposed to Egyptian
nightly television talk shows, the more they are likely to have positive attitudes
towards civic engagement through prioritizing socio-political awareness, participation
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in sociopolitical discussions, public opinion expression, community involvement, and
political participation.
4.1.3. Independent Variables, operational definitions and levels of measurement.
Exposure to talk shows: is defined by the level of dependency on talk shows as a
source of news. It is measured by the survey Question (8) by asking respondents how
often they depend on different media sources for news about Egyptian affairs. The
options include newspapers, television news, television talk shows, radio news, radio
talk shows, magazines, and the internet. The answer categories are on the three-point
scale always, sometimes, and never. The level of measurement is interval.
Talk shows news agenda: defined as the news priorities covered by Egyptian nightly
television talk shows. The news agenda is measured by coding the issues and news
stories discussed by talk shows in the quantitative content analysis methodology. The
level of measurement is nominal.
Talk shows portrayal of the elections: It refers to the parliamentary election frames
covered by talk shows. The issue examined is the Egyptian parliamentary elections
held in November, 2010. The talk shows‟ attributes of the parliamentary elections are
listed in the content analysis codebook. Several statements are coded to measure the
talk shows‟ portrayal of the parliamentary elections in their advance election
coverage. The level of measurement is nominal.
Perception of the role of television talk shows: It refers to how viewers perceive the
role of talk shows in promoting civic engagement. The variable is measured through
statements on a five-point likert scale in the questionnaire from strongly agree to
strongly disagree. The level of measurement is interval. The statements in question (3)
are as follows:
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a) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are a source of news about Egypt‟s affairs.
b) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage people to participate in solving
community problems in Egypt.
c) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage people to make charitable
contributions
d) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage ordinary citizens to express their
opinions publicly (e.g. calls, emails, fax, letters, sms).
e) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows create sociopolitical awareness.
f) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are my primary source of information about
the Egyptian parliamentary elections held in November, 2010.
g) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage citizens to vote.
4.1.4. Dependent Variables, operational definitions and levels of measurement.
Public perception of news priorities: It‟s defined as the news issues perceived as
important by the public. The word public refers to viewers of Egyptian nightly
television talk shows. This variable is measured by question 5 in the questionnaire
which asks respondents to list the five most important issues that are happening in
Egypt recently. The question tests the first-level of agenda-setting to determine
whether the public agenda corresponds with the talk shows‟ agenda. The level of
measurement is nominal. Question 6 in the questionnaire is designed to measure the
source of information for each topic respondents listed to determine whether their
source was Egyptian nightly television talk shows. The issues listed by respondents in
addition to the source for each issue were coded separately to determine whether talk
shows have an agenda setting influence. Furthermore, the name of each source was
also coded to determine whether the agenda-setting impact is coming from the three
talk shows examined in this research.
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Public perception of the parliamentary elections: is how the public perceives the
Egyptian parliamentary elections. In agenda-setting theory, the public perception is
defined as the election attributes or frames on the public agenda. This is measured
through survey question 9 which lists statements regarding the elections on a 5-point
Likert scale. This is to examine whether the public attributes of the parliamentary
elections correspond with the talk show attributes of the parliamentary elections. The
statements listed in question 9 in the survey are the exact statements listed in the
content analysis codebook. Question 9 in the survey asks respondents to indicate their
degree of agreement or disagreement with 22 opposite statements regarding the
Egyptian parliamentary elections. Opposite statements were created to maintain
balance and objectivity. The level of measurement is interval. The statements are as
follows:
1. The government‟s recent restrictions on private media have nothing to do with
the elections.
2. The elections will be fairly conducted.
3. National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates are expected to hold the majority
of seats in parliament.
4. Judicial supervision is important to prevent election fraud.
5. The elections are expected to be peaceful.
6. It‟s important to have independent monitors.
7. Opposition party candidates will have a powerful representation.
8. Muslim brotherhood candidates will be welcomed to run in the elections by
the government.
9. Women must have equal representation in parliament.
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10. Coptic Christians should hold more than the current10 percent of parliament
seats.
11. The Wafd opposition party is expected to hold most opposition seats in
parliament.
12. The government recently issued restrictions on private media because of the
elections.
13. The elections will not be fairly conducted.
14. NDP candidates are not expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament.
15. Judicial supervision is not important to prevent election fraud.
16. The elections are expected to be violent.
17. It‟s not important to have independent monitors.
18. Opposition party candidates will have a weak representation.
19. Muslim brotherhood candidates will be restricted from running in the elections
by the government.
20. Women representation should be restricted to the quota set by the president.
21. Coptic Christians should hold the usual current 10 percent seats in parliament.
22. The Wafd opposition party is not expected to hold most opposition seats in
parliament.
Attitudes towards civic engagement: is defined by 14 statements covering the
different levels of civic engagement which is divided into awareness, interpersonal
discussion, public opinion expression, community involvement, and political
participation. All categories defining civic engagement are measured through several
statements on a five-point Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree in
question (4) in the survey. The level of measurement is interval. The statements are
listed in question 4 in the questionnaire as follows:
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a) I consider voting a priority
b) I express my opinion through the media (e.g. call-ins, emails, letters, sms, fax)
c) I express my opinion to public officials (e.g. petitions, letters)
d) I consider discussing sociopolitical affairs a priority
e) Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important
f) I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority
g) Citizens should not wait for the government to solve their community
problems
h) I make a difference in my community
i) Contributing to community is my responsibility
j) I volunteer to help solve community problems in Egypt
k) It‟s my responsibility to vote in Egypt‟s presidential elections in 2011
l) It‟s my responsibility to vote in Egypt‟s upcoming parliamentary elections
m) I intend to vote in the upcoming presidential elections
n) I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections
The overall civic engagement attitude level is calculated through placing the five
subcategories measuring civic engagement on a five-point scale. Awareness
represents the first point on the civic engagement scale, followed by interpersonal
discussion, public opinion expression, community involvement, and finally political
participation which marks the end of the civic engagement spectrum, representing the
strongest level of engagement. Although in other cultures political participation might
not be the highest level of engagement, it‟s considered the highest in pre-revolution
Egypt because that form of participation was frowned upon and discouraged by the
government. Figure 4.1.4 on the following page illustrates the categories that define
civic engagement.


Sociopolitical awareness is measured in question (4) by statements: (e) Being
informed about Egyptian affairs is important and (f) I consider sociopolitical
awareness a priority.
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Interpersonal discussion is measured in question 4 by the statement (d) I
consider discussing sociopolitical affairs a priority.



Public opinion expression is measured in question 4 by statements (b) I
express my opinion through the media (e.g. call-ins, emails, letters, sms, fax)
and (c) I express my opinion to public officials (e.g. petitions, letters).



Community involvement is measured by the following statements in question
4 (g) Citizens should not wait for the government to solve their community
problems, (h) I make a difference in my community, (i) Contributing to
community is my responsibility, and (j)I volunteer to help solve community
problems in Egypt.



Political participation: is measured by respondents‟ attitude towards voting
in question 4 of the survey through the statements (k) It‟s my responsibility to
vote in Egypt‟s presidential elections in 2011 (l) It‟s my responsibility to vote
in Egypt‟s upcoming parliamentary elections (m) I intend to vote in the 2011
presidential elections and (n) I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary
elections.

Figure 4.1.4 Civic engagement categories and levels:
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Experts‟ perception of civic engagement: experts are defined as academics and
professionals in the fields of civic engagement, philanthropy, media, political science,
and sociology. This dependent variable is defined in terms of how experts perceive
the status of civic engagement in Egypt and the significance of civic engagement for
Egypt. This variable is answered through the qualitative interview questions 1 and 2.
Experts‟ perception of the role of talk shows in civic engagement: this is defined
as how experts perceive the role and potential for talk shows to foster civic
engagement in Egypt. This variable is answered through the qualitative interview
questions 3 and 4.
Experts‟ perception of media strategies: this is defined as experts‟ suggestions for
the implementation of media strategies and recommendations that would foster civic
engagement in Egypt. The variable is answered through question 6 in the qualitative
interview.
4.2. The Content Analysis Methodology
The content analysis methodology is efficient in investigating media content in
terms of quantity and quality of content (Wimmer and Dominick, 2006). According to
Kerlinger‟s (2000) classical definition, “content analysis is a method of studying and
analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the
purpose of measuring variables” (cited in Wimmer and Dominick, 2006, p.150).
Agenda-setting studies rely heavily on content analysis to analyze media content and
determine the significance of news subjects. Successive audience research is
conducted to compare between the media and the public agendas (Wimmer and
Dominick, 2006). To study research hypotheses one and two which cover the first and
second levels of agenda-setting, a content analysis based on primary data recorded by
the researcher was conducted in this study.
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The content analysis was conducted to analyze the agenda of Egyptian nightly
television talk shows which specialize in covering and analyzing Egyptian affairs.
Regardless of ownership, any television talk show that specializes in discussing
Egyptian affairs is considered an Egyptian television talk show. This study covers
Egyptian television talk shows broadcast in prime time during the first part of the fall
broadcast season from October 6 to November 10 of the year 2010. The exact dates
are included in (Appendix J).
4.2.1. Content Analysis Sample
Due to the absence of a credible program rating system in Egypt, 18 Egyptian
television viewers were asked about the most popular talk shows in Egypt in order to
select the most popular talk shows for this study. Respondents cited four talk shows as
the most popular in Egypt: Al Qahera Al Youm (Cairo Today), Masr Ennaharda
(Egypt Today), Al Ashera Masa‟an (10 PM) and 90 Deqeeqa (90 Minutes). Popular
talk shows such as Al Qahera Al Youm (Cairo Today) aired on the Saudi-owned Orbit
Showtime Network (OSN) lied within the population of this study because it
discussed Egyptian affairs. Al Qahera Al Youm was initially included in the sample
but the show was suspended by the Egyptian government during the course of this
study and was therefore excluded from the sample.
Accordingly, a purposive sample of three of the four most popular television
talk shows was selected for study. The importance of purposive sampling in studies
applying a content analysis research methodology is confirmed by Riffe and Fretag
(1997) who found that 68 % of the Journalism Quarterly‟s content analysis studies
used purposive sampling (cited in Wimmer and Dominick, 2006). Also, research
studies applying agenda-setting theory were conducted over periods ranging from two
weeks, to two months, to more than two months. Several research studies found that
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the media succeeded in setting the public agenda after two weeks of media exposure
(Severin and Tankard, 2001).
4.2.2. The unit of analysis
The unit of analysis is the topic. All topics discussed during the entire duration
of the talk show were examined. The talk shows selected for analysis vary in airtime
from two hours to three hours. A total of 78 episodes of talk shows were coded,
representing an estimated total of 208 hours of television talk show airtime. The
content was coded by the researcher with 15.6% percent of the sample coded by a
second coder trained by the researcher for inter coder reliability (Appendix I).
Two code books (Appendix E & F) and coding sheets (Appendix G & H) were
formulated covering several variables. The first codebook covers the first level of
agenda setting and second covers the second level of agenda setting. The codebook
and code sheet were updated following a pretest on a sample of talk show content
coded by the researcher and the second coder. Inter coder reliability was conducted
using the Holsti formula R = 2M / N1 + N2. The inter coder reliability result is as
follows: R = 0.99 or 99%, which is very high (see Appendix I for calculations).
4.2.3 Categories of Content Analysis and Operational Definitions
The content was coded according to categories and subcategories created for
each topic discussed. These categories were formulated during the pretest period to fit
the purposes of the current study. Accurate coding of the topics and the subcategories
is determined by assessing the most important element about the topic discussed.
Neuendorf (2002) noted that when an issue was seen as strongly dominant, any other
issue was regarded as secondary and therefore not coded.
Topics: to examine the first-level of agenda setting, topics were coded into 14
categories: Political, Economic, Social, Environmental, Health, Education, Criminal,
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Human Interest, Religion, Sports, Arts & Culture, Media, Science and Technology,
and Miscellaneous. The subcategories under each topic list the focus of the
discussion. The 14 topic categories are defined as follows:
Topic 1 (Political): this category covers issues tackling Egyptian politics such as
parliamentary elections, presidential candidates, and government. Attributes of
covering the parliamentary elections were coded separately using the second
codebook for the second-level of agenda setting.
Topic 2 (Economic): this category covers topics such as minimum wages, Egypt‟s
investments, development, economic growth, national debt, inflation, poverty,
unemployment and other economic topics.
Topic 3 (Social): this category includes topics such as labor rights, women rights,
family, and divorce.
Topic 4 (Environmental): this category covers pollution, water shortage, endangered
species, energy resources, natural disasters, and other environmental topics listed in
the codebook.
Topic 5 (Health): this category covers health care, diseases, health insurance, and
drugs.
Topic 6 (Education): this category covers quality of education, higher education,
school education, and curricula.
Topic 7 (Criminal): this category covers thefts, murders, right to own a gun,
terrorism, crime control, and trials.
Topic 8 (Human interest): this category covers ordinary citizen success stories or
personal ordeal stories.
Topic 9 (Religion): this category covers religious preaching, sectarian tension,
national unity, and religious discrimination.
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Topic 10 (Sports): this category covers matches, accomplishments, and fan tension
or violence.
Topic 11 (Arts & Culture): this category covers arts and culture and celebrity
interviews
Topic 12 (Media): this category includes subcategories that deal with the status of the
media in Egypt such as freedom of expression, censorship, media laws and
regulations, mergers and acquisitions, jailing journalists, firing journalists, and
suspension of programs or newspapers.
Topic 13 (Science & Technology): this category includes subcategories that cover
scientific news or discoveries and technological advances.
Topic 14 (Miscellaneous): this category includes any topic that doesn‟t fit the list of
topics above.
Second-level agenda setting: the talk show attribute agenda is measured by
examining the advance coverage of the Egyptian parliamentary elections. The
following issue attributes are coded: elections fairness, NDP representation, judicial
supervision, election violence, independent monitoring, Muslim Brotherhood, women
representation, opposition representation, and Coptic Christian representation. The 22
statements measuring the framing of the elections in the codebook are an exact copy
of the statements formulated in the questionnaire in question 9. The frames were
coded as mentioned, neutral and not mentioned depending on their dominance.
4.3. Survey Methodology
Due to the fact that a quantitative content analysis methodology couldn‟t be
used to infer statements about the impact (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006) of television
talk shows on viewers, this study proceeded with conducting a quantitative survey
methodology. To measure whether talk shows influence the public agenda with a
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specific impact on civic engagement attitudes among Egyptian viewers, a
questionnaire (Appendix A) was formulated and self-administered. The questionnaire
was translated from English to Arabic (Appendix B) to accommodate non-English
speakers.
The questionnaire is composed of 15 questions including 13 closed ended
questions on different scales of measurement and two open-ended questions.
Responses for the open-ended questions which measure the first-level agenda of the
public were coded using the codebook and coding sheet in (Appendix C & D). Many
of the statements measuring civic engagement were adopted from national surveys
conducted in the US and the civic measurement models created by Flanagan, C.A.,
Syvertsen, A.K. & Stout, M.D. (2007). The questions were rephrased to fit Egyptian
culture. Fink‟s (2003) “How to Ask Survey Questions” was also used as a reference.
The data was collected from November 5 to November 20, 2010 ahead of the
Egyptian parliamentary elections to make sure that participants‟ responses were not
affected by the election results. The questionnaire was reviewed by eight faculty
members at the American University in Cairo. Several questions were reformulated
and the questionnaire was updated based on the faculty and advisor‟s comments. A
pretest has been conducted on an available sample of 20 students at AUC and the
questionnaire was updated accordingly.
Due to the restrictive environment prior to the Jan.25th revolution and the
government‟s constraints over conducting survey research in Egypt, this study was
conducted on a non-random purposive sample of the well-educated Egyptian elite.
The actual survey was administered among students, staff, and faculty at two private
elite universities in Egypt: the American University in Cairo (AUC) and Modern
Science and Arts University (MSA). An online survey was also created using
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surveymonkey.com and was circulated on the social networking website
Facebook.com. The survey was also self-administered among business people,
lawyers, and other members of the elite.
It‟s worth noting that many respondents were worried over answering the
question regarding the 2010 parliamentary elections amidst a clear government
crackdown on the media during the period that preceded the elections. Many
respondents quit the survey starting from question 9 which lists 22 statements about
the parliamentary elections and were therefore, eliminated from the sample.
4.3.1. Survey Sample
This study examines the agenda-setting impact of Egyptian nightly television
talk shows on the participants‟ agenda and the relationship between exposure to talk
shows and civic engagement attitudes among a purposive sample of the Egyptian
well-educated elite. The elite are defined as well educated members of the Egyptian
public. Elite by definition is composed of “a group of persons who by virtue of
position or education exercise much power or influence” (Merriam-Webster, 2010).
This stratum of society is selected for study because it‟s important to determine
whether well-educated Egyptians are civically engaged and actively involved in the
country‟s transition to democracy. According to Postel (1992), the 40 percent illiterate
Egyptian citizens are not concerned about democracy in Egypt or civic engagement.
People at the low socio-economic level are more concerned about sustaining a living.
Therefore, for democratic change to take place in Egypt, it must be nurtured by
informed, involved and active members of society who have the collective power and
education to influence policies and empower the rest of the population.
Boyd (1977) studied mass media usage among Egyptian elites. His criteria for
classifying elites were mainly based on occupation and economic status. Boyd divided
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the sample into three sub-samples including top government officials, university
administrators and professors, and well-off Egyptians. Shlapentokh and Woods
(2004) defined elites as “people whose position in society allows them to shape public
perceptions through the media” (p.160) but also asserted that elites vary across
countries. As leaders in educational, political, social, and economic institutions, elites
have a great influence on domestic policies and media which in turn influence the
public. Therefore, elites in this study are defined as well educated Egyptians who are
socially more privileged than the rest of the population by virtue of their education
and socioeconomic status. Responses were filtered to determine the elite sample
according to education and area of residence. Well educated elites include university
students, bachelor degree holders, graduate students, master's degree holders, and
PhD holders.
Therefore, this study classifies elite primarily as well educated individuals
who are socially privileged. Respondents below 18 years of age were excluded from
the study because voting cards in Egypt are only issued at 18. Accordingly, the
purposive sample of Egyptian elites in this study covers elite Egyptians who are well
educated and older than 18.

4.4 Qualitative in-depth interviews
A number of 11 in-depth interviews were conducted with media, sociology,
political science, and philanthropy experts. The following six questions were
formulated for the qualitative interview methodology which covers all the research
questions. The questions were also translated into Arabic for interviews with nonEnglish speakers.
To answer RQ1 with regards to the experts‟ perception of civic engagement in
Egypt, the following interview questions were formulated:
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1. “Egyptian citizens are politically apathetic.” What is your opinion
about this statement?
2. “Civic engagement is an essential aspect in any democratic
society.” How do you evaluate civic engagement in Egypt?
To answer RQ2 with regards to the perception of the role of media in general
and talk shows in particular in promoting civic engagement in Egypt, the following
interview questions were formulated:
3. In your opinion, do media have any role in fostering civic
engagement in Egypt?
4. Do talk shows play any role in promoting civic engagement in
Egypt? How?






Do Egyptian television talk shows create socio-political
awareness in Egypt?
Do Egyptian television talk shows promote socio-political
dialogue in Egypt?
Do Egyptian television talk shows encourage citizens to
express their opinions publicly?
Do Egyptian television talk shows foster community
involvement in Egypt?
Do Egyptian television talk shows encourage political
participation?

5. How do you evaluate the performance of Egyptian television talk
shows during their coverage of the Egyptian parliamentary
coverage?
To answer RQ3 with regards to the experts‟ perception of the future strategies that
should be adopted by talk shows to promote civic engagement, the following
interview question was formulated:
6. What are the future strategies that should be adopted by Egyptian
media in general and talk shows in specific to create a civically
engaged society?
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Chapter 5: Results
The results of the current study were processed using PASW Statistics 18, a
data analysis software previously known as SPSS. Microsoft Excel was also used for
some graphs and tests. Hypothesis testing was conducted using the same software.
The results are divided into two sections. The first section lists the survey results and
the content analysis results and the second section lists qualitative interview results.
The results are listed in the following tables, most illustrated by accompanying
charts. A total number of 676 stories were coded in three television shows in the
content analysis study. In addition, a number of 356 respondents completed the
survey. Respondents had the following demographics:
5.1: Level of education
Respondents were asked to specify their level of higher education on 5
categories because the purposive sample studied is the well-educated elite.
Table 5.1 Frequencies and percentages of the respondents‟ educational level
Level of Education
Undergraduate Student
Bachelor degree holder
Graduate Student
Master's degree holder

Frequency
186
79
39
40

%
52.2%
22.2%
11.0%
11.2%

Doctoral degree holder
Total

12
356

3.4%
100.0%

As shown in (Table 5.1), more than half the sample is undergraduate
university students, representing 52.2%. They are followed by bachelor degree
holders who represent 22.2% of the sample. Whereas, 11.2% are master's degree
holders and 11% are graduate students. Only 3.4% are doctoral degree holders.
The following figure illustrates the levels of higher education in the sample studied.
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Figure 5.1 Level of education, arranged in descending order of percentages
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5.2 Area of Residence
Respondents were asked to specify their area of residence among 9 closedended categories and one open-ended category „other‟ which resulted in three new
residence categories: Garden City, Alexandria and Shorouk.
Table 5.2 Area of residence, frequencies and percentages ranked in descending
order
Area of Residence
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Heliopolis
New Cairo/Katameya
Alexandria
Maadi
Mohandiseen
Nasr City
6th of October
Dokki
Haram

10. Garden City
11. Zamalek
12. Shorouk
Total

Frequency
72
48
48
35
34
33
26
20
14

%
20.2
13.5
13.5
9.8
9.6
9.3
7.3
5.6
3.9

14
11
1
356

3.9
3.1
.3
100.0

As shown in (Table 5.2), the majority of the respondents reside in Heliopolis,
representing 20.2 %. Respondents who reside in New Cairo/Katameya and the coastal
city of Alexandria equally represented 13.5 % of the sample each. Maadi residents
followed representing 9.8 % of the sample. Mohandiseen residents represented 9.6 %
of the sample. Nasr city residents followed making 9.3 % of the sample followed by
7.3 % respondents residing in the 6th of October city. Dokki followed with 5.6 %
respondents. Haram and Garden City had equal 3.9 % representation. Whereas,
Zamalek had 3.1 respondents represented. Lastly, only 0.3 % reside in Shorouk.

82

Figure 5.2 Area of residence, percentages in descending order
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5.3 Age
Respondents are classified according to five age categories listed in the
following table. Respondents who were less than 18 years old were excluded. This is
because Egyptian citizens who are less than 18 cannot vote and the survey includes
questions about voting.
Table 5.3: Age frequency and percentage
Age
18-29
30-41
42-53
54-65
Older than 65
Total

Frequency
261
69
14
10
2
356

%
73.3
19.4
3.9
2.8
.6
100.0

As shown in (Table 5.3) the majority representing 73.3 % of the sample is 1829 years old which is justified by the 52.2 % undergraduate students who took the
survey. Respondents belonging to the age group from 30-41 years old represented
19.4 %. Whereas, 42-53 year olds and 54-65 years old had close representation in the
sample, 3.9 % and 2.8 % respectively. Only 2 respondents representing 0.6 % of the
sample are older than 65.
Figure 5.3 Age
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5.4 Monthly Income
Respondents were asked to choose between seven income categories.
Table 5.4 Monthly Income, arranged in descending order
Monthly Income
EGP 1,000 - less than EGP 3,000
EGP 3,000 - less than EGP 5,000
EGP 11,000 and above

Frequency
83
67
63

%
23.3
18.8
17.7

Less than EGP 1,000
EGP 5,000 - less than EGP 7,000
EGP 9,000 - less than EGP 11,000
EGP 7,000 - less than EGP 9,000
Total

42
42
30
29
356

11.8
11.8
8.4
8.1
100.0

As shown in (Table 5.4), the majority 23.3 % of respondents earn EGP 1,000
- less than EGP 3,000, followed by 18.8 % who earn EGP 3,000 - less than EGP
5,000. This is also followed by 17.7 % earning EGP 11,000 and above. A number of
42 respondents or 11.8 % earn less than EGP 1,000 which could be explained by the
52.2 % under graduate students who took the survey. On the other hand, 11.8 % earn
EGP 5,000 - less than EGP 7,000. In addition, 8.4 % earn EGP 9,000 - less than EGP
11,000 and 8.1 % earn EGP 7,000 – less than EGP 9,000.
Figure 5.4 Monthly Income, arranged in descending order of percentages
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5.5 Gender
Both female and male respondents took the survey.
Table 5.5
Gender
Female
Male
Total

Frequency
%
241
67.7%
115
32.3%
356
100.0%

As show in (Table 5.5), females represent the majority of this sample, as 241
female respondents took the survey representing 67.7 %. Males represent 32.3 % as
115 male respondents took the survey.

Figure 5.5 Gender
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5.6 Viewership
Viewership refers to whether respondents watch Egyptian nightly television
talk shows such as Masr Ennaharda, Al Ashera Masa‟an, and 90 Deqeeqa. The first
question in the questionnaire determines viewership with a „yes‟ or „no‟ answer.
Those who answered „no‟ were excluded from the sample of viewers and only
answered the demographics questions.
Table 5.6: Viewership of Egyptian nightly television talk shows
Do you watch any of the following Egyptian nightly
television talk shows: Masr Ennaharda, 90 Deqeeqa, and Frequency
Al-Ashera Masa’an?
Yes
286
No
70
Total
356

%
80.3
19.7
100.0

As shown in (Table 5.1), the majority of the 356 respondents who took the
survey watch Egyptian nightly television talk shows, representing 286 respondents or
80.3 %. A number of 70 respondents representing 19.7 % of the sample surveyed
don't watch television talk shows.
Figure 5.6: Viewership of Egyptian nightly television talk shows
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5.7 Popularity of the three talk shows among viewers
Popularity of the three Egyptian nightly television talk shows Masr
Ennaharda, Al Ashera Masa‟an, and 90 Deqeeqa is defined by the degree to which
respondents follow or view each talk show on a weekly basis. Accordingly,
respondents were asked in the questionnaire how often they watch each show with six
answer options from 5 times a week to never.
Table 5.7a How often do you watch each television talk show per week?
Viewership per
week
5 times
4 times
3 times
2 times
1 time
Never
Total

Frequency (%) of respondents
Masr Ennaharda
Al Ashera
90 Deqeeqa
Masa'an
8 (2.8%)
25 (8.7%)
18 (6.3%)
21 (7.3%)
28 (9.8%)
22 (7.7%)
38 (13.3%)
58 (20.3%)
46 (16.1%)
40 (14.0%)
49 (17.1%)
54 (18.9%)
77 (26.9%)
83 (29.0%)
75 (26.2%)
102 (35.7%)
43 (15.0%)
71 (24.8%)
286 (100.0%)
286 (100.0%)
286 (100.0%)

Masr Ennaharda: (Table 5.7) shows that only 2.8% of the respondents are regular
viewers of Masr Ennaharda, 7.3% watch it 4 days per week, 13.3% and 14% of the
respondents watch it 3 and 4 days respectively. Whereas 26.9% watch it once a week
and the majority 35.7% never watch it.
Al Ashera Masa'an: (Table 5.7) shows that only 8.7% of the respondents regularly
view Al Ashera Masa'an, 9.8% view the show 4 days a week, 20.3% watch it 3 days
per week and 17.1% of the respondents watch it twice a week. The majority of
respondents 29% watch the show once a week and 15% never watch the show.
90 Deqeeqa: (Table 5.7) shows that 6.3% regularly view 90 Deqeeqa, 7.7 % watch
the talk show 4 days a week. Whereas 16.1% watch it 3 days per week and 18.9% of
the respondents watch it twice a week. The majority of viewers, 26.2% watch 90
Deqeeqa once a week and 24.8% never watch the show.
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A Chi square test was conducted as shown in (Table 5.7a) below to examine if
there was any significant difference between the mean average rating. The result χ2 =
14.71 is non-significant, indicating a similar distribution of viewership times in the
three talk shows. An analysis of variance was also conducted to test if there was any
significant difference between the mean times per week for the three talk shows, and
result was not significant. Therefore, because the popularity of the three programs is
defined as the viewing times per week for each show and there is no significant
difference in viewership, the three talk shows are more or less on the same popularity
level.
Table 5.7b Statistical test for table 5.7a
Chi square
Mean Average rating (
times per week)
Standard deviation
ANOVA
ANOVA
df
Talk shows
2
Error
15
Total
17

χ2 =14.71 NS
1.38

2.07

0.140
ss
0.0396
0.4301
0.4697

0.201
F = 0.69 NS

ms
0.0198
0.0287

1.74
0.162

F
0.69 ns

Fig 5.7 Popularity of the three talk shows among viewers, weekly viewership
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5.8 Level of talk show exposure
The level of exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows was measured
by comparing exposure to media sources on a three-point scale of always, sometimes,
and never. Respondents were asked how often they depend on the media sources
listed for news about Egyptian affairs. Since media and civic engagement previous
research linked civic engagement to the news or information exposure rather than
entertainment, it was necessary to specify the news dependency in the exposure
question. Responses to always and sometimes were combined together in the
following table to provide more robust results on the overall level of exposure.
Table 5.8: Level of talk show exposure compared to other media
Frequency (%) in degree of agreement
Mean av.
Always +
Never
Rating*
Sometimes
+ SD
28
2.52
258
Internet
(9.8%)
+
0.918
(90.2%)
3
2.46
283
TV Talk shows
(1.0%)
+ 0.724
(99%)
31
2.37
255
Newspapers
(10.8%)
+ 0.660
(89.2%)
45
2.18
241
TV news
(15.7%)
+ 0.494
(84.2%)
128
1.64
158
Radio news
(44.8%)
+ 0.353
(55.3%)
141
1.59
145
Magazines
(49.3%)
+
0.299
(50.7%)
154
1.51
132
Radio talk shows
(53.8%)
+ 0.332
(46.1%)
1472
530
2.04
Overall
(73.6.4%)
(26.5%)
+ 0.360
* based on a 3-point scale: 3 = Always, 2 = Sometimes, 1 = Never.
Media Sources
Arranged in order of
Mean
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Table 5.8a: Statistical test for table 5.8
ANOVA
Source of

Sum of

Degrees of

variation

squares

freedom

Media sources

6.83

Error
Total

Mean square

F

6

1.138

3.357

4.75

14

0.339

11.58

20

ANOVA: F= 3.357 significant (p=0.029) indicating the existence of significant
differences between the mean average ratings of media sources. (s2 = 0.339)
Internet: (Table 5.8) shows that 90.2% depend on the Internet for news while 9.8%
never depend on the Internet. A mean of 2.52 indicates that the majority falls between
always and sometimes.
Television Talk Shows: (Table 5.8) shows that almost all respondents 99% depend
on television talk shows for news about Egyptian affairs. Only 3 respondents,
representing 1% never do. A mean of 2.46 indicates that the majority fall between
always and sometimes.
Newspapers: (Table 5.8) shows that 89.2% depend on newspapers, compared to
10.8% who never depend on newspapers. A mean of 2.37 indicates that the majority
fall between always and sometimes.
Television News: (Table 5.8) shows that 84.2% depend on television news and 15.7%
never. A mean of 2.18 indicates that the majority sometimes depends on TV news.
Radio news: (Table 5.8) shows that 55.3% of the respondents depend on radio news
and 44.8% never. A mean of 1.64 indicates that the majority fall between sometimes
and never.
Magazines: (Table 5.8) shows that 50.7% depend on magazines and 49.3% never. A
mean of 1.59 indicates that the majority falls between sometimes and never.
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Radio talk shows: (Table 5.8) shows that only 46.1% depend on radio talk shows and
53.8% never. A mean of 1.51 indicates that the majority falls between sometimes and
never.
As shown in (Table 5.8a), a statistical test was conducted to determine if there
was any significant difference in exposure. An ANOVA: F= 3.357 significant
(p=0.029) value indicates the existence of significant differences between the mean
average ratings of media sources.
Figure 5.8: Level of talk show exposure compared to other media, in descending
order
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5.9 Public & Media agendas of news priorities & H1: Public perception of issue
salience is most likely influenced by Egyptian nightly television talk shows agenda
The public agenda is defined as the news issues that are perceived as
important by the public. To measure the public news agenda, respondents were asked
in the open-ended question (5) of the questionnaire to list the five most important
news issues happening in Egypt that came to their knowledge recently. Open-ended
survey responses were coded using the codebook in (Appendix C) which lists the
same topics in the content analysis codebook (Appendix E).
As for the media agenda, it‟s defined as the news issues covered by the three
popular television talk shows Masr Ennaharda, Al Ashera Masa‟an and 90 Deqeeqa.
To measure their news agenda, a content analysis was conducted. (Table 5.9a) lists
the public‟s news agenda and the talk show‟s news agenda.
Table 5.9a: Public news agenda vs. Nightly Television Talk shows news agenda

Respondents news agenda
1. Parliamentary
elections
2. Rising food prices
3. Presidential elections
4. Minimum wages
5. School violence
6. Terrorism
7. Courts
8. Dostour crisis
9. Suspension of media
10. University guards
11. Diseases
12. Other topics in politics
13. Illegal land acquisition
14. Traffic problems
15. Total Inflation
16. Sectarian tension

F (%)
229(20.8%)
69 (6.3%)
56 (5.1%)
55 (5.0%)
54 (4.9%)
47 (4.3%)
42 (3.8%)
38 (3.5%)
37 (3.4%)
35 (3.2%)
34 (3.1%)
32 (2.9%)
28 (2.5%)
24 (2.2%)
19 (1.7%)
18 (1.6%)
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Talk Shows news
agenda
1. Parliamentary
elections
2. Dostour crisis
3. Health care
4. Profiles
5. Other politics
6. People‟s ordeals
7. Rising food prices
8. Food shortages
9. Media regulations
10. Pilgrimage
11. Traffic problems
12. Higher education
13. University security
14. Courts
15. Football matches
16. School violence

F (%)
63 (9.3%)
25 (3.7%)
24 (3.6%)
23 (3.4%)
22 (3.3%)
21 (3.1%)
18 (2.7%)
16 (2.4%)
16 (2.4%)
15 (2.2%)
15 (2.2%)
14 (2.1%)
14 (2.1%)
14 (2.1%)
14 (2.1%)
13 (1.9%)

17. Media regulations
18. Football matches
19. Opposition
20. Investments
21. School education
22. Other social issues
23. Workers issues
24. World affairs
25. Demonstrations/strikes
26. Food shortages
27. Embezzlements
28. People‟s ordeals
29. Water Shortage
30. Natural Disasters
31. Nile Water Issues
32. Health insurance
33. Police brutality
34. Right to own guns
35. Pilgrimage
36. Pollution
37. Electricity issues
38. Fires
39. President
40. Unemployment
41. Poverty
42. Antiquities
43. Wikileaks
44. Development
45. Education quality
46. Fan tension
47. Government
48. Women issues
49. Family issues
50. Other crimes
51. Profiles
52. Loss of the satellite
53. Health care
54. Other sports
55. Media ethics

17 (1.5%)
16 (1.5%)
14 (1.3%)
14 (1.3%)
13 (1.2%)
11 (1.0%)
10 (.9%)
10 (.9%)
8 (.7%)
8 (.7%)
8 (.7%)
8 (.7%)
7 (.6%)
7 (.6%)
7 (.6%)
7 (.6%)
7 (.6%)
7 (.6%)
7 (.6%)
6 (.5%)
6 (.5%)
6 (.5%)
5 (.5%)
5 (.5%)
5 (.5%)
5 (.5%)
5 (.5%)
4 (.4%)
4 (.4%)
4 (.4%)
3 (.3%)
3 (.3%)
3 (.3%)
3 (.3%)
3 (.3%)
3 (.3%)
2 (.2%)
2 (.2%)
2 (.2%)

17. Pollution
18. Other sports
19. Suspension of media
20. Minimum wages
21. Private media
22. Terrorism
23. Scientific research
24. Charity
25. Government
26. Natural disasters
27. Diseases
28. Fan tension
29. Pol. achievements
30. Family issues
31. Right to own guns
32. Land take overs
33. Religious preaching
34. Achievements
35. Freedom of exp.
36. Future of media
37. Pol. representation
38. Total inflation
39. Nile water
40. Health corruption
41. Sectarian tension
42. Cinema reviews
43. Closing shops early
44. World affairs
45. Opposition
46. Demonstrations
47. Taxes
48. Women issues
49. Drugs
50. Quality of education
51. Edu-development
52. Arrests
53. Police brutality
54. Censorship
55. Scientific inventions
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13 (1.9%)
13 (1.9%)
13 (1.9%)
12 (1.8%)
8 (1.2%)
7 (1.0%)
7 (1.0%)
7 (1.0%)
6 (.9%)
6 (.9%)
6 (.9%)
6 (.9%)
5 (.7%)
5 (.7%)
5 (.7%)
5 (.7%)
5 (.7%)
5 (.7%)
5 (.7%)
5 (.7%)
4 (.6%)
4 (.6%)
4 (.6%)
4 (.6%)
4 (.6%)
4 (.6%)
4 (.6%)
4 (.6%)
3 (.4%)
3 (.4%)
3 (.4%)
3 (.4%)
3 (.4%)
3 (.4%)
3 (.4%)
3 (.4%)
3 (.4%)
3 (.4%)
3 (.4%)

56. Scientific research
57. Underground metro
58. Closing shops early
59. Government spending
60. Energy resources
61. Drugs
62. Health negligence
63. Arrests
64. Crime control
65. Religious preaching
66. Achievements
67. Cinema reviews
68. Jailing journalists
69. Scientific projects
70. Gaza aid
Total

2 (.2%)
2 (.2%)
2 (.2%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1100
(100%)

56. Unemployment
57. Other human int.
58. Drama reviews
59. Galleries & concerts
60. Jailing journalists
61. Scientific projects
62. Electricity issues
63. Loss of satellite
64. Wikileaks
65. Islam & the west
66. Pol. participation
67. Health insurance
68. Crime control
69. Underground metro
70. Gaza aid
Total

2 (.3%)
2 (.3%)
2 (.3%)
2 (.3%)
2 (.3%)
2 (.3%)
2 (.3%)
2 (.3%)
2 (.3%)
2 (.3%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
1 (.1%)
676
(100%)

As shown in (Table 5.9a), the most important topic happening in Egypt
according to the respondents is the Egyptian parliamentary elections, representing
20.8% of the total topics listed by respondents. The parliamentary elections also
topped the talk shows agenda, representing the mostly covered topic receiving 9.3 %
of the total talk show coverage.
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Figures 5.9aa: Respondents news agenda

Figure 5.9ab: Talk shows news agenda
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5.9b Public and Media Agendas Classified into Main Topics
The public and media agendas of news priorities were also classified into main
topics as shown in table 5.9b.
Table 5.9b: Main Topics of Public & Media agendas
Talk Shows Topics
Frequency/%
1. Political
2. Media
3. Economic
4. Criminal
5. Miscellaneous
6. Arts & Culture
7. Education
8. Social
9. Health
10. Human Interest
11. Sports
12. Religion
13. Environmental
14. Science &
Technology
Total

Respondents
Frequency/%
Political

114
(16.9%)
85
(12.6%)
74
(10.9%)
59
(8.7%)
49
(7.2%)
45
(6.7%)
43
(6.4%)
38
(5.6%)
38
(5.6%)
35
(5.2%)
35
(5.2%)
25
(3.7%)
24
(3.6%)
12
(1.8%)
676
(100%)

Economic
Criminal
Media
Social
Miscellaneous
Education
Health
Environmental
Religion
Sports
Human Interest
Arts & Culture
Science & Technology
Total
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Main
Topic
346
(31.5%)
181
(16.5%)
143
(13.0%)
96
(8.7%)
81
(7.4%)
59
(5.4%)
52
(4.7%)
45
(4.1%)
28
(2.5%)
26
(2.4%)
23
(2.1%)
9
(.8%)
8
(.7%)
3
(.3%)
1100
(100%)

As shown in (Table 5.9b), the mostly covered topic by talk shows is the
political topic (16.9%), which is also the first on the respondents‟ agenda (31.5%).
Education, sports, and science and technology all fall on matching ranks on the two
agendas. The media topic on the talk show agenda was much higher as the programs
focused on media related developments heavily in their coverage before the Egyptian
parliamentary elections. But for the respondents, economic issues (16.5%) were
second on the agenda compared to third on the talk shows agenda (10.9%).
Criminal issues ranked third on the respondents‟ agenda (13%) compared with
fourth on the media agenda (8.7%). The media topic ranked fourth on the public
agenda (8.7%), followed by social issues (7.4%). The least mentioned topic on both
agendas is science and technology which ranked 14th representing 0.3% of the public
agenda and 1.8% on the media agenda. The following figures display the main topics
on both agendas.
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Figure 5.9ba: Public news agenda categorized into main topics

Figure 5.9bb: Talk shows‟ news agenda categorized into main topics
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5.9c Talk show‟s agenda setting impact
To determine whether nightly television talk shows agenda had an agenda
setting influence, respondents were asked to name the primary source of information
for each of the five issues they listed. The responses were coded into categories of
media sources and were also coded into specific names of such sources when
mentioned. If respondents listed more than one source for the same issue, they were
coded as miscellaneous. However, if they cited nightly television talk shows among
those sources, they were coded as television talk shows and other. This is to separate
it from the category specified for television talk shows when they were solely cited.
Furthermore, to determine whether the three television talk shows studied had any
agenda setting influencing, the names of the shows and sources mentioned were also
coded. Tables 5.9c and 5.9d display the sources cited by respondents and the specific
names whenever mentioned, respectively.
Table 5.9c: Main source of news for the issues listed by respondents
How did these issues come to your knowledge?
Specify the source
1. Television Talk Shows
2. Newspapers
3. Internet
4. TV News
5. Personal Communication
6. Miscellaneous
7. Radio News
8. TV Talk Shows & other
9. Magazines
10. SMS service
11. Radio Talk Shows
Total

100

Frequency

%

465
229
172
83
62
34
22
20
6
4
3
1100

42.3%
20.8%
15.6%
7.5%
5.6%
3.1%
2.0%
1.8%
.5%
.4%
.3%
100.0%

As shown in (Table 5.9c), television talk shows topped respondents sources
mentioned 465 times comprising 42.3 % of the total news sources listed. Newspapers
came second listed 229 times by respondents at 20.8 %. The Internet came third, cited
by 172 respondents as their source of news comprising 15.6 %. Television news
ranked fourth, mentioned 83 times at 7.5 %. The remaining sources include personal
communication, miscellaneous, radio news, television talk shows and other,
magazines, SMS, and radio talk shows were the least mentioned. The following figure
describes the results.
Figure 5.9c: Main source of news for the issues listed by respondents
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Table 5.9d: Name of main source of news for the issues listed by respondents
How did these issues first come to your knowledge?
Specify the name
1. Al Ashera Masa'an TV talk show
2. 90 Deqeeqa TV talk show
3. Masr Ennaharda TV talk show
4. Al Masry Al Youm newspaper
5. Al Youm Al Sabe online paper
6. Al Ahram newspaper

Frequency

%

119
83
52
29
25
15

28.7%
20.0%
12.5%
7.0%
6.0%
3.6%

7. Al Shorouk newspaper
8. Facebook
9. Al Shorouk Online
10. Masrawy website
11. Al Jazeera TV channel

14
14
7
6
6

3.4%
3.4%
1.7%
1.4%
1.4%

12. Men Qalb Masr TV talk show
13. Al Hayat Al Youm TV talk show
14. Twitter
15. Akhbar Baladna sms service

6
6
4
4

1.4%
1.4%
1.0%
1.0%

16. Al Qahera Al Youm TV talk show
17. Nogoum FM
18. Ahram Online
19. Sabah Dream TV talk show
20. Radio Masr
21. Al Arabeya.net
22. Baladna Belmasry talk show
23. 48 Sa'a TV talk show
24. Al Akhbar newspaper

3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1

.7%
.7%
.5%
.5%
.5%
.5%
.5%
.2%
.2%

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
415

.2%
.2%
.2%
.2%
.2%
.2%
.2%
100.0%

25. Al Jazeera.net
26. Al Tab'a Al Akheera news program
27. Teen Stuff magazine
28. MSN News
29. Business Today magazine
30. Youtube
31. Al Tab'a Al Oula news program
Total
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As shown in (Table 5.9d), out of the 415 names listed by respondents as the
main sources of news, television talk show Al Ashera Masa'an topped respondents
sources, mentioned 119 times comprising 28.7 % of the news sources. 90 Deqeeqa
talk show came second cited 83 times by respondents at 20 %. Masr Ennaharda came
third cited by 52 respondents as their source of news comprising 12.5 %.

Figure 5.9d: Name of main source of news for the issues listed by respondents
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To further investigate the agenda-setting influence of television talk shows,
two cross tabulation tables were conducted: (Table 5.9e) shows the cross tabulation
of the five main sources of news which include television talk shows with the main
topics. (Table 5.9f) shows the cross tabulation of the same five main sources with the
top 10 news issues by respondents.
Table 5.9e: Cross tabulation of the five main sources of news and the main
topics

Topic

Political
Econ.
Criminal
Media
Social
Edu.
Health
Misc.
Religion
Sports
Environ.
Human
Inst.
Arts &
Cult.
Sci &
Tech.
Total
mean%

News

TV

p.

News

81
23.4%
38
21%
32
22.4%
10
10.4%
19
23.5%
15
28.8%
7
1.5%
8
13.5%
5
19.2%
4
17.3%
6
21.4%
0
0%
4
50%
0
0%
229
20.8%

26
7.5%
12
6.6%
10
7%
8
8.2%
1
1.2%
4
7.7%
5
11.5%
8
13.5%
1
3.8%
3
3%
5
17.8%
0
0%
0
0%
0
0%
83
7.5%

TV
Talk
Shows
137
39.6%
83
45.9%
54
37.8%
52
54.2%
43
53%
21
40%
19
42.2%
19
32.3%
10
38.4%
10
43.4%
9
32%
6
66.6%
2
25%
0
0%
465
42.2%
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Internet
55
15.9%
21
11.6%
25
17.5%
14
14.6%
11
13.6%
6
11.5%
6
13%
11
18.6%
5
19.2%
6
26%
6
21.4%
2
22.2%
2
25%
2
66.6%
172
15.6%

Personal

Other

Total

29
8.4%
16
8.8%
13
9%
6
6.3%
5
6.2%
5
9.6%
5
11.1%
6
10.1%
2
7.7%
0
0%
1
3.6%
1
11.1%
0
0%
0
0%
89
8%

346
100%
181
100%
143
100%
96
100%
81
100%
52
100%
45
100%
59
100%
26
100%
23
100%
28
100%
9
100%
8
100%
3
100%
1100
100%

com.
18
5.2%
11
6.1%
9
6.3%
6
6.3%
2
2.5%
1
1.9%
3
6.6%
7
11.8%
3
11.5%
0
0%
1
3.6%
0
0%
0
0%
1
33.3%
62
5.6%

Table 5.9ea: Statistical test for table 5.9e
ANOVA
Source of
variation
Sources of news

Sum of
squares
11731.77

Degrees of
freedom
5

Mean
square
2346.355

Error
Total

9378.643
21110.42

78
83

120.239
254.3424

F
19.5140
9

As shown in (Table 5.9e), television talk shows topped the news sources in all
topics, cited 42.2 % out of the total number of sources cited for the 1,100 issues
provided by respondents. Talk shows were cited for political topic at 39.6 % as the
primary source of news which supports the previous results in table 5.9c.
As shown in (Table 5.9ea), ANOVA was conducted to compare the sources of
news and to determine if there was any significant difference. The result F = 19.514
(p=0.00001), is highly significant, indicating that the differences between the sources
of news are significant with nightly television talk shows significantly much higher
than any other source.
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Table 5.9f: Cross tabulation of the five main sources of news and the 10 mostly
mentioned news issues listed by respondents
News Issue
Parliamentary
Elections
Minimum
wages
Rising Food
Prices
School
violence
University
Guards
Courts
Terrorism
Dostour Crisis

57
24.9%
13
23.6%

15
6.6%
2
3.6%

TV
Personal
Talk Internet
Other
Comm.
Shows
32
9
16
100
3.9%
7%
43.7% 14.0%
8
1
4
27
1.8%
7.3%
49.1% 14.5%

14
20.3%
9
16.7%
11
31.4%
11
26.2%
10

5
7.2%
1
1.9%
1
2.9%
6
14.3%
0

31
44.9%
31
57.4%
12
34.3%
14
33.3%
14

7
10.1%
7
13.0%
5
14.3%
5
11.9%
13

5
7.2%
1
1.9%
1
2.9%
1
2.4%
6

7
10.1%
5
9.3%
5
14.3%
5
11.9%
4

69
100%
54
100%
35
100%
42
100%
47

21.3%
3
7.9%

.0%
1
2.6%

29.8%
23
60.5%

27.7%
5
13.2%

12.8%
3
7.9%

100%
38
100%

5
23
13.5% 62.2%

7
18.9%

1
2.7%

2
3.6%
5.7%

11
19.6%
15.8%

4
7.1%
5.1%

8.5%
3
7.9%
1
2.7%
10
17.9%
9.7%

TV
Newspaper
News

Suspension of
Media

0
0%

Presidential
Elections
Mean %

12
21.4%
19.3%

17
30.4%
44.5%

Total
229
100 %
55
100%

37
100%
56
100%
100%

Table 5.9fa: Statistical test for table 5.9f
ANOVA
Source of variation Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square
Source of news
10849.68
5
2169.937
Error
2901.3
54
53.72778
Total
13750.98
59
233.0675

F
40.38761

As shown in (Table 5.9f), television talk shows also topped the news sources
in all 10 issues listed, representing 43.7% of the sources mentioned for parliamentary
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elections. Television talk shows were also cited by respondents for the issue of
minimum wages representing 49.1 %.
As shown in (Table 5.9fa), ANOVA was conducted to compare the sources of
news. The result F = 40.388 (p=0.00001) is highly significant indicating that the
differences between the sources of news are significant with TV talk shows much
higher than any other source.
To further investigate whether respondents follow talk shows‟ coverage on the
issues they listed and to insure internal validity, respondents were asked to specify
how often they follow talk show‟s coverage for each issue they listed on a three-point
scale with always representing the highest value of 3, sometimes representing a value
of 2, and never representing the lowest value of 1.
Table 5.9g Exposure to talk show's coverage of news priorities on the public
agenda
How often do you follow talk shows'
coverage of each issue you listed?
Always
Sometimes
Never
Total
Mean Av. Rating*
SD

Frequency

Percent

376
636
88
1100

34.2%
57.8%
8.0%
100.0%
2.26
0.587

* based on a 3-point scale: 3 = Always, 2 = Sometimes, 1 = Never
As shown in (Table 5.9g), the majority of respondents sometimes (57.8%)
follow talk shows‟ coverage of the 1,100 news issues they listed, followed by always
(34.2%) and "never" (8 %). The mean value of 2.26 shows that the majority fall
between sometimes and always.
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5.10 Talk Shows‟ Coverage & Agenda Setting
The amount of coverage of talk shows is defined as the total number of news
stories covered by the three Egyptian nightly television talk shows analyzed in the
content-analysis study. As shown in (Table 5.9d) earlier, television talk show Al
Ashera Masa'an topped respondents‟ sources representing 28.7 % of the news
sources, followed by 90 Deqeeqa (20%) and Masr Ennaharda (12.5 %). If the
amount of coverage is related to the agenda-setting impact, then the talk show with
the highest number of stories would be most cited by respondents. A cross tabulation
of the three talk shows with the top story on the agenda, the parliamentary elections,
was also formulated. This is to examine if a particular show‟s amount of coverage had
any relation to its dominant agenda-setting influence. The following table shows the
amount of coverage in the three shows.
Table 5.10a: Total number of stories covered by Egyptian nightly television talk
shows:
Talk Show

Frequency
258
211
207
676

Masr Ennaharda
90 Deqeeqa
Al Ashera Masa'an
Total

Percent
38.2
31.2
30.6
100.0

The total number of stories covered by the three talk shows is 676 stories.


Masr Ennaharda produced a slightly larger number with 258 stories,
representing 38.2%.



90 Deqeeqa produced 31.2% of the stories.



Al Ashera Masa'an produced 30.6% of the total stories.

As shown in (Table 5.10), There is no significant difference in the amount of
coverage between the three talk shows.
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Figure 5.10a: Total number of stories covered by Egyptian nightly television talk
shows:

Table 5.10b Cross tabulation of the amount of coverage of the parliamentary
elections in the three talk shows

News Issue

Parliamentary Elections

Talk Show
Al Ashera
Masr
90
Masa'an Ennaharda Deqeeqa
25
(39.7%)

20
(31.7%)

Total

18
63
(28.6%) (100%)

As shown in (Table 5.10b), Al Ashera Masa‟an had the highest parliamentary
election stories (39.7%), followed by Masr Ennaharda (31.7%) and 90 Deqeeqa
(28.6%). The difference between the three shows in terms of the amount of coverage
is not significant. Therefore, there is no relation between the amount of coverage and
a particular talk show‟s agenda-setting impact.
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5.11 Second-level agenda-setting: Public framing vs. media framing of the
Egyptian parliamentary elections & H2: Egyptian nightly television talk shows’
portrayal of Egypt’s parliamentary elections is likely to influence viewers’
perception of the parliamentary elections.
The second-level of agenda setting is applied in this study by examining the
frames of the talk shows‟ advance coverage of the parliamentary elections and
comparing it with respondents‟ frames of elections during the period that preceded
the elections. Respondents were given 22 opposite statements in the questionnaire
and were asked to specify their level of agreement on a five-point likert scale from
strongly agree to strongly disagree. The statements tackled a variety of election
attributes. The statements were categorized into separate tables according to topic for
ease of analysis. To provide more robust results, strongly agree and agree results
were combined into an overall agreement total. As well as strongly disagree and
disagree as shown in the following table (also for the rest of the tables).
5.11a Results of survey framing statements
Table 5.11aa: Media Restrictions
Frequency (%)

Mean Av.

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Rating* + SD

57
(19.9%)

43
(15.0%)

186
(65.0%)

2.20
+ 0.121

206
(72.0%)

58
(20.3%)

22
(7.7%)

3.97
+ 0.791

Opposite Statements
a) The government's recent
restrictions on private media
have nothing to do with the
elections
l) The government recently
issued restrictions on private
media because of the elections

* based on a 5-point scale (5=S. Agree, 4=Agree, 3=Neutral, 2=Disagree, 1=S. Disagree)

„t‟ = 4.956 (p= 0.0011) highly significant difference between the two opposites

No election-related media restrictions: Table 5.11aa shows that 57% agree with
statement (a), 5% are neutral, and 65% disagree. A mean of 2.20 indicates a
disagreement level.
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Election-related media restrictions: (Table 5.11aa) shows that 72% agree with
statement (l), 20.3% are neutral, and 7.7% disagree. A mean of 3.97 indicates that the
majority agree with the statement.
Table 5.11ab: Election Fairness
Frequency (%)

Opposite Statement
Agree

Neutral

Disagree

+ SD

41

65

180

2.18

(14.3%)

(22.7%)

(62.9%)

+ 0.211

191

62

33

3.88

b) The elections will be
fairly conducted

Mean av. rating*

m) The elections will

(21.7%)
(11.5%)
+ 0.750
not be fairly conducted
(66.8%)
„t‟ = 4.875 (p= 0.0012) highly significant difference between the two opposites
Fair Elections: (Table 5.11ab) shows that only 14.3% agree with statement (b),
22.7% are neutral, and 62.9% disagree. A mean of 2.18 indicates that the majority
disagree with the statement.
Unfair Elections: (Table 5.11ab) shows that 66.8% agree with statement (m), 21.7%
are neutral, and 11.5% disagree. A mean of 3.88 indicates that the majority are
between agree and neutral.
Table 5.11ac: NDP
Opposite Statements

Frequency (%)

Mean av.

Neutral

Rating*

Agree

Disagree

+ SD
c) National Democratic Party
(NDP) candidates are expected

213

60

13

4.10

(74.5%)

(21.0%)

(4.5%)

+ 0.880

56

74

156

2.40

(19.6%)

(25.9%)

(54.5%)

+ 0.196

to hold the majority of seats in
parliament
n) NDP candidates are not
expected to hold the majority of

seats in parliament
„t‟ = 4.224 (p= 0.0029) highly significant difference between the two opposites
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NDP Majority: (Table 5.11ac) shows that 74.5% agree with statement (c), 21% are
neutral, and only 4.5% disagree. A mean of 4.10 indicates that the majority is
between strongly agree and agree.
NDP Not Majority: (Table 5.11ac) shows that 19.6% agree with the statement (n),
25.9% are neutral, and 54.5% disagree.
Table 5.11ad: Judicial supervision
Frequency (%)

Opposite Statements

Mean av. Rating*

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

+ SD

d) Judicial supervision

199

68

19

4.03

is important to prevent

(69.6%)

(23.8%)

(6.6%)

+ 0.856

54

64

168

2.33

(18.9%)

(22.4%)

(58.7%)

+ 0.151

election fraud
o) Judicial supervision
is not important to

prevent election fraud
„t‟ = 4.388 (p= 0.0023) highly significant difference between the two opposites
Important Judicial Supervision: (Table 5.11ad) shows that 69.6% agree with
statement (d), 23.8% are neutral, and 6.6% disagree. A mean of 4.03 indicates that the
majority is between strongly agree and agree.
Unimportant Judicial Supervision: (Table 5.11ad) shows that 18.9% agree with
statement (o), 22.4% are neutral, and 58.7% disagree.

Table 5.11ae: Peaceful vs. violent elections
Frequency (%)

Mean av. Rating*

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

+ SD

56

83

147

2.52

(19.6%)

(29.0%)

(51.4%)

+ 0.300

160

87

39

3.57

Opposite Statements
e) The elections are
expected to be peaceful
p) The elections are

(30.4%)
(13.6%)
+ 0.594
expected to be violent
(55.9%)
„t‟ = 3.500 (p= 0.0081) highly significant difference between the two opposites

112

Peaceful Elections: (Table 5.11ae) shows that 19.6% agree with statement (e), 29%
are neutral, and 51.4% disagree. A mean of 2.52 shows that the majority is between
disagree and neutral.
Violent Elections: (Table5.11ae) shows that 55.9% agree with statement (p), 30.4%
are neutral, and 13.6% disagree. A mean of 3.57 shows that the majority is between
agree and neutral.
Table 5.11af: Independent Monitors
Frequency (%)

Opposite Statements

Mean av. Rating*

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

+ SD

223

52

11

4.11

independent monitors

78.0(%)

(18.2%)

(3.8%)

+ 0.879

q) It's not important to

36

62

188

2.22

(12.6%)

(21.7%)

(65.7%)

+ 0.269

f) It's important to have

have independent monitors

„t‟ = 4.592 (p= 0.0018) highly significant difference between the two opposites

Important Independent Monitors: (Table 5.11af) shows that 78% agree with
statement (f), 18.2% are neutral, and 3.8% disagree. A mean of 4.11 shows that the
majority is between strongly agree and agree.
Unimportant Independent Monitors: (Table 5.11af) shows that 12.6 % agree with
statement (q), 21.7 % are neutral, and 65.7 % disagree. A mean of 2.22 shows that the
majority is between disagree and neutral.
Table 5.11ag: Opposition Representation
Frequency (%)

Opposite Statements

g) Opposition party
candidates will have a

Mean av. Rating*

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

+ SD

77

108

101

2.82

(26.9%)

(37.8%)

(35.3%)

+ 0.431

140

101

45

3.47

(49.0%)

(35.3%)

(15.7%)

+ 0.531

powerful representation
r) Opposition party
candidates will have a

weak representation
„t‟ = 2.136 (p= 0.0652) no significant difference between the two opposites
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Powerful Opposition: (Table 5.11ag) shows that 26.9 % agree with statement (g),
37.8% are neutral, and 35.3 disagree. A mean of 2.82 shows that the majority is
between disagree and neutral.
Weak Opposition: (Table 5.11ag) shows that 49 % agree with statement (r), 35.3 %
are neutral, and 15.7% disagree. A mean of 3.47 shows that the majority is between
agree and neutral.
Table 5.11ah: Muslim Brotherhood
Opposite Statements
Agree

Frequency (%)

Mean av.

Neutral

Rating*

Disagree

+ SD
Muslim Brotherhood
candidates will be welcomed

49

63

174

2.31

(17.1%)

(22.0%)

(60.8%)

+ 0.213

153

84

49

3.56

(53.5%)

(29.4%)

(17.1%)

+ 0.533

to run in the elections by the
government
Muslim Brotherhood
candidates will be restricted
to run in the elections by
the government
„t‟ = 4.840 (p= 0.0013) highly significant difference between the two opposites

Muslim Brotherhood Welcomed: (Table 5.11ah) shows that 17.1 % agree with
statement (h), 22% are neutral, and 60.8% disagree. A mean of 2.31 shows a majority
between disagree and neutral.
Muslim Brotherhood Restricted: (Table 5.11ah) shows that 53.5% agree with
statement (s), 29.4% are neutral, and 17.1% disagree. A mean of 3.56 indicates that
the majority falls between agree and neutral.
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Table 5.11ai: Women Representation
Frequency (%)

Statement

Mean av.
Rating*

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

154

90

42

3.66

(53.8%)

(31.5%)

(14.7%)

+ 0.598

t) Women representation

72

92

122

2.73

should be restricted to the

(25.2%)

(32.2%)

(42.7%)

+ 0.294

i) Women must have equal
representation in

+ SD

parliament

quota set by the president
„t‟ = 3.095 (p= 0.0148) significant difference between the two opposites
Equal Women Representation: (Table 5.11ai) shows that 53.8% agree with
statement (i), 31.5% are neutral, and 14.7% disagree. A mean of 3.66 shows that the
majority is between agree and neutral.
Unequal Women Representation: (Table 5.11ai) shows that 25.2% agree with
statement (t), 32.2% are neutral, and 42.7% disagree. A mean of 2.73 indicates that
the majority is between disagree and neutral.
Table 5.11aj: Coptic Representation
Frequency (%)

Statement

j) Coptic Christians should
hold more than the current 10

Mean av. Rating*
+ SD

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

114

110

62

3.26

(39.9%)

(38.5%)

(21.7%)

+ 0.468

83

132

71

3.06

(29.0%)

(46.2%)

(24.8%)

+ 0.504

percent of parliament seats
u) Coptic Christians should
hold the current 10 percent of

parliament seats
„t‟ = 0.637 (p= 0.5419) no significant difference between the two opposites
More Coptic Representation: (Table 5.11aj) shows that 39.9% agree with statement
(j), 38.5% are neutral, and 21.7% disagree. A mean of 3.26 indicates the majority is
between agree and neutral.
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Same Coptic Representation: (Table 5.11aj) shows that 29 % agree with statement
(u), 46.2% are neutral, and 24.8% disagree. A mean of 3.06 also indicates a majority
that is also between agree and neutral.
Table 5.11ak: Wafd Opposition Party
Frequency (%)

Statement

Mean av. Rating*
+ SD

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

83

139

64

3.08

(29.0%)

(48.6%)

(22.4%)

+ 0.557

v)The Wafd opposition party

92

132

62

3.14

is not expected to hold most

(32.2%)

(46.2%)

(21.7%)

+ 0.538

k)The Wafd opposition party
is expected to hold most
opposition seats in
parliament

opposition seats in
parliament
„t‟ = 0.161 (p= 0.9999) no significant difference between the two opposites
Wafd Majority: (Table 5.11ak) shows that 29 % agree with statement (k), 48.6% are
neutral, and 22.4% disagree. A mean of 3.08 indicates that the majority is between
neutral and agree.
Wafd Not Majority: (Table 5.11ak) shows that 32.2 % agree with statement (v),
46.2% are neutral, and 21.7% disagree. A mean of 3.14 also shows that the majority is
between agree and neutral.
As shown in the above tables most respondents expect the elections to be
violent. However, the majority had positive attitudes towards election monitoring by
judges and independent monitors agreeing that they are important to prevent election
fraud. To determine whether the respondents overall frames corresponded with the
talk shows‟ frames of the elections, the results of the content analysis which basically
indicate which frame was mentioned more, thereby more dominant, are compared
with the survey agreement results listed in the table below.
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5.11b Results of Content Analysis Election Frames
Table 5.11ba: Election Frames: Media Restrictions
Frequency (%)
Opposite Statements

Not

Mentioned

Neutral

3

2

31

(8.3%)

(5.6%)

(86.1%)

5

2

29

(13.9%)

(5.6%)

(80.6%)

The government's recent restrictions on
private media have nothing to do with the
elections
The government recently issued
restrictions on private media because of
the elections

Mentioned

No election-related media restrictions: (Table 5.11ba) displays how the media
restrictions frame was presented out of the total 36 election stories coded. Framing the
government's recent restrictions as having nothing to do with elections was mentioned
8.3%, not mentioned 86.1%, and neutral 5.6%.
Election-related media restrictions: (Table 5.11ba) shows that framing the media
restrictions as being issued because of the elections was mentioned 13.9%, not
mentioned 80.6%, and neutral 5.6%.
Table 5.11bb: Elections Fairness
Frequency (%)
Opposite Statements

The elections will be fairly conducted

The elections will be unfairly conducted

Not

Mentioned

Neutral

13

4

19

(36.1%)

(11.1%)

(52.8%)

13

4

19

(36.1%)

(11.1%)

(52.8%)

Mentioned

Fair Elections vs. Unfair Elections: (Table 5.11bb) shows that framing the elections
as fair and unfair was equally mentioned in 36.1% of the stories, not mentioned
52.8%, and neutral 11.1%.
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Table 5.11bc: The National Democratic Party
Frequency (%)
Opposite Statements

The NDP is expected to hold the majority
of seats in parliament
The NDP is not expected to hold the
majority of seats in parliament

Not

Mentioned

Neutral

9

4

23

(25.0%)

(11.1%)

(63.9%)

0

4

32

(0%)

(11.1%)

(88.9%)

Mentioned

NDP Majority: (Table 5.11bc) shows that framing the NDP as the majority was
mentioned in 25% of the stories, not mentioned 63.9% and neutral 4%.
NDP Not Majority: (Table 5.11bc) shows that framing the NDP as not expected to
hold the majority was mentioned in 0% of the stories, not mentioned in 88.9%, and
neutral in 11.1%.
Table 5.11bd: Judicial Supervision
Frequency (%)
Opposite Statements

Judicial supervision is important to
prevent fraud
Judicial supervision is not important to
prevent fraud

Not

Mentioned

Neutral

10

9

17

(27.8%)

(25.0%)

(47.2%)

10

4

22

(27.8%)

(11.1%)

(61.1%)

Mentioned

Important vs. Unimportant Judicial Supervision: (Table 5.11bd) shows that
framing judicial supervision as important and as unimportant was equally mentioned
in 27.8% of the stories. The importance of judicial supervision was not mentioned in
47.2% and was neutral in 25%. The unimportance of judicial supervision was neutral
in 11.1% and not mentioned in 61.1%.
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Table 5.11be: Peaceful vs. Violent Elections
Frequency (%)
Opposite Statements

The elections are expected to be peaceful

The elections are expected to be violent

Not

Mentioned

Neutral

7

5

24

(19.4%)

(13.9%)

(66.7%)

10

5

21

(27.8%)

(13.9%)

(58.3%)

Mentioned

Peaceful Elections: (Table 5.11be) shows that framing the elections as peaceful was
mentioned 19.4%, not mentioned 66.7% and neutral 13.9%.
Violent Elections: (Table 5.11be) shows that framing the elections as violent was
mentioned 27.8%, not mentioned 58.3% and neutral 13.9%.

Table 5.11bf: Independent Monitors
Frequency (%)
Opposite Statements

It’s important to have independent
monitors
It‟s not important to have independent
monitors

Not

Mentioned

Neutral

11

1

24

(30.6%)

(2.8%)

(66.7%)

5

1

30

(13.9%)

(2.8%)

(83.3%)

Mentioned

Important Independent Monitors: (Table 5.11bf) shows that framing independent
monitors as important was mentioned 30.6%, not mentioned 66.7% and neutral 2.8%.
Unimportant Independent Monitors: (Table 5.11bf) shows that framing
independent monitors as unimportant was only mentioned 13.9%, neutral 2.8%, and
not mentioned 83.3%.
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Table 5.11bg: Opposition Representation
Frequency (%)
Opposite Statements

Opposition party candidates will have a
powerful representation
Opposition party candidates will have a
weak representation

Not

Mentioned

Neutral

6

5

25

(16.7%)

(13.9%)

(69.4%)

15

6

41.7

(41.7%)

(16.7%)

(83.3%)

Mentioned

Powerful Opposition: (Table 5.11bg) shows that framing the opposition
representation as powerful was only mentioned 16.7%, 13.9% neutral, and 69.4% not
mentioned.
Weak Opposition: (Table 5.11bg) shows that framing the opposition representation
as weak was mentioned 41.7%, neutral 16.7% and not mentioned 83.3%.

Table 5.11bh: Muslim Brotherhood
Frequency (%)
Opposite Statements
Muslim brotherhood candidates will be
welcomed to run in the elections by the
government
Muslim brotherhood candidates will be
restricted from running in the elections
by the government

Not

Mentioned

Neutral

5

5

26

(13.9%)

(13.9%)

(72.2%)

8

5

23

(22.2%)

(13.9%)

(63.9%)

Mentioned

Muslim Brotherhood Welcomed: (Table 5.11bh) shows that framing the Muslim
Brotherhood as being welcomed to run in the elections was only mentioned 13.9%,
neutral 13.9% and not mentioned 72.2%.
Muslim Brotherhood Restricted: (Table 5.11bh) shows that framing the Muslim
Brotherhood as being restricted from running in the elections was mentioned 22.2%,
13.9% neutral, and 63.9% not mentioned.
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Table 5.11bi: Women Representation
Frequency (%)
Opposite Statements

Women must have equal representation in
parliament
Women representation should be restricted
to the quota set by the president

Not

Mentioned

Neutral

3

3

30

(8.3%)

(8.3%)

(83.3%)

0

3

33

(0%)

(8.3%)

(91.7%)

Mentioned

Equal Women Representation: (Table 5.11bi) shows that framing equal women
representation was 8.3% mentioned, neutral 8.3%, and not mentioned 83.3%.
Unequal Women Representation: (Table 5.11bi) shows that framing unequal
women representation was mentioned 0%, neutral 8.3% and not mentioned 91.7%.

Table 5.11bj: Coptic Representation
Frequency (%)
Opposite Statements

Coptic Christians should hold more than
the current10 percent of parliament seats
Coptic Christians should hold the usual
current 10 percent seats in parliament

Not

Mentioned

Neutral

6

1

29

(16.7%)

(2.8%)

(80.6%)

0

0

36

(0%)

(0%)

(100.0%)

Mentioned

More Coptic Representation: (Table 5.11bj) shows that framing more Coptic
representation was mentioned 16.7%, neutral 2.8% and not mentioned 80.6%.
Same Coptic Representation: (Table 5.11bj) shows that framing the same Coptic
representation was mentioned 0%, neutral 0% and not mentioned 100%.
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Table 5.11bk: Wafd Opposition Party
Frequency (%)
Opposite Statements

Not

Mentioned

Neutral

9

6

21

(25.0%)

(16.7%)

(58.3%)

0

6

30

(0%)

(16.7%)

(83.3%)

The Wafd opposition party is expected to
hold most opposition seats in parliament
The Wafd opposition party is not expected
to hold most opposition seats in
parliament

Mentioned

Wafd Majority: (Table 5.11bk) shows that framing the Wafd opposition party as
expected to hold most opposition seats was mentioned 25%, neutral 16.7%, and not
mentioned 58.3%.
Wafd Not Majority: (Table 5.11bk) shows that framing the Wafd opposition party as
not expected to hold most opposition seats was mentioned 0%, neutral 16.7%, and not
mentioned 83.3%.

5.11c Comparing Content Analysis & Survey Election Frames
Table 5.11c Comparing content analysis and survey frames of the elections
Content
Analysis

Survey
%

Opposite Frames

%
Mentioned

1 The government's recent restrictions on private media
have nothing to do with the elections

8.3-L

Match
Agree
19.9-L
Yes

2 The government recently issued restrictions on
private media because of the elections

13.9-H

72.0-H

3 The elections will be fairly conducted

36.1

14.3

4 The elections will be unfairly conducted

36.1

66.8

5 Judicial supervision is important to prevent fraud

27.8

69.6-H

6 Judicial supervision is not important to prevent fraud

27.8

18.9-L

No

No
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7 The elections are expected to be peaceful

19.4-L

19.6-L

8 The elections are expected to be violent

27.8-H

55.9-H

9 It’s important to have independent monitors

30.6-H

78.0-H

10 It‟s not important to have independent monitors

13.9-L

12.6-L

11 Opposition party candidates will have a powerful
representation

16.7-L

26.9-L

Yes

Yes

Yes
12 Opposition party candidates will have a weak
representation

41.7-H

49.0-H

13 Muslim brotherhood candidates will be welcomed to
run in the elections by the government

13.9-L

17.1-L
Yes

14 Muslim brotherhood candidates will be restricted
from running in the elections by the government

22.2-H

53.5-H

15 Women must have equal representation in
parliament

8.3-H

53.8-H
Yes

16 Women representation should be restricted to the
quota set by the president

0-L

25.2-L

17 Coptic Christians should hold more than the
current10 percent of parliament seats

16.7-H

39.9-H
Yes

18 Coptic Christians should hold the usual current 10
percent seats in parliament

0-L

29.0-L

19 The NDP is expected to hold the majority of seats in
parliament

25.0-H

74.5-H
Yes

20 The NDP is not expected to hold the majority of seats
in parliament

0-L

19.6-L

21 The Wafd opposition party is expected to hold most
opposition seats in parliament

25.0-H

29.0-L
No

22 The Wafd opposition party is not expected to hold
most opposition seats in parliament

0-L

32.2-H

As shown in (Table 5.11c), 8 framing statements out of 11 matched between
being mentioned by talk shows and agreed upon by respondents, representing a 73%
match.
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5.12 Perception of the role of nightly TV talk shows and civic engagement
attitudes & H3: The more the public perceives talk shows as promoting civic
engagement, the more positive attitudes the public will have towards civic
engagement.
Perception of the role of Egyptian nightly television talk shows in civic
engagement was measured through seven statements on a five-point likert scale.
Civic engagement is operationally defined as sociopolitical awareness, sociopolitical
discussions, public opinion expression, community involvement and political
participation.
Table 5.12a: Perception of nightly television talk shows‟ role in civic engagement
Frequency (%) in degree of agreement
Mean Av.
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Rating*
(5+4)
(3)
(2+1)
+ SD
264
17
5
4.28
(92.3%)
(5.9%)
(1.7%)
+ 1.084
209
57
20
3.90
(73.1%)
(19.9%)
(7.0%)
+ 0.808

Survey Statements of Question 3
Arranged in order of Mean*
a) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are a
source of news about Egypt's affairs
e) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows create
sociopolitical awareness
d) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows
encourage ordinary citizens to express
their opinions publicly (e.g. calls, emails,
fax, letters, sms to the show)
c) Egyptian nightly TV Talk shows
encourage people to make charitable
contributions
b) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows
encourage people to participate in solving
community problems in Egypt
g) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows
encourage citizens to vote
f) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are my
primary source of information about the
Egyptian parliamentary elections held in
Nov. 2010
Total

208
(72.7%)

51
(17.8%)

27
(9.4%)

3.87
+ 0.791

192
(67.1%)

76
(26.6%)

18
(6.3%)

3.82
+ 0.741

144
(50.3%)

91
(31.8%)

51
(17.8%)

3.43
+ 0.542

114
(39.9%)

103
(36.0%)

69
(24.1%)

3.22
+ 0.477

121
(42.3%)

82
(28.7%)

83
(29.0%)

3.21
+ 0.394

1252
(%62.5)

477
(23.8%)

273
(13.6%)

3.68
+ 0.653

* based on a 5-point scale (5=S. Agree, 4=Agree, 3=Neutral, 2=Disagree, 1=S. Disagree)
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Table 5.12aa: Statistical test for table 5.12a
Source of variation

Sum of squares

Degrees of freedom

Mean square

F

Media sources

2.74

6

0.457

1.053

Error

12.16

28

0.434

Total

14.9

34

ANOVA: F= 1.053 not significant (p=0.4134) indicating no significant differences between
the mean average ratings of talk shows role in civic engagement.

a) Perception of talk shows as a source of news: (Table 5.12a) shows that almost
the entire sample, 92.3%, agree that talk shows are a source of news, 5.9% are neutral,
and only 1.7% disagree. A mean of 4.28 indicates that the majority falls between
agree and strongly agree.
e) Perception of talk shows as creating sociopolitical awareness: (Table 5.12a)
shows that the majority representing 73.1%, agree that talk shows promote
sociopolitical awareness, 19.9% are neutral, and only 7% disagree. A mean of 3.90
indicates that the majority falls almost on the agree level.
d) Perception of talk shows as encouraging public opinion expression: (Table
5.12a) shows that the 72.7% representing the majority agree that talk shows
encourage public opinion expression, 17.8% neutral, and only 9.4% disagree. A mean
of 3.87 indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral.
c) Perception of talk shows as encouraging charity: (Table 5.12a) shows that
67.1%, representing the majority, agree that talk shows encourage charity work,
26.6% neutral, and only 6.3% disagree. A mean of 3.22 indicates that the majority
falls between agree and neutral.
b) Perception of talk shows as encouraging community participation: (Table
5.12a) shows that half the sample, 50.3%, agrees that talk shows encourage
community participation, 31.8% neutral, and 17.8% disagree. A mean of 3.43
indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral.

125

g) Perception of talk shows as encouraging voting: (Table 5.12a) shows that
39.9% agree that talk shows encourage voting, followed by 36% neutral, and 24.1%
disagree. A mean of 3.22 indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral.
f) Perception of talk shows as a main source for information on the Egyptian
parliamentary elections: (Table 5.12a) shows that 42.3%, agree that talk shows are
a main source of news regarding the elections, 19.9% are neutral, and 29% disagree.
A mean of 3.21 indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral.
There is a high agreement on the total 2,002 responses. As shown in (Table
5.12a), the total number of agreement on all talk show perception statements is
62.5% or 1,252 agreement responses, compared to 23.8% neutral and a low
disagreement total of 13.6%. The overall mean is 3.68, which is between agree and
neutral indicating a positive perception of the role of television talks shows.
An ANOVA was conducted, as shown in (Table 5.12aa), to test if there was
any significant difference between the statements. The result F= 1.053 is not
significant (p=0.4134), indicating that there is no significant difference between the
mean average ratings of the perceptions of talk shows role in civic engagement.
Figure 5.12a: Perception of nightly TV talk shows‟ role in civic engagement
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5.12b Attitudes towards civic engagement
Civic engagement attitudes were measured through 14 statements on a fivepoint likert scale. Civic engagement is defined into sociopolitical awareness, public
opinion expression, sociopolitical discussions, community participation and political
participation through voting.
Table 5.12b: Attitudes towards civic engagement, listed in descending order of
mean
Statements of Question 4
Arranged in order of Mean

Frequency (%) in degree of agreement
Mean av.
Agree
Neutral Disagree
Rating*
(5+4)
(3)
(2+1)
+ SD

e) Being informed about Egyptian affairs
is important

254
(88.8%)

21
(7.3%)

11
(3.8%)

4.30
+ 1.068

f) I consider sociopolitical awareness a
priority
i) Contributing to community is my
responsibility
g) Citizens should not wait for the
government to solve their community
problems
d) I consider discussing sociopolitical
affairs a priority
j) I volunteer to help solve community
problems in Egypt

224
(78.3%)
206
(72.0%)

43
(15.0%)
59
(20.6%)

19
(6.6%)
21
(7.3%)

4.09
+ 0.889
3.88
+ 0.787

189
(66.1%)

35
(12.2%)

62
(21.7%)

3.70
+ 0.720

176
(61.5%)
157
(54.9%)
160
(55.9%)
159
(55.6%)
146
(51.0%)
140
(49.0%)
138
(48.3%)
104
(36.4%)
86
(30.1%)
68
(23.8%)
2207
(55.1%)

70
(24.5%)
91
(31.8%)
79
(27.6%)
72
(25.2%)
77
(26.9%)
79
(27.6%)
61
(21.3%)
81
(28.3%)
76
(26.6%)
74
(25.9%)
918
(22.9%)

40
(14.0%)
38
(13.3%)
47
(16.4%)
55
(19.2%)
63
(22.0%)
67
(23.4%)
87
(30.4%)
101
(35.3%)
124
(43.4%)
144
(50.3%)
879
(22.0%)

3.69
+ 0.626
3.60
+ 0.570
3.54
+ 0.570
3.55
+ 0.552
3.45
+0.487
3.38
+ 0.461
3.31
+ 0.438
3.03
+ 0.319
2.81
+ 0.316
2.65
+ 0.308
3.50
+ 0.525

h) I make a difference in my community
k) It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's
presidential elections in 2011
a) I consider voting a priority
l) It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's
upcoming parliamentary elections
m) I intend to vote in Egypt's upcoming
presidential elections
n) I intend to vote in the upcoming
parliamentary elections
b) I express my opinion through the
media (e.g. call-ins, emails, etc.)
c) I express my opinion to public officials
(e.g. petitions, letters)
Overall

* based on a 5-point scale (5=S. Agree, 4=Agree, 3=Neutral, 2=Disagree, 1=S. Disagree)
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Table 5.12ba: Statistical test for table 5.12b
Source of variation

Sum of squares

Degrees of freedom

Mean square

F

Media sources

0.557

13

0.043

0.112

Error

21.394

56

0.382

Total

21.951

69

ANOVA: F= 0.112 not significant (p=0.9999) indicating no significant differences between
the mean average ratings of attitudes towards civic engagement. (s2 = 0.382)

e) Informed about Egyptian affairs: (Table 5.12b) shows that the majority 88.8%
agree that being informed about Egyptian affairs is a priority, 7.3% are neutral, and
only 3.8% disagree. A mean of 4.30 indicates that the majority is between strongly
agree and agree.
f) Sociopolitical awareness: (Table 5.12b) shows that the majority 78.3% agree that
sociopolitical awareness is a priority, 15% neutral, and only 6.6% disagree. A mean
of 4.09 indicates that the majority is between agree and strongly agree.
i) Community responsibility: (Table 5.12b) shows that 72% agree that contributing
to community is their responsibility, 20.6% are neutral, and 7.3% disagree. A mean
of 3.88 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral.
g) Community action: (Table 5.12b) shows that the majority comprising 66.1%
agree that citizens should not wait for the government to solve their community
problems, 12.2% are neutral, and 21.7% disagree. A mean of 3.70 indicates that the
majority is between agree and neutral.
d) Discussing sociopolitical affairs: (Table 5.12b) shows that 61.5% agree that
discussing sociopolitical affairs is a priority, 24.5% are neutral, and 14% disagree. A
mean of 3.69 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral.
j) Volunteer to solve community problems: (Table 5.12b) shows that 54.9% agree
with the statement that they volunteer to help solve community problems in Egypt,
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31.8% are neutral, and 13.3% disagree. A mean of 3.60 indicates that the majority is
between agree and neutral.
h) Community value: (Table 5.12b) shows that 55.9% agree that they make a
difference in their communities, 27.6% are neutral, and 16.4% disagree. A mean of
3.54 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral.
k) Voting responsibility, presidential elections: (Table 5.12b) shows that 55.6%
agree that it's their responsibility to vote in Egypt's presidential elections in 2011,
25.2% are neutral, 19.2% disagree. A mean of 3.55 indicates that the majority agree.
a) I consider voting a priority: (Table 5.12b) shows that 51% agree that they
consider voting a priority, 26.9% are neutral, and 22% disagree. A mean of 3.45
indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral.
l) Voting responsibility, parliamentary elections: (Table 5.12b) shows that 49%
agree that it's their responsibility to vote in Egypt's 2010 parliamentary elections,
27.6% are neutral, and 23.4% disagree. A mean of 3.38 indicates that the majority is
between agree and neutral.
m) Voting intention, presidential elections: (Table 5.12b) shows that 48.3% agree
that they intend to vote in the presidential elections, 21.3% are neutral, and 30.4%
disagree. A mean of 3.31 indicates that the majority is between neutral and agree.
n) Voting intention, parliamentary elections: (Table 5.12b) shows that 36.4%
agree that they intend to vote in the Nov.2010 parliamentary elections, 28.4% are
neutral, and 35.3% disagree. A mean of 3.03 indicates that the majority is neutral.
b) Public opinion expression through media: (Table 5.12b) shows that 30.1%
agree that they express their opinions through mass media, 26.6% are neutral, and
43.4% disagree. A mean of 2.81 indicates that the majority is between neutral and
disagree.
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c) I express my opinion to public officials: (Table 5.12b) shows that 23.8% agree
that they express their opinions to public officials, 25.9% are neutral, and 50.3%
disagree. A mean of 2.65 indicates that the majority is between neutral and disagree.
Overall, as shown in (Table 5.12b) the agreement percentage on the total 14
statements measuring civic engagement attitudes is more than half (55.1 %). The
overall neutrality and disagreement percentage with the civic engagement attitudes
are almost the same, 22.9% and 22% respectively. The total mean average for all the
statements is 3.50 which indicates that the majority of respondents are between agree
and neutral. The majority fall midpoint between agree and neutral with regards to
civic engagement attitudes, which indicate positive attitudes.
As shown in (Table 5.12ba), an ANOVA was conducted to determine whether
there was a significant between the mean average ratings of attitudes towards civic
engagement and the result was ANOVA: F= 0.112 not significant (p=0.9999)
indicating no significant differences. (s2 = 0.382)
Figure 5.12b: Attitudes towards civic engagement
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5.12c Perception of the role of television talk shows & attitudes towards civic
engagement
Perception of talk shows as promoting civic engagement was measured
through seven statements on a five-point liker scale in question 4 in the questionnaire.
The results were listed earlier in section 5.12a, showing an average mean of
agreement on perceiving talk shows as having a positive role regarding civic
engagement. A correlation coefficient was carried out to test H3 to determine if there
is a significant correlation between perception of talk shows as civically engaging and
positive attitudes towards civic engagement. Statements from survey question (3)
which measure the perception were correlated with corresponding statements in
question (4) measuring attitudes towards civic engagement. Statement (c) regarding
the perception of talk shows as encouraging charity was not included in the
correlations table because it didn‟t have corresponding attitude statement. The
following table shows lists the results.
Table 5.12c: Correlations between perception of the role of talk shows and civic
engagement attitudes
Correlated variables

R

P

0.173**
0.166**

0.003
0.005

-0.032
0.047
0.029
0.178**

0.585
0.433
0.631
0.003

d)TV talk shows encourage opinion expression &
- Opinion expression through Media
- Opinion expression to public officials
- Discussing sociopolitical affairs

0.190**
0.073
0.209**

0.001
0.216
0.000

e)TV talk shows promote sociopolitical awareness &
- Informed about Egyptian affairs
- Sociopolitical awareness priority

0.244**
0.295**

a)TV talk shows are a source of news &
-Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important
- I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority
b)TV talk shows encourage community participation &
- Citizens should not wait for government to solve problems
- I make a difference in my community
- Community contribution a responsibility
- I volunteer to solve community problems
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0.000
0.000

f)TV talk shows are a main source of election information &
- Responsibility to vote in parliamentary elections
- Intention to vote in parliamentary elections

0.083
0.128*

0.160
0.030

g)TV talk shows encourage voting &
- Voting priority
0.256** 0.000
- Responsibility to vote in presidential elections
0.204** 0.001
- Responsibility to vote in parliamentary elections
0.215** 0.000
- Intention to vote in presidential elections
0.192** 0.001
- Intention to vote in parliamentary elections
0.264** 0.000
* Correlation coefficient „r‟ significant (at 0.05 level of probability)
** Correlation coefficient „r‟ highly significant (at 0.01 level of probability)
a) Correlations between perception of talk shows as source of news and
attitudes towards sociopolitical awareness: (Table 5.12c) shows that the
correlation was highly significant at 0.173** and 0.166** with the two
statements measuring attitudes towards sociopolitical awareness.
b) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as encouraging
community participation and respondents‟ attitudes towards community
participation were highly significant, 0.178**, with one statement: „I volunteer
to help solve community problems in Egypt‟. There was no significance with
the remaining three statements shown in (Table 5.12c).
d) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as encouraging opinion
expression and respondent‟s attitudes towards opinion expression were
highly significant with expression opinion through media, 0.190**, and
discussing sociopolitical affairs, 0.209**. The correlation was insignificant
with expressing opinions directly to public officials.
e) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as promoting
sociopolitical awareness and attitudes towards sociopolitical awareness
were highly significant with 0.244** for being informed about Egyptian
affairs, and 0.295** for considering sociopolitical awareness a priority.
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f) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as a primary source
for election information and attitudes towards the elections were
significant, 0.128*, with the intention to vote in the elections. However, they
were insignificant, 0.083, with the responsibility to vote in the elections.
g) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as encouraging voting
and the five attitudes towards voting were all highly significant: Voting
priority, 0.256**, Responsibility to vote in presidential elections, 0.204**,
responsibility to vote in parliamentary elections, 0.215**, intention to vote in
presidential elections, 0.192**, and the intention to vote in the parliamentary
elections, 0.264**

As shown in table 5.12c and the corresponding results, there is a significant to
highly significant correlation between most of the talk show perception statements
and corresponding attitudes towards civic engagement.
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5.13 Exposure & attitudes towards civic engagement & H4: There is a relation
between exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement
attitudes.
Exposure to nightly television talk shows was defined earlier in section 5.8 of
the results as the degree of dependency on talk shows for news. This was measured on
the three-point scale: always, sometimes, never. A mean average result of 2.46
indicates that the majority fall between always and sometimes. Civic engagement
attitudes are measured in question (4) in the survey on a five-point liker scale. The
following table is based on cross tabulations between each statement in question (4)
with exposure (see Appendix K). The ratio results and percentages are listed below.
Table 5.13a: Relationship between Exposure to Talk Shows and Civic
Engagement Attitudes
Television Talk Shows
Civic Engagement Attitudes

Exposure

(Strongly agree & Agree)

(Always & Sometimes)
Ratio

%

a) Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important

251 / 286

87.8%

b) I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority

222 / 286

77.8%

c)

203 / 286

71.0%

d) Citizens should not wait for the government to solve community

187 / 286

65.4%

e)

Discussing sociopolitical affairs

175 / 286

61.2%

f)

Responsibility to vote at presidential elections

159 / 286

55.6%

g) Making a difference in community

158 / 286

55.2%

h) Volunteer to solve community problems

156 / 286

54.5%

i)

Voting priority

145 / 286

50.7%

j)

Responsibility to vote at parliamentary elections

140 / 286

48.9%

k) Intention to vote at presidential elections

138 / 286

48.3%

l)

104 / 286

36.4%

m) Opinion expression through media

85 / 286

29.7%

n) Opinion expression to public officials

68 / 286

23.8%

Community contribution is my responsibility

Intend to vote at parliamentary elections
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a) Relationship between exposure to talk shows and attitudes towards being
informed about Egyptian affairs was the highest relationship, representing 87.8%
b) Relationship between exposure and considering sociopolitical awareness a
priority was the second highest, representing 77.8%
c) Relationship between exposure and considering community contribution a
responsibility was also high, representing 71.0%
d) Relationship between exposure and considering that citizens should not wait for
the government to solve community problems was relatively high, representing
65.4%
e) Relationship between exposure and discussing sociopolitical affairs was
relatively high, representing 61.2%
f) Relationship between exposure and responsibility to vote at presidential
elections was moderate, representing 55.6%
g) Relationship between exposure and making a difference in community was
moderate, representing 55.2%
h) Relationship between exposure and volunteering to solve community problems
in Egypt was moderate, representing 54.5%
i) Relationship between exposure and considering voting a priority was moderate,
representing 50.7%
j) Relationship between exposure and responsibility to vote at parliamentary
elections was low, representing 48.9%
k) Relationship between exposure and the intention to vote at presidential
elections was low, representing 48.3%
l) Relationship between exposure and the intention to vote at parliamentary
elections was low, representing 36.4%
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m) Relationship between exposure and opinion expression through media was very
low, representing 29.7%
n) Relationship between exposure and opinion expression to public officials was
very low, representing 23.8%
The following figure shows the relationships between exposure and civic
engagement attitudes as displayed in (Table 5.13a).

Figure 5.13a Relationship between Television Talk Shows Exposure and Civic
Engagement Attitudes

Civic Engagement Attitudes
Informed about Egyptian affairs
Sociopolitical awareness priority
Community contribution responsibility
Citizens should act and not wait for government
Discussing sociopolitical affairs
Responsibility to vote in presidential elections
Making a difference in community
Volunteer to solve community problems
Voting priority
Responsibility to vote at parliamentary elections
Intention to vote at presidential elections
Intention to vote at parliamentary elections
Opinion expression through media
Opinion expression to public officials
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5.13b Overall level of civic engagement
Civic engagement attitudes were categorized and rated on a five-point scale
according to the operational definition of civic engagement: sociopolitical awareness,
sociopolitical discussions, opinion expression, community involvement, and political
participation. Each of the five aspects is given a value from 1 to 5, representing a
specific weight on the civic engagement scale created by the researcher. Political
participation was considered the highest level of engagement and hence given a value
of 5. Community engagement is the second highest level (4), opinion expression (3),
sociopolitical discussions (2), and sociopolitical awareness was given a value of (1).
Accordingly, the total percentage of agreement with attitude statements measuring a
specific category was calculated and translated into a corresponding value for each
category of civic engagement with 1 (representing the basic level of engagement) to 5
(representing the top level of engagement).
Table 5.13b Overall Level and Value of Civic Engagement
Civic Engagement Categories
[Agree + Strongly Agree/exposure]
Sociopolitical Awareness (Value=1)
Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important
I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority
Community Involvement (Value=4)
Contributing to community is my responsibility
Citizens shouldn‟t wait for the government to solve their community
problems
I make a difference in my community
I volunteer to solve community problems in Egypt
Sociopolitical Discussions (Value=2)
I consider discussing sociopolitical affairs a priority
Political Participation (Value=5)
It‟s my responsibility to vote in Egypt‟s upcoming presidential
elections
I consider voting a priority
It‟s my responsibility to vote in Egypt‟s upcoming parliamentary
elections
I intend to vote in Egypt‟s upcoming presidential elections
I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections
Opinion Expression (Value=3)
I express my opinion through the media (e.g. call-ins, emails)
I express my opinion to public officials (e.g. petitions, letters)
Total Value
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N

%

Value

473 82.6%
251 87.8%
222 77.8%
704 82.05%
203 71.0%
187 65.4%
158 55.2%
156 54.5%

0.8/1

157

61.2%

1.1/2

686
159
145
140
138
104

47.9%
55.6%
50.7%
48.9%
48.3%

2.4/5

3.8/4

36.4%
153
85
68

26.7% 0.8/3
29.7%
23.8%
2.96/5

Sociopolitical Awareness: as shown in (Table 5.13b), the total percentage of
agreement with the two statements measuring sociopolitical awareness, represents the
highest category of civic engagement (82.6%). The calculated rating value of this
category is 0.82/1.
Community Involvement: as shown in (Table 5.13b) the total percentage of
agreement with the four statements measuring community involvement represents is
(82.05%), making community involvement the second highest category. The
calculated value is 3.8/4.
Sociopolitical Discussions: as shown in (Table 5.13b), the percentage of the
statement measuring sociopolitical affairs discussions is (61.2%), representing the
third highest category. The calculated rating value is 1.08/2.
Political participation: as shown in (Table 5.13b) the total percentage of agreement
with the five statements measuring political participation is (47.9%) making political
participation the fourth category of engagement. The calculated value is 2.4/5.
Opinion Expression: as shown in (Table 5.13b), the total percentage of agreement
with the two statements measuring opinion expression is the lowest (26.7%). The
calculated value of this category is 0.78/3.

The overall value as shown in (Table 5.13b) is 2.96/5, as illustrated in (Figure
5.13bb). The value was derived through calculating the total values (in the values
column) which produced 8.88/15. The total was then multiplied by 5, for placement
on the 5-point civic engagement scale created by the researcher. The following
figures illustrate the results.
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Figure 5.13ba Percentages of civic engagement categories
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Figure 5.13bb Overall value of civic engagement
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5.14 Mean average ratings of education level and perception of the role of talk
shows
Because the sample surveyed is the well-educated elite, it was necessary to
conduct further statistical tests to examine if there was any significant difference
between the different levels of education, listed in (Table 5.1) with the perception of
the role of talk shows.
Table 5.14 Mean average ratings of education level and perception of the role of talk
shows
Av. Rating* of Education levels
Statements on the role of talk shows

a) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are a
source of news about Egypt's affairs
b) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows
encourage people to participate in solving
community problems in Egypt
c) Egyptian nightly TV Talk shows
encourage people to make charitable
contributions
d) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows
encourage ordinary citizens to express their
opinions publicly (e.g. calls, emails, fax,
letters, sms to the show)
e) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows create
sociopolitical awareness
f) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are my
primary source of information about the
Egyptian parliamentary elections held in
Nov. 2010

Undergrad

BA

Grad.
Student

MA

PHD

4.19

4.39

4.3

4.41

4.25

3.53

3.45

3.07

3.5

2.63

3.71

4.01

3.93

3.97

3

3.88

3.84

4

3.79

3.63

3.86

4.01

3.87

3.91

3.75

3.31

3.43

2.63

3.06

2.5

g) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows
3.39
3.27
2.73
3.03 2.5
encourage citizens to vote
Mean
3.70
3.77
3.50
3.67 3.18
* based on: 5= Strongly agree, 4= Agree, 3= Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1= Strongly disagree.

Table 5.14a Statistical test for table 5.14
Source of variation Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F
Education levels
1.55
4
0.3875
1.33
Error
8.75
30
0.2917
Total
10.3
34
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As shown in (Table 5.14a), ANOVA F between education levels = 1.33 not
significant (p=0.2816), indicating no significant differences between the mean
average ratings of education levels. Error mean square s2 =0.292.
5.15 Mean average ratings of education level and civic engagement attitudes
Because the sample surveyed is the well-educated elite, it was necessary to
conduct further statistical tests to examine if there was any significant difference
between the different levels of education, listed in (Table 5.1) with attitudes towards
civic engagement.
Table 5.15 Mean average ratings of education levels and civic engagement
attitudes
Civic engagement attitudes

Average rating* of Education levels
Undergrad
BA
Grad.
MA
PH
stude
D
nt
3.59
3.34
3.5
3.06
3.5
2.88
2.96
2.6
2.35
2.88
2.65
2.88
2.43
2.35
3
2.58
3.88
3.8
3.59
4.13
4.29
4.27
4.27
4.38
4.5
3.99
4.12
4.27
4.21
4.5
3.63
3.63
3.6
4.03
4.5
3.56
3.45
3.6
3.53
3.63
3.9
3.78
4.07
3.85
3.88

a) voting a priority
b) opinion through the media
c) opinion to public officials
d) discussing sociopolitical affairs
e) informed about Egyptian affairs
f) sociopolitical awareness a priority
g) Citizens should solve their problems
h) I make a difference in my community
i) Contributing to community
j) volunteer to help solve community
3.63
3.61
3.63
3.47
3.63
problems
k) responsibility to vote presidential
3.62
3.52
3.83
3
3.75
elections
l) responsibility to vote parliamentary
3.44
3.33
3.53
3.06
3.75
elections
m) vote intent presidential elections
3.36
3.34
3.63
2.71
3.38
n) vote intent parliamentary elections
3.13
3.13
2.9
2.5
3.13
Mean av. rating
3.45
3.52
3.55
3.29
3.73
* based on: 5= Strongly agree, 4= Agree, 3= Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1= Strongly disagree.

Table 5.15a Statistical test for table 5.15
ANOVA
Source of variation
Education levels
Error
Total

Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F
1.39
4
0.35
19.09
65
0.29
20.48
69
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1.21

As shown in (Table 5.15a), ANOVA F between education levels = 1.21 not
significant (p=0.3151), indicating no significant differences between the mean
average ratings of education levels. Error mean square s2 =0.294.
5.16 Mean average ratings of education level and media exposure
Because the sample surveyed is the well-educated elite, it was necessary to
conduct further statistical tests to examine if there was any significant difference
between the different levels of education, listed in (Table 5.1) with media exposure.
Table 5.16 Mean average ratings of education level and media exposure
Media Exposure

Newspapers
Television news
Television talk shows
Radio news
Radio talk shows
Magazines
Internet
Mean av. rating

Average rating *of Education levels
Grad.
Undergrad.
BA
MA
Student
2.27
2.49
2.53
2.29
2.29
2.21
1.83
2.03
2.51
2.43
2.33
2.35
1.64
1.61
1.6
1.68
1.54
1.61
1.37
1.41
1.7
1.57
1.27
1.5
2.67
2.22
2.7
2.41
2.09
2.02
1.95
1.95

PHD
2.75
2
2.63
1.75
1.13
1.38
2.25
1.98

* based on: 5= Strongly agree, 4= Agree, 3= Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1= Strongly disagree.

Table 5.16a Statistical test for table 5.16
ANOVA
Source of variation Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F
Education levels
0.09
4
0.0225
0.09
Error
7.51
30
0.25 ns
Total
7.6
34
As shown in (Table 5.16a), ANOVA F between education levels = 0.09 not
significant (p=0.9849) indicating no significant differences between the mean average
ratings of education levels. Error mean square s2 =0.250.
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5.17 Qualitative Interview Results
5.17.1 Experts perception of civic engagement in Egypt
RQ1: How do experts perceive civic engagement in Egypt?
Experts were divided over the status of civic engagement in pre-revolution
Egypt. Some experts agreed with the statement that Egyptian citizens are politically
apathetic and some didn‟t.
Dr. Barbara Ibrahim, director of the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy
and Civic Engagement at the American University in Cairo, disagrees with the
statement that Egyptians are politically apathetic. Ibrahim asserted that “Egyptians are
politically well informed.” She asserted that when Egyptians see a window of
opportunity for free and fair elections, they will feel that their voices really count and
they will be politically engaged citizens. The lack of political participation is a result
of three decades of what Ibrahim describes as a “fossilized political system [with] no
circulation of power”. Egyptians have figured out that their voices do not count, that
elections are forged, and that the national democratic ruling party enforces its will,
regardless of people‟s engagement.
Dr. Ibrahim noted that youth are engaged in Egypt and cited examples such as
the 6th of April movement and bloggers. She also cited youth involvement in the
social service group called Resala which has 90 thousand members operating 34
branches across Egypt. “I can‟t even think about any US organization that is founded
and led by young people that reached that level,” she said.
Journalism and Mass Communication Professor Naila Hamdy believes that
Egyptians used to be politically apathetic but they have started to change over the past
few years. According to Dr. Hamdy, Egyptians engagement may not go as far as
voting but “they still discuss, watch, analyze, comment, [and] circulate media about
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events.” Dr. Hamdy noted that even the Egyptian elite who gave up and stopped being
interested in politics for many years, are much more active now.
Dr. Amani Al Shimi of the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic
Engagement, also agrees with Dr. Ibrahim and Dr. Hamdy. She explains that
Egyptians don‟t take steps toward voicing their opinions on the assumption that their
opinion will not change the status quo but asserts that a large portion of the Egyptian
population has opinions and insights about the political ruling in Egypt. “They are
very critical and analytic about their future situation. They do have a voice. They,
sometimes, choose not to use it,” Al Shimi explained. However, when it comes to
voting, they are discouraged by the tedious process for issuing a voting card.
Director of the Adham Center for Journalism Training and Research, Hafez
Mirazi, emphasized that there needs to be a clear definition for political apathy. “If
political apathy means the low numbers for voting or political participation in the way
that it could be measured by American standards or western standards,” then
Egyptians would be apathetic. However, Mirazi believes that Egyptians are involved
and interested in politics. Empirically speaking by American standards, no voting
would make someone apathetic, but when it comes to involvement or interest,
Egyptians are very active. Their “sense of perceived powerlessness” is the reason for
their political inactivity, he explained. They could be discouraged and feel it‟s not
worth the trouble because they don‟t have the power to make real change but they
frequently discuss politics. “It is not fair to call someone who is talking politics and
eating and drinking politics apathetic,” Professor Mirazi asserted.
Professor Mirazi added that in order to accurately measure civic engagement
in Egypt, charity and activities at religious institutions including mosques and
churches should considered. Disregarding this form of activity in Egypt and dealing
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with civic engagement as strictly secular is not fair and would make everyone
apathetic, he explained. Civic engagement could be an alternative for people because
they gave up on the political democratic process. By being engaged, Egyptians feel
they can do something about their society. This in turn should lead to more political
participation because it trains people to be more involved. “You can‟t have a
democratic society without civic engagement. But, you can have civic engagement
without a democratic society,” Professor Mirazi explained. “A prerequisite of
democratic society is civic engagement.”
Dr. El Shimi noted that there is an awakening among the youth population in
Egypt. Large numbers of young people create or participate in groups with a mission
to serve the community in a variety of ways. For example some groups address
poverty related issues, gender equity, or support child rights. The themes are various
and the fact that large numbers of students from schools and universities engage in
such activities shows that people are not apathetic.
On the other hand, Journalism and Mass Communication Professor Amani
Ismail agrees with the statement saying that a significant portion of Egyptian citizens
are politically apathetic. Dr. Ismail attributed the low voter turnout in the November
2010 parliamentary elections to political apathy in Egypt. According to Dr. Ismail, the
voter turnout was about quarter of the total aggregate of the eligible population. She
also argued that political apathy is also manifested in the fact that there aren‟t
demonstrations and protests against issues that people complain about all the time.
Although professor Ismail perceives Egyptians as politically apathetic, she
noted that one can‟t accuse Egyptian citizens of political apathy without taking into
consideration the root causes behind their apathy. Citing Maslow‟s hierarchy of
needs, which places the most essential needs for survival such as food, shelter, and
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water at the very base of the needs pyramid, Professor Ismail argues that one can‟t
expect Egyptians to be politically active when a big portion of the population is
deprived of such basic needs. “More than third of the population are under the poverty
line. You can‟t really expect them to be politically active,” said Dr. Ismail, explaining
one of the reasons behind political apathy.
Professor Ismail added that about half of the Egyptian population can‟t read or
write and by excluding this 50 percent in addition to the population under 18 who
can‟t vote, a small portion of the population is left which includes the vocal
intellectual elite. Dr. Ismail said the intellectual elite are very vocal but in terms of
mobilizing for political activism and for political reform in society, it‟s more about
the quantity and not the quality. Numbers do matter, she asserted citing the example
of US women who were able to achieve suffrage by 1920 because many open-minded
men believed in their cause and supported them.
Dr. Laila Abdul Meguid, journalism and mass communication professor and
former dean at Cairo University, also agrees with Dr. Ismail that the majority of
Egyptians have been politically apathetic for many years. She attributes this apathy to
the historical, social and economic structure of Egypt. Professor Abdul Meguid
explains that in Egyptian culture, there is usually no space for people to express their
opinions. The Egyptian society is built on a tribal system. She added that under this
system, any institution whether educational, media or even family is hierarchical in
nature. Furthermore, democracy is not even instilled in the educational system.
Therefore, the ideas of establishing dialogue, accepting opposition, and the
differences in opinion are not well established in Egyptian culture. She also noted that
Egyptian society is a centralized one. Decisions come from top to bottom. Therefore,
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citizens don‟t feel that they are real partners so they don‟t take the initiative to change
their communities.
The concept of democracy must be nurtured for the coming generations,
beginning with the family and the educational system. In many instances, one can find
an amount of censorship and direct supervision from the parental authority or the
educators who impose their supervision on their children or students rather than
encourage discussion or dialogue. This is one of the reasons why most Egyptian
citizens are politically apathetic, asserted Dr. Abdel Meguid. When students voice
their opinions at the university, their voices should be heard and others should respect
their opinions. In Egyptian culture, the voices of young people are often ignored just
because they are young and their opinions are not perceived as important. Therefore,
when citizens reach the eligible age of voting at 18, they do not transform into active
citizens just because they reached the legal age. They were raised up in a passive
culture that doesn‟t encourage them to be active or even make decisions on their own
including crucial life changing decisions such as which university to join or which
partner to marry, said Dr. Abdel Meguid.
AUC Political Science Professor Manar El-Shorbagy, who also agrees that
Egyptians are politically apathetic, noted that people have learned throughout the last
50 years that engagement in politics is risky. Egyptians fear being subjected to trouble
so they avoid participating in politics but they are not “genetically apathetic”. Dr. ElShorbagy agrees with Dr. Ismail that Egyptians learned that their votes don‟t count,
which was recently exemplified by the most fraudulent parliamentary elections of
November 2010. Although it‟s a “smart position” for people to choose not to waste
their time when they already know in advance that their votes won‟t count, the
problem is total withdrawal. Dr. Hassan Hamed, journalism and mass communication
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professor, also believes that Egyptians suffer from political apathy. They are very
negative and their participation is very limited, consequently, most of the population
is not engaged, Professor Hamed explained.
AUC Journalism and Mass Communication Professor Mervat Abou Ouf,
agrees that apathy is becoming a norm in Egypt. People are taking a passive approach
because they perceive it as an equivalent to being safe and secure. Egypt is not a
democratic nation and people fear retaliation if they take action. People have to have
some sort of an incentive or sense of belonging to become active. Professor Abou Ouf
said the young generation who has the educational means are the country‟s hope and
all what they need to do to is get engaged. All the engaging social networking on the
Internet is a platform for these young people to express their ideas and beliefs freely.
This is a sign that youth care. But they need a push to get more involved. They need
to trust that they can make a difference, asserted Professor Abou Ouf.
Sociology Professor Madiha Safty, who conducted a research in 2005 for
UNDP on social capital which involves public and political community participation,
found that Egyptians were very apathetic. She noted that, they are “indifferent to the
point of apathy.” Dr. Safty explained that Egyptians are not willing to participate
because they don‟t affiliate with their communities for several reasons. Like Abdel
Meguid, Dr.Safty attributed this passiveness to the absence of political education in
the Egypt.
Cairo University Journalism and Mass Communication Professor Sami ElSherif, believes that not all Egyptians are apathetic. He emphasized that the
intellectuals and elites are the most involved politically and socially. As for the rest
the population who struggle with finding a living, they are less active. According to
Dr. El-Sherif, civic engagement is still a newly born idea in Egypt.
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5.17.2 Experts perception of the role of media in general and Egyptian nightly
television talk shows in particular in fostering civic engagement in Egypt
RQ2: How do experts perceive the role of Egyptian nightly television talk shows in
fostering civic engagement in Egypt?
As for the role of media, most experts believed that the media‟s role starts
with creating awareness and that change will have to come from the well-informed
citizens.
Regarding the role of media in fostering civic engagement in Egypt, Dr.
Ibrahim agrees that the media play a vital role because unless citizens are well
informed, they can‟t act responsibly. According to Ibrahim, 10 years ago all of the
Egyptian media was controlled by the state, and there were only two or three
television channels. Now, there is an “explosive growth of satellite channels and
independent newspapers in Egypt.” Regardless of the fact that the independent media
is occasionally attacked and their editors fined or jailed, Ibrahim thinks it is almost
impossible to go backward. The media give people a voice, encouraging them to
express their opinions publicly about social and political issues in Egypt. She cited the
examples of television talk shows and call-in radio programs, adding that the Internet
is partly contributing to that as well. Ibrahim attributes the increase in political
activism over the past 20 years to the corresponding increase in sources of
information. “The multiplicity of sources of information aspire more activism,” she
said.
In getting audience‟s to voice their opinions and to voice their agendas, the
media itself can act as a form of civic engagement, explained Dr. El Shimi. By
providing a space for citizens‟ voices and raising awareness, discussions, and debates
the media becomes a mean of civic engagement. The media has a lot of potential
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because it can help people be more critical viewers and provide space for people to
talk about their problems. “The media can act as a teacher and at the same time a
bridge or a facilitator of civic engagement,” Professor El Shimi explained.
According to Dr. Hamdy, Egyptian media has changed dramatically over the past
few years. “The media is much more vibrant and they handle all kinds of issues and
that allows for changing the way people think. It makes people want to be part of their
society and be civically engaged.” Whether talk shows promote civic engagement
depends on the nature of the show and the selection of topics, explained Dr. Hamdy.
But many of them play a role in promoting civic engagement. They create awareness
among audiences who learn about new issues through these talk shows. The effect of
talk shows on awareness is seen across different strata in Egyptian society but most
impressively the unprivileged population. Professor Hamdy noted that before the
introduction of talk shows, it was seldom to witness uneducated citizens at public
transportation means engaging in debates about politics in reference to what they saw
the night before on a television talk show.
Although Dr. Hamdy emphasized that it is difficult to measure the direct impact
of talk shows and other media, she believes that talk shows “have helped people think
about engaging in community issues and community awareness.” Citing the Agrium
petrochemical case as an example, Dr. Hamdy said ordinary citizens protested against
the establishment of the factory because they learned about environmental hazards
through media. According to Professor Hamdy, a lot of the influence in the Agrium
case came from television as well.
Sociopolitical discussions on talk shows help make people more aware of what is
going especially when politics is of interest to the Egyptian audience. Talk shows
discuss issues that are of interest to the audience. Professor Mirazi described how
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ironic it is to find people tuned to television talk shows discussing politics late at night
instead of watching something entertaining such as a movie or drama. “It gives you a
statement about how people are really glued to political issues and that they are not
apathetic…These talk shows keep them more interested and sometimes guide the
discussions,” Professor Mirazi said.
Dr. El Sherif described the media‟s role as essential in creating a democratic
environment that fosters effective community and political participation. To fulfill
this role, it‟s crucial to have a free media which is an integral part in any political
reform experience. By informing people of their social and political rights and
responsibilities and by giving them space to express their opinions freely, the media
encourage people to be civically engaged. However, Professor El Sherif emphasized
that it‟s difficult to evaluate the role of media in Egypt because the free and
independent media is newly born and the state-owned media strongly portrays the
views of the government.
Professor El Sherif explained that television talk shows encourage people to
express their opinions by criticizing certain negative aspects in their community
including high profile individuals such as ministers in the government, which never
existed in the Egyptian media before. When people get exposed to such shows and see
others expressing a diversity of opinions, they get affected and it creates some sort of
a movement in society. On the other hand, Dr. El Sherif asserted that media alone
cannot push people to go and vote. Media can only call on people to participate
because there are other factors involved, such as how citizens value the importance of
their voices.
As for encouraging political participation, Dr. El Sherif noted that despite the
fact that the media covered the parliamentary elections extensively, official
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participation was 14 million. However, he considered this 35 % participation
“reasonable”. Professor El Sherif who was also a member of the committee assigned
by former information minister Anas El Fiki to monitor the performance of the
Egyptian media during the Nov.2010 parliamentary Elections, argued that the best
aspect about the elections was the media coverage. According to Dr. El Sherif, state
television provided opposition parties with the opportunity to express their points of
view and gave every candidate five minutes to present their views.
Professor El Sherif asserted that television talk shows on state-owned channels
encouraged participation in the elections through covering candidates from all walk of
politics. The media‟s role in covering the elections was rated by El Sherif as 80
percent successful. He further elaborated that programs did abide by the committee‟s
rules. Chief among these rules is separating editorial content from the elections‟
advertising content. For example, if a minister is running in the elections, there should
be a clear separation between covering his day-to-day activities as a minister and
covering his race in the elections.
On the other hand, Professor Abou Ouf disagrees with El Sherif emphasizing
that “media have loads of defects in fulfilling” their role because they are heavily
affected by agendas from different parties including the government and businessmen.
This affects media content as each party tries to serve its interests. Professor Abou
Ouf noted that Egypt is “far lagging” compared to the rest of the world when it comes
to the role of media in promoting active citizenship. Media is also restricted by the
government when it comes to fulfilling its functions freely. Freedom of expression is
not absolute. For example, the talk show which enjoyed almost absolute freedom was
Al Qahera Al Youm and it was shut down for political reasons ahead of the Nov.2010
parliamentary elections.
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In order for the media to play an effective role in civic engagement, the media
should be free, said Dr. Safty supporting Professor Abu Ouf‟s point of view. If people
can say what they feel and express themselves freely on the media, they can pave the
road to democracy. Dr. Safty explained that the last few years before the revolution
witnessed more rallies, strikes, and protests because the media enjoyed more freedom.
People had more space to express their frustration on the media which stirred up ideas
and opposition which didn‟t exist in the past.
Dr. Shorbagy noted that it‟s difficult to analyze the role of the media without
putting the whole political context into consideration. If there is relative openness in
the media but political parties remain restrained and demonstrations remain risky, the
media openness becomes just a way for people to express their frustration. She argued
that people talk about issues, listen and feel angry but at the end of the day they
switch off their “TV and they go to sleep.” On the other hand, the government
realized that this openness in the media is making people angry at the government and
dissatisfied so they started to limit that freedom again by closing down several
satellite channels and talk shows before the November 2010 elections.
Dr. Hassan Hamed believes the media has a limited role. Civil society groups
must unite their efforts in order to do something beneficial for the welfare of society.
If all elements of society are not involved, media will not be able to fulfill a civically
engaging role in society on its own. Thus, all the roles need to be integrated together,
explained Dr. Hamed. Television talk shows and the media create political awareness
and motivate citizens to participate but this is not enough, Dr. Hamed asserted.
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5.17.3 Experts perception of the future strategies that should be adopted by talk
shows to foster civic engagement in Egypt
RQ3: How do experts perceive the strategies that Egyptian nightly television talk
shows should implement to foster civic engagement in Egypt?
Experts provided a multiplicity of ideas that would serve as recommendations
for media outlets in general and talk shows in particular to play a more effective and
responsible role in society. Many experts called for the need to establish credibility,
professionalism, and balance in the media coverage.
Ibrahim noted that for Egypt to change, new mechanisms, institutions, and
networks that allow youth voices to be heard must be established. New ideas need to
circulate in society which always originate from young people, explained Dr. Ibrahim
adding that more outlets are needed to provide young people with a platform to share
their opinions. Ibrahim noted that democracy can only work if citizens are engaged
and if they invest in taking the time to inform themselves through a variety of sources
as well as expose themselves to different perspectives. She asserted that media play a
pivotal role in informing the Egyptian public, yet they still need to be more
professional and more disciplined in the way they cover the news. Lack of
professionalism is seen in how factual reporting gets mixed with opinions by the
Egyptian media. As for talk shows to play a more constructive role in promoting civic
engagement, Ibrahim suggested hosting government officials, parliamentarians and
governors and asking a panel of citizens to interview them on the talk show.
Dr. El Shimi said that although talk shows like Masr Ennaharda have diverse
themes or topics to cover, there is still no diversity among the guests they interview.
She also said that interviewers or talk show hosts should only be facilitators who
guide the audience to critically observe and form opinions rather than enforce their
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opinions on their audiences. This is crucial because anything interviewers
communicate can be taken by the average viewer as the right opinion to adopt. The
interviewer‟s input should be minimized to facilitating or moderating the discussion.
In addition, the media‟s role in fostering civic engagement should be accomplished by
giving the people media space to voice their opinions. Ordinary citizens can appear
on talk shows, talk to people like themselves, and discuss problems together to come
up with solutions for their community problems, Professor El Shimi suggested.
Professor El Sherif noted that some talk shows focus only on the negative side
ignoring what‟s positive which gradually affects their credibility because they only
show their audiences one side of the story. If they continue to paint a gloomy image
of Egypt, they will lose future viewership. Focusing on the problems without
suggesting any solutions drives people away. Successful television talk shows engage
people without depressing them, he said. People need to see both the dark side and
bright side. Talk shows also need to maintain balance by showing the argument and
the counter argument without being biased towards the government or a specific
political party. They must also present issues that cater to the needs of ordinary
citizens and not issues that serve the interests of the channel or the ruling party. Dr. El
Sherif emphasized that there is no ready recipe for any talk show to succeed in
encouraging Egyptians to participate. But he asserted that successful talk shows are
the ones that engage citizens by allowing them to personally participle on these
shows.
Dr. Safty said there is no particular strategy to follow explaining that all what
the media need is more freedom to be able to create public awareness and
development. It is important to encourage civic involvement at the very early stages
through education and the media can also play a role of an educator. The media
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should encourage people to be active, express themselves freely, and cultivate their
sense of belongingness, Dr. Safty said.
According to Dr. Hamdy, it is not a “mandate” for the talk show itself to
establish a strategy to foster civic engagement unless people decide to take action.
Talk shows can perform their role by giving people space to express their opinions.
Also, civil society organizations should influence media to take issues of civic
engagement seriously. Talk shows exercise social responsibility through performing
their journalistic function and they should focus on establishing more credibility and
professionalism. Many shows will die out, but those who have established credibility
will survive. There is an abundance of talk shows on Egyptian satellite channels and
the only ones who are going to survive are the credible shows. As professor Hamdy
puts it “all the taboos have been broken, now is the time for credibility.”
Dr. Ismail said talk shows should shed more light on offering concrete
solutions to problems. The media need to educate people about good practices to fill
the gap between what‟s taught and what is practiced. Dr. Abdel Meguid agrees,
criticizing talk shows for magnifying issues and focusing on problems all the time
without offering solutions. The media make people hate and refuse everything without
offering an alternative, she said. By shedding light on the negative aspects of society,
they tend to portray a gloomy picture of reality. Eventually, people suffer from
depression because they see everything as negative. Talk shows need to give people
more hope by showing more positive images of society. Media tend to frighten people
to a great extent until they become apathetic. To overcome this problem, talk shows
should introduce both positive and negative aspects but in a balanced way to provide
people with hope to change, Dr. Abdel Meguid said.
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In order for talk shows to be professional and balanced, Dr. Abu Ouf agrees with
Dr. Abdel Meguid that they need to convey negative and positive aspects of society.
Talk shows have to realize how popular they are and the “powerful effect” they have
on people. They create an “output for viewers to convey what [they] believe in at the
spur of the moment and [they] get [their] responses immediately.” This makes the
responsibility for talk shows “humongous”. They must cover issues in an ethical and
balanced approach which gives hope. They also have to find a way to promote
nationalism as well as activism. “The mistrust is overwhelming Egyptians. That is the
core of our problems. We need to establish a sense of trust and belongingness among
people in Egypt,” Abu Ouf said.
Professor Abu Ouf noted that although talk shows create sociopolitical awareness,
sometimes they end up sensationalizing news. She gave the example of talk show host
Amr Adeeb and how he tackles controversial issues in a sarcastic and in some cases
gossipy way. She noted that this makes viewers not take important issues very
seriously. Although the standard varies among talk shows as some are presentable to
an extent, but they tend to move in a direction of sensationalism in their coverage.
Professor Abu Ouf asserted that making profits should not be at the expense of the
quality of the message and ethics because talk shows at the end of the day would
rather have scoops of news to attract the audience.
Professor Mirazi criticized talk shows for trying to attract the sympathy of
viewers by calling for charity. He said they need to separate the editorial content from
charity. If talk shows wish to collect money for special cases, then they can organize
an event and raise funds for that purpose. There should be a clear separation from the
professional work of these talk shows and charity. Mirazi referred to the now defunct
Masr Ennaharda where the former host Mahmoud Saad calls on businessmen to
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donate money to special cases. He also airs special requests or petitions written by
viewers. Mirazi said this gives an indication that it is a service provided by the show.
“People are really abusing it and it is a way to attract an audience,” he said. Professor
Mirazi argued that such individual cases of charity should be carried out at the
mosque or church level. They take a big portion of airtime when audiences are
expecting to hear news from the show. However, Professor Mirazi argued that if it‟s a
national cause like the rain floods crisis, then it would be valid to give it enough
exposure. However, giving individual cases national attention is not professional. It
wears donors out, said Mirazi adding that it would be better to create an annual
telethon instead of soliciting for individual cases most of the time.
According to professor Mirazi, part of the intention behind these calls for charity
is finding a good story and appealing to the audience through using the cases of these
poor people. However, this embarrasses the people who are not aware of their right to
remain anonymous, he said. There should be clear guidelines regarding this matter.
The intention maybe good but talk shows need to develop ethical rules that would
protect individuals who resorted to the show for help as well as maintain a level of
professionalism, he emphasized.
Mirazi noted that talk shows succeeded in giving the Egyptian audience a national
media outlet compared to pan Arab outlets. National talk shows allowed people to
focus on Egyptian issues instead of the pan Arab ones, which allowed people to be
more engaged because they can actually do something about issues in proximity. This
was evident in the case of the rain floods in Aswan and Sinai. “At least you are not
telling them about Iraq or Palestine because they cannot do anything about it,” said
Mirazi.
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However, Mirazi added that talk shows and other media outlets need to move
further from the national level to a more local level by establishing talk shows that
cater to different Egyptian communities at the village level and not just at the national
level. Getting local involves real liberalization of the Egyptian media which hasn‟t
been achieved until now.
Making it possible to issue a license for FM and AM stations on a local level
provides citizens with their rights to air waves. According to Mirazi, if local media
outlets are established, the level of engagement would be very high. This is because it
will no longer be about an anchor in Cairo talking about problems in a remote village.
Instead, it will be an anchor within the village discussing its community problems.
Abu Ouf agreed with Mirazi and noted that more specialized talk shows in terms of
content also need to be developed.
Dr. Abdel Meguid believes the media has an essential role but “it is not a
magical stick”. The media has a role just like any other educational and social
institution. Professor Abdel Meguid emphasized that the more the media engage as a
real partner in the decision making process, the more influence it will have on society.
Without media, people will not be able to convey their plans or programs or urge
people to participate. Thus, media should take part in the early stages by creating
debates and not just covering the end result.
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Chapter 6: Analysis and Discussion
6.1 Talk shows information function and civic engagement
As the number and popularity of Egyptian nightly television talk shows
increase, as well as people‟s dependency on them for news on Egyptian affairs, it was
important to examine how viewers perceive these shows and their possible impact on
their attitudes. Talk shows substituted traditional news by providing social, political
and public affairs information in a simplified entertaining way that is easy to grasp by
the ordinary citizen, forming an information-entertainment mix often referred to by
communication scholars as infotainment. This also bridged the gap between the
mainstream media and the Egyptian audience by establishing virtual channels of
communication between the public and policy makers who appear on talk shows
responding to citizens‟ queries, often about controversial economic, political or social
issues.
Since many scholars associate the information and awareness function of the
mass media with civic engagement, it was essential to study the impact of such a
developing and important genre in Egypt on civic engagement attitudes among
viewers. Civic engagement is fundamental for any democracy and especially for
countries in transition such as Egypt. In both developed and emerging democracies,
there is always a dire need to foster civic engagement which represents sociopolitical
awareness, discussions, opinion expression, community involvement, and political
participation. In a democracy, citizens rule. In order to achieve this status, citizens
should engage in politics and their communities effectively and responsibly.
However, to reach this level of engagement, citizens must get well-informed first.
Information comes from many sources with the mass media in the lead.
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6.2 Agenda-setting impact of Egyptian nightly television talk shows
To study whether television talk shows play such an important role in
informing the public and influencing civic engagement attitudes, the current research
examined three research questions and four research hypotheses that test the
relationship between exposure to television talks, agenda-setting and attitudes towards
civic engagement. Since seeking sociopolitical awareness is the first level of being
civically engaged, this research applied agenda-setting theory to determine whether
Egyptian nightly television talk shows set the news agenda among their viewers. By
setting the news priorities, talk shows satisfy the first-level of agenda setting which
translates into the first level of civic engagement, which represents awareness. The
second-level of agenda setting or framing shapes the audience‟s opinions. If the
agenda-setting effect is achieved at the first and second levels, then it will most likely
extend to shaping attitudes and possibly influence behavior. This research studied the
first three levels beginning with awareness, opinions, and ending with attitudes
towards civic engagement. At the core of these civic engagement attitudes lies the
intention to take action.
Beginning with the viewership of talk shows, the results of the study found
that 286 respondents representing an 80.3% majority of the total 356 sample surveyed
watch Egyptian nightly television talk shows. A number of 70 respondents
representing 19.7 % of the sample surveyed don't watch television talk shows (Table
5.6). As for the popularity of the three television talk shows Masr Ennaharda, Al
Ashera Masa‟an, and 90 Deqeeqa, an analysis of variance testing if there was any
significant difference between the mean times of viewership per week was not
significant (Table 5.7a). Since popularity of the three programs is defined as the

161

viewing times per week which were not significantly different, the three talk shows
are more or less on the same popularity level.
The content analysis conducted also showed that there was no significant
difference between the quantities of news coverage provided by the three talk shows.
As shown in (Table 5.10a), the total number of stories covered by the three talk shows
is 676 stories. Masr Ennaharda produced a slightly larger number with 258 stories
(38.2%), followed by 90 Deqeeqa (31.2%) which was very close to Al Ashera
Masa'an representing 30.6% of the total stories. However, there is no significant
difference in the amount of coverage between the three talk shows.
Moving on to the information function of talk shows, the results of the study
confirm that Egyptian viewers do depend on talk shows as a primary source of news.
Almost all respondents (99 %) depend on Egyptian nightly television talk shows for
news, significantly higher than any other source of news with the exception of the
Internet which ranked second with 90.2 % news dependency as shown in (Table 5.8).
Although more respondents depend on television talk shows for news as compared to
the Internet, the mean average rating for the Internet was slightly higher (2.52),
compared to television talk shows (2.46). This is explained by the larger number of
respondents who always depend on the Internet (62.2%) compared to (46.9%) who
always depend on television talk shows. Since „always‟ carries more weight
representing a value of 3 on the three point exposure scale, the mean for the Internet
was slightly higher with 0.06 than television talk shows. However, a larger number of
respondents „never‟ depend on the Internet for news representing 9.8% compared to
only 1% who „never‟ depend on talk shows for news. The differences in the „never‟
value which equals (1) re-established the balance between the mean scores for the
Internet and television talk shows.
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The exposure results support the widespread opinion that talk shows have
become an important source of news for the Egyptian audience. The quantitative
survey results also support the qualitative interview results as most experts perceived
talk shows as a source of news, emphasizing the role of talk shows in creating
sociopolitical awareness and thereby fostering the first level of civic engagement.
This finding is in agreement with Mahmoud‟s (2007) study about Egyptian youth‟s
dependency on television talk shows for news and information.
In order to determine whether an agenda-setting effect is a likely outcome of
this exposure, results of the primary content analysis and primary survey conducted in
this research were compared. The 676 stories coded from the three talk shows were
compared with the 1,100 news issues listed by the 286 respondents who watch the
three television talk shows. After examining whether the public‟s agenda of news
priorities corresponds with the talk shows‟ agenda, the results in (Table 5.9a), show
corresponding agendas with the Egyptian 2010 parliamentary elections leading both
agendas. Out of the 70 news categories coded, 51 matched representing 72.85%
similarity. The parliamentary elections represented 20.8% of the total topics listed by
respondents and received the highest quantity (9.3 %) with regards to the talk show
overall coverage. Moreover, among the top 20 news issues on the public and media
agendas, 12 news issues were common which include rising food prices, minimum
wages, school violence, courts, Dostour crisis, suspension of media programs and
channels, university security, other political topics, traffic problems, media
regulations, and football matches.
A brief description of the top five news issues on the public versus the media
agendas in (Table 5.9a), shows that the rising food prices ranked second (6.3%) on the
viewers‟ news agenda, followed by presidential elections (5.1%). It is worth noting

163

that the issue of the presidential elections ranked as the third most important issue for
the public but was never covered by talk shows. The fourth issue is the minimum
wages representing 5% of the respondents‟ news agenda and the fifth news issue is
school violence, representing 4.9 % of the total issues. On the other hand, the
remaining top five news issues on the talk shows agenda, as shown in (Table 5.9a),
include the Dostour newspaper crisis (3.7%) which followed the parliamentary
elections, health care and awareness (3.6%), profiles (3.4%) and other simultaneous
topics in politics which ranked fifth (3.3%).
After examining whether the viewers‟ agenda was set by nightly television
talk shows as opposed to other sources of news, the results showed that respondents
listed talk shows as their source of news for the majority of issues. The results support
an agenda-setting impact as talk shows were cited by respondents 465 times,
representing a significant 42.3 % of the total news sources listed as shown in (Table
5.9c).
Furthermore, the agenda-setting impact did come from the three nightly
television talk shows under study, as the names of talk shows listed by respondents
were coded separately and the results in (Table 5.9d) were as follows: Al Ashera
Masa'an topped respondents news sources (28.7 %), followed by 90 Deqeeqa (20 %),
and the third talk show on the list of news sources is Masr Ennaharda (12.5 %). The
results support H1: Public perception of news priorities is most likely influenced by
Egyptian nightly television talk shows‟ news agenda. Therefore, H1 is accepted and
this study found that Egyptian nightly television talk shows have an agenda-setting
impact on viewers. This finding is in agreement with previous research studies such as
Youssef‟s (2008) study which also found that Egyptian nightly television talk shows
have an agenda-setting impact on viewers.
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After supporting an agenda-setting impact on the first-level which corresponds
with the exposure results supporting further that viewers depend on talk shows for
news, it is necessary to move on to the second-level of agenda setting to determine
whether talk show have an impact on viewers‟ perceptions of the Egyptian 2010
parliamentary elections. After analyzing 11 election frames in the content analysis
study and comparing them with corresponding frames rated by respondents in the
survey, the result was a high match between the talk shows‟ frames and the viewers‟
frames. Eight frames out of 11 frames examined matched, representing a 73%
similarity which is considerably high as shown in (Table 5.11c). The results indicate a
relatively strong relationship between the media and public second-level agendas,
thereby supporting H2: Egyptian nightly television talk shows‟ portrayal of Egypt‟s
parliamentary elections is likely to influence viewers‟ perception of the parliamentary
elections.
It‟s worth noting that the three frames which didn‟t match between the viewers
and the talk shows were election fairness, judicial supervision, and the Wafd
opposition party. Such a disagreement in frames could be attributed to the fact that
talk shows provided equal mention to the opposite statements “the elections will be
fairly conducted” versus “the elections will be unfairly conducted”. This discrepancy
which could be regarded as neutral or balanced coverage supports what experts noted
in the qualitative results with reference to the government‟s pressure on talk shows
before the elections. With many media outlets shutdown by the government ahead of
the elections, it seemed that self-censorship was a safe way to keep the shows and
their hosts on air.
Self-censorship was evident in the Oct.10 episode of Al Ashera Masa‟an
which featured two women candidates who discussed their representation in
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parliament. Although one was an NDP candidate and the other an opposition
candidate, the discussion was far from being free. When opposition member Gamila
Ismail described how the former ruling party forged previous elections and how it
failed in running the country, the presenter Mona El Shazly interrupted Ismail several
times trying to explain to her that she‟s not asking her to evaluate NDP‟s
performance. El-Shazly stressed more than once that she‟s only asking about women
representation in parliament. The same show received a warning on Nov.11 for
allowing two guests to make negative remarks about how the NDP is running the
election. Ironically enough, the guests were state-owned newspaper editors Nasr El
Qaffas and Mahmoud Nafadi.
The second frame which didn‟t match is the importance of judicial supervision
to prevent election fraud. The same reasons could be attributed to this frame as well
because talk shows also gave that frame equal coverage which could be explained as
an attempt to be balanced or to avoid a possible government crackdown. The third
frame was about the Wafd party‟s representation in parliament which is not a
controversial frame and is therefore insignificant to the analysis. Despite these three
mismatching frames, the survey results confirmed the content analysis results as
shown in (Table 5.11c), supporting a second-level agenda setting impact on the
viewers‟ perception of the 2010 parliamentary elections. It‟s worth noting that the
survey was collected before the elections to make certain that the viewers‟ perceptions
were not affected by the actual election results.
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6.3 Perception of talk shows, exposure, and civic engagement
With regards to how viewers perceive talk show‟s role in civic engagement,
participants highly agreed (62.5%) with the seven statements rating talk shows‟ role.
The five-point likert statements rate talk shows‟ role starting from the first level of
civic engagement which is creating awareness and ending with encouraging voting.
The results in (Table 5.12a), show that perception of talk shows as a source of news
received the highest percentage of agreement (92.3%). This finding further explains
why talk shows have an agenda-setting impact. Likewise, respondents also perceived
talk shows as creating sociopolitical awareness (73.1%). This finding is in further
agreement with the qualitative results regarding experts‟ perception of talk shows,
which also supports why talk shows have a strong agenda-setting impact on their
viewers. The perception of talk shows as encouraging voting received the least
degree of agreement (39.9%), which had a mean average rating of 3.22 indicating
that the majority falls between agree and neutral. Overall, respondents perceive talk
shows as civically engaging as the total percentage of agreement with the statements
represents (62.5%).
To determine which civic engagement attitudes had a positive correlation with
viewers‟ perception of talk shows role, 14 statements on a five-point likert scale were
rated by respondents according to their degree of agreement with the different aspects
of civic engagement, also covered in the perception statements. The results in (Table
5.12b) indicate that the highest percentage of agreement went to sociopolitical
awareness (88.8%), followed by community participation (66.1%), and discussing
sociopolitical affairs (61.5). The total agreement percentage on civic engagement
attitudes is (55.1 %). The results show a positive correlation between the perception
statements and their corresponding civic engagement attitudes as shown in (Table
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5.12c) which illustrates a significant to highly significant correlation results. These
results support H3: The more the public perceives talk shows as promoting civic
engagement, the more positive attitudes the public will have towards civic
engagement.
Accepting H3 which supports a positive correlation between perception of talk
shows and civic engagement attitudes is in itself an indicator of the extension of the
agenda-setting impact beyond the first and second levels to shaping perceptions and
influencing attitudes. Therefore, to examine whether the news exposure to talk shows
is related to civic engagement attitudes, each attitude was cross-tabulated with
exposure (Appendix K). The findings in (Table 5.13a) confirm that exposure to talk
shows has the highest relationship (87.7 %) with attitudes towards sociopolitical
awareness. This further confirms the agenda-setting link to civic engagement
attitudes. The second highest relationship with exposure also measures sociopolitical
awareness (77.8%). The least relationships with exposure were opinion expression
through media (29.7%) and opinion expression to public officials (23.8 %). Most
relations in (Table 5.13a) are high with 9 out of the 14 attitudes having over 50%
agreement. Therefore, the results support H4: There is a positive relation between
exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement attitudes.
Thus, H4 is accepted.
Due to the fact that the sample surveyed is the well-educated elite, statistical
tests were conducted to examine if there was any significant difference between the
different levels of education listed in (Table 5.1) and respondents‟ perception of the
role of talk shows, civic engagement attitudes and talk show exposure. The results in
section 5.14 show no significant difference between education and the other variables.
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In order to rate the overall level of civic engagement, attitudes were organized
into the categories which operationally define civic engagement (sociopolitical
awareness, sociopolitical discussions, opinion expression, community involvement,
and political participation). The results show that sociopolitical awareness which
represents the basic level of engagement was leading with (82.6%). It‟s interesting to
find that community involvement represented the second highest category of
engagement with (82.05%), followed by sociopolitical affairs discussions (61.2%),
representing the third highest category. The categories which fell below (50%) were
political participation (47.9%) and opinion expression, representing the lowest
(26.7%).
These findings emphasize further that there‟s a strong relation between
exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement. However,
the strongest relations are with the first three categories: sociopolitical awareness,
community involvement and sociopolitical discussions. The strongest positive attitude
towards civic engagement is sociopolitical awareness as shown in (Table 5.13b). This
finding is in agreement with the qualitative interview results as most experts noted
that Egyptians seek sociopolitical awareness emphasizing how much the public is
interested in politics regardless of any tangible political participation. The finding
regarding community involvement illustrates that despite the common misperception
about Egyptians being involved in their communities, they had strong positive
attitudes towards involvement with (71%) agreeing to the statement “contributing to
community is my responsibility”. Also, more than half the sample agreed with the
statements “I make a difference in my community”, “I volunteer to help solve
community problems in Egypt” and “citizens should not wait for the government to
solve their community problems”. This finding is in line with some of the experts
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perceptions about community involvement in Egypt. Almost half the experts noted
how Egyptians collaborate at the community level by forming informal fundraising
networks for the poor, volunteering with NGOs or other forms of community
activities. This finding illustrates that the well-educated elite sample surveyed in this
research has very positive attitudes towards community engagement.
As for political participation, the findings are in agreement with the experts‟
perception that Egyptians are not active politically. This is mostly because the
environment in pre-revolution Egypt discouraged such participation. As many experts
noted, Egyptians had a general feeling that their voices are not going to count, so they
were not likely to invest their energies in political activities such as voting especially
when they can tell the results beforehand. This is evident in the (36.4%) agreement
with the statement “I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections”
(36.4%), which represents the lowest percentage of agreement among the five
statements measuring political participation. Despite that, (55.6%) still agreed that it‟s
their responsibility to vote in the presidential elections and (50.7%) considered voting
a priority.
The very low agreement level with public opinion expression through the
mass media or through petitions or letters to government officials (26.7%) could also
be explained by the atmosphere of mistrust that the experts referred to in the
qualitative interview results. As many Egyptians felt voiceless or didn‟t care to voice
their concerns before the revolution believing that their opinion won‟t be taken
seriously and won‟t change anything. Despite that, the overall rating of the categories
mentioned above on the civic engagement scale produced a value almost at midpoint
(2.96/5) illustrating that the elite sample surveyed are civically engaged mostly when
it comes to awareness, community involvement, and discussing sociopolitical affairs.
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Due to the fact that sociopolitical awareness ranked the highest in terms of
agreement among viewers, it‟s crucial that Egyptian nightly television talk talks adopt
more professional and ethical standards in their coverage of Egyptian affairs. Most
experts noted that talk show hosts and reporters are often opinionated when they
should be reporting facts and moderating discussions. They must also refrain from
dramatizing the news. Experts interviewed in this research also emphasized the need
to diversify sources appearing on talk shows. This is because talk shows often
interview the same sources over and over again which creates redundancy. In
addition, providing excessive exposure creates a misperceived status for such sources
in the eyes of viewers. Abiding by an ethical standard of coverage is extremely
important for a genre perceived by 92.3% of the sample as a primary source of news.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations
7.1 Conclusion
The findings of this study are in agreement with the findings of previous
studies conducted on the agenda-setting effect of the media. The findings support that
Egyptian nightly television talk shows have an agenda-setting impact on elite viewers
both on the first-level, which sets the news priorities, and on the second-level, which
sets the framing of issues. The findings also support that the agenda-setting at the
second-level shaped how viewers perceived the Egyptian parliamentary elections
examined in this research.
The primary finding of this research is that the agenda-setting function of
television talk shows has an impact on attitudes towards civic engagement. The
findings support that the more viewers are exposed to talk shows, the more they
perceive issues covered by talk shows as important (first-level agenda-setting).
Furthermore, viewers‟ perceptions of particular issues were most likely shaped by talk
shows‟ frames of coverage (second-level agenda-setting). The first outcome of the
agenda-setting impact on both levels is sociopolitical awareness, which represents the
first and most basic level of civic engagement. One of the primary findings of this
research is the positive correlation between the perception of talk shows as civically
engaging and attitudes towards civic engagement. Another significant finding is the
positive relationship between exposure to Egyptian nightly television shows and civic
engagement attitudes.
The findings of this study also show that the Egyptian elite scored a 2.96 on
the civic engagement rating scale. This illustrates that they are engaged when it comes
to sociopolitical awareness, community involvement and sociopolitical discussions.
Although more is needed from talk shows to foster higher levels of civic engagement
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as Egypt transcends this transitional period and transforms into a democracy, it‟s
important to note that political participation was discouraged in pre-revolution Egypt.
Talk shows themselves didn‟t really promote voting per se but worked more on
fostering awareness and community level engagement. The significance of the
agenda-setting impact of television talk shows calls for an urgent need to establish a
high level of professionalism with regards to talk shows‟ news coverage and
discussions.
Since they are perceived as a source of news and were found to have an
agenda-setting impact as well as an impact on perceptions and civic engagement
attitudes, Egyptian nightly television talk shows have a greater responsibility towards
their viewers. They must maintain balance and accuracy in their coverage. They must
moderate discussions and not impose opinions. The fact that Egypt is hopefully on the
right way to democracy entails that these talk shows also need to establish the
fundamentals of democracy within their coverage. They need to give ordinary citizens
airtime and not just officials or experts. Provide minorities with a voice and not just
the vocal mainstream Egyptian majority. Maintain balance and give interviewees full
freedom to express their opinions even if they are not in line with the channel‟s
ideology. Question officials and hold them accountable. Allow citizens to question
them as well. Egyptian nightly television talk shows must implement a greater degree
of social responsibility as they are held accountable to millions of viewers who resort
to this genre for news and information. Therefore, they must perform their
information function professionally and responsibly to help establish well-informed
and engaged citizenry in Egypt.
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7.2 Recommendations for talk shows
Experts provided recommendations for talk shows to play a more effective and
responsible role with regards to news coverage and civic engagement. Following is a
summary of their recommendations:


Establish credibility, professionalism, and balance in coverage.



Separate factual reporting from opinions.



Provide more voices to youth to circulate fresh and new ideas in society.



Establish more diversity in guests.



Hosts should facilitate discussion and not enforce their opinions.



Give ordinary citizens more representation and interaction with the show.



Provide both sides of the picture. The positive as well as the negative side to
avoid painting a gloomy image of society and driving audiences away.



Offer concrete solutions to problems.



Separate editorial content from charity soliciting by organizing fundraising
events for that purpose instead of using airtime for it.



Establish local talk shows that cater to different Egyptian communities at
the village level and not just on the national level to focus on smaller
communities and foster civic engagement.
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7.3 Recommendations for future research


The current study was conducted before the Egyptian revolution, a similar
study examining exposure to nightly television talk shows and civic
engagement after the revolution is necessary to examine how far political
participation attitudes have changed after the revolution.



Apply the uses and gratifications theory in future research.



Conduct focus groups with television talk show viewers to provide a more
in depth analysis of their perceptions and attitudes.



Conduct research on different television talk shows which have become
popular after the revolution such as Baladna Belmasry and Akher Kalam



Conduct research on the popularity and credibility of talk shows during and
after the revolution.
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8. Limitations of the study


The study surveyed a non-random purposive sample. Therefore, the results
can‟t be generalized.



Lack of studies conducted on media and civic engagement in Egypt.



Lack of published scholarly research on Egyptian television talk shows.



Lack of freedom of expression before the revolution. Several respondents
were worried about answering the questions about their perception of the
upcoming parliamentary elections. Many online surveys were disregarded for
that specific reason because many participants skipped that section all
together.



Al Qahera Al Youm, one of the very popular talk shows before the revolution,
intended for this study, was suspended after a few episodes were recorded.
Therefore, it was excluded from the sample.
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10. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE
This is an academic questionnaire conducted for graduate studies in Journalism
and Mass Communication at the American University in Cairo. This study
focuses on media and civic engagement in Egypt with a particular emphasis on
Egyptian nightly television talk shows Masr Ennaharda (Egypt Today), 90
Deqeeqa (90 Minutes), and Al-Ashera Masa’an (10 PM). Your participation is of
extreme importance. By filling out this questionnaire you will contribute to social
science research in Egypt and help make our society better. Your participation is
voluntary and your data will remain anonymous. Thank you for your time.
1) Do you watch any of the following Egyptian nightly television talk shows:
Masr Ennaharda, 90 Deqeeqa, and Al-Ashera Masa’an? Please select one answer.
a. Yes
b. No (if you answered “No”, please jump to question 10 and answer questions 10 to 15)
2) Please indicate with (√) how often you watch each talk show per week?
Five
times

Four
times

Three
times

Two
times

Once
a
week

Never

1. Masr Ennaharda
2. Al Ashera Masa’an
3. 90 Deqeeqa
3) Please indicate with (√) your degree of agreement or disagreement with the
following statements about Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic
engagement:
Strongly
Agree

a) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are a source
of news about Egypt‟s affairs
b) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage
people to participate in solving community
problems in Egypt
c) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage
people to make charitable contributions
d) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage
ordinary citizens to express their opinions
publicly (e.g. calls, emails, fax, letters, sms).
e) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows create
sociopolitical awareness
f) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are my
primary source of information about the
Egyptian parliamentary elections held in
November, 2010.
g) Egyptian nightly TV talks shows encourage
citizens to vote
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Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

4) Please indicate with (√ ) your degree of agreement or disagreement with
each of the following statements about civic engagement:
Strongly
Agree
a) I consider voting a priority
b) I express my opinion
through the media (e.g. callins, emails, letters, sms, fax)
c) I express my opinion to
public officials (e.g.
petitions, letters)
d) I consider discussing
sociopolitical affairs a
priority
e) Being informed about
Egyptian affairs is important
f) I consider sociopolitical
awareness a priority
g) Citizens should not wait for
the government to solve
their community problems
h) I make a difference in my
community
i) Contributing to community
is my responsibility
j) I volunteer to help solve
community problems in
Egypt
k) It‟s my responsibility to
vote in Egypt‟s presidential
elections in 2011
l) It‟s my responsibility to
vote in Egypt‟s upcoming
parliamentary elections
m) I intend to vote in the
upcoming presidential
elections
o) I intend to vote in the
upcoming parliamentary
elections
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Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

5) What is the most important news happening in Egypt that came to your

knowledge recently? Please list five issues.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________

6) How did these issues first come to your knowledge? Please specify your
source of information for each issue and name the source (e.g. 90 Deqeeqa
TV talk show).
You may choose from the following sources:
[Newspapers, Magazines, Radio News, Radio talk shows, Television News,
Internet, Egyptian TV Talk Shows including Masr Ennaharda, 90 Deqeeqa,
or Al Ashera Masa’an , Personal communication].
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Source for issue one: ________________________
Source for issue two: ________________________
Source for issue three: _______________________
Source for issue four: ________________________
Source for issue five:_________________________

7) How often do you follow Egyptian nightly television talk shows‟ coverage
for each issue you listed? Please indicate with (√) for each issue.
Always

Sometimes

Never

Issue 1 you listed
Issue 2 you listed
Issue 3 you listed
Issue 4 you listed
Issue 5 you listed
8) How often do you depend on the following media sources for news about
Egyptian affairs? Please indicate with (√) for each source.
Always

Newspapers
Television news
Television talk shows
Radio news
Radio talk shows
Magazines
Internet
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Sometimes

Never

9) Please indicate with (√ ) your degree of agreement with the following
statements about the upcoming Egyptian parliamentary elections.
Strongly
Agree

a) The government‟s recent restrictions on
private media have nothing to do with the
elections
b) The elections will be fairly conducted
c) National Democratic Party (NDP)
candidates are expected to hold the
majority of seats in parliament
d) Judicial supervision is important to
prevent election fraud
e) The elections are expected to be peaceful
f) It‟s important to have independent
monitors
g) Opposition party candidates will have a
powerful representation
h) Muslim brotherhood candidates will be
welcomed to run in the elections by the
government
i) Women must have equal representation in
parliament
j) Coptic Christians should hold more than
the current10 percent of parliament seats
k) The Wafd opposition party is expected to
hold most opposition seats in parliament
l) The government recently issued
restrictions on private media because of
the elections
m) The elections will not be fairly conducted
n) NDP candidates are not expected to hold
the majority of seats in parliament
o) Judicial supervision is not important to
prevent election fraud
p) The elections are expected to be violent
q) It‟s not important to have independent
monitors
r) Opposition party candidates will have a
weak representation
s) Muslim brotherhood candidates will be
restricted from running in the elections by
the government
t) Women representation should be
restricted to the quota set by the president
u) Coptic Christians should hold the usual
current 10 percent seats in parliament
v) The Wafd opposition party is not expected
to hold most opposition seats inparliament
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Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

10) Gender
a. Female
b. Male
11) What is your area of residence? Check one answer only.
a. Heliopolis
b. Nasr City
c. New Cairo/Katameya
d. Maadi
e. Dokki
f. Mohandiseen
g. Zamalek
h. Haram
i. 6th of October
j. Other, Please specify____________________
12) How old are you? Check one answer only.
a. Less than 18
b. 18 – 29
c. 30 – 41
d. 42 – 53
e. 54 – 65
f. Older than 65
13) What is your nationality? Check one answer only.
a. Egyptian
b. Other, Please specify_____________________
14) What is your level of education? Check one answer only.
a. Undergraduate student
b. Bachelor degree holder
c. Graduate student
d. Master‟s degree holder
e. Doctoral degree holder
f. Other, Please specify_________________________
15) Which best describes your monthly income? Check one answer only.
a. Less than 1,000
b. EGP 1,000 – less than EGP 3,000
c. EGP 3,000 – less than EGP 5,000
d. EGP 5,000 – less than EGP 7,000
e. EGP 7,000 – less than EGP 9,000
f. EGP 9,000 – less than EGP 11,000
g. EGP 11,000 and above

Thank you for your most valuable participation
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APPENDIX B:Arabic Questionnaire
إسخبٞبُ أمبدَٜٝ
ٕزا إسخبٞبُ أمبدٍ َٜٝعذ ىيذساسبث اىعيٞب بقسٌ اىصحبفت ٗ اإلعالً ببىجبٍعت األٍشٝنٞت ببىقبٕشة .حشمز ٕزٓ
اىذساست عي ٚاىَشبسمت اىَذّٞت فٍ ٜصش ٗ دٗس بشاٍج اىخيٞفز ُ٘ٝاىح٘اسٝت اىَسبئ ٔٞاىَصشٝت ٍزوٍ :صش
اىْٖبسدٓ 90 ،دقٞقتٗ ،اىعبششة ٍسبءا .إُّ ٕزا اإلسخبٞبُ ٍخصص فقظ ىيبحذ اىعيَٗ ٜال ٝخطيب ٍعشفت إسٌ
أٗ ٕ٘ٝت اىَشبسك ٗ ،اىَعيٍ٘بث اىخ ٜسخضبف إى ٚاىْخبئج ىِ حْسب إىٕٝ٘ ٚخلٍ .شبسمخل ٍَٖت ىيَسبعذة
عي ٚحفٌٖ ٍب ٝحذد ف ٜاىَجخَع اىَصش .ٛشنشا ٍسبقب عيٗ ٚقخل.
ٕ )1و حشبٕذ أ ٍِ ٛبشاٍج اىخيٞفز ُ٘ٝاىح٘اسٝت اىَسبئ ٔٞاىَصشٝتٍ :صش اىْٖبسدٓ 90 ،دقٞقت ،اىعبششة
ٍسبءا؟ اىشجبء إخخٞبس إجببت ٗاحذة.
أّ -ؼٌ
ة -ال (إرا مبّج اإلجببت "ال" ،اىشجبء االّخقبه إى ٚاىسؤاه سقٌ ٗ 10االجببت عي ٚاألسئيت  10إى)15 ٚ
ٍ )2ب ٍذٍ ٙشبٕذحل ىبشاٍج اىخيٞفز ُ٘ٝاىح٘اسٝت اىَسبئ ٔٞاىَصشٝت ف ٜخاله األسب٘ع ؟ ضع عالٍت (√)
خَس ٍشاث

أسبع ٍشاث

رالد ٍشاث

ٍشحِٞ

ٍشة

أبذا

ٍصر اىْٖبردٓ
اىؼبشرح ٍطبءا
 90دقٍقخ
 )3ضع عالٍت (√) ىخحذد دسجت ٍ٘افقخل أٗ اخخالفل ٍع اىعببساث اىخبىٞت ح٘ه بشاٍج اىخيٞفز ُ٘ٝاىح٘اسٝت
اىَسبئ ٔٞاىَصشٝت ٗاىَشبسمت اىَذّٞت:
ٍ٘افق جذا
)1
)2
)3
)4

)5
)6

)7

ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخ
رؼذ ٍصذر ٍِ ٍصبدر األخجبر ح٘ه اىشؤُٗ
اىَصرٌخ
ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخ
رشجغ اىْبش ػيى اىَشبرمخ فً حو ٍشبمو
اىَجزَغ اىَصري
ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخ
رشجغ اىْبش ػيى رقذٌٌ ٍطبَٕبد خٍرٌخ
ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخ
رشجغ اىَ٘اطِ اىؼبدي ػيى اىزؼجٍر ػِ رأٌٔ
(ٍِ خاله اىَنبىَبد ،رضبئو اىجرٌذ
اإلىنزرًّٗ ،اىفبمص ،اىرضبئو اىقصٍرح ،اىخ)
ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخ
رْشًء ر٘ػٍخ إجزَبػٍخ -ضٍبضٍخ
ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخ
رؼذ ٍصذرا رئٍطٍب ىيَؼيٍ٘بد ح٘ه اإلّزخبثبد
اىجرىَبٍّخ اىَصرٌخ اىزً ضزؼقذ فً ّ٘فَجر
2010
ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخ
رشجغ اىَ٘اطٍِْ ػيى اىزصٌ٘ذ فً اإلّزخبثبد
ثشنو ػبً
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ٍ٘افق

ٍحبٝذ

غٞش ٍ٘افق

غٞش ٍ٘افق جذا

 ٍِ ) 4فضيل قٌ بخ٘ضٞح ٍذٍ٘ ٙافقخل أٗ عذً ٍ٘افقخل ٍع مو ٗاحذة ٍِ اىعببساث اىخبىٞت ٗاىخ ٜحذٗس عِ
اىَشبسمت اىَشبسمت اىَذّٞت عِ طشٝق ٗضع عالٍت (√( بَب ْٝبسبل
ٍ٘افق
جذا
 )1أػزجر اىزصٌ٘ذ اإلّزخبثً أٗىٌ٘خ
 )2أػجرػِ رأًٌ ٍِ خاله ٗضبئو
اإلػالً (ٍثو:اىَنبىَبد اىٖبرفٍخ،
اىجرٌذ اإلىنزرًّٗ ،اىرضبئو،
اىرضبئو اىقصٍرحٗ ،اىفبمص)
 )3أػجر ػِ رأًٌ ىيَطؤٗىٍِ (ٍثو:
رظيَبدٗ ،رضبئو)
 )4أػزجر ٍْبقشخ اىقضبٌب اإلجزَبػٍخ-
اىطٍبضٍخ أٗىٌ٘خ
 )5أُ أػرف ػِ اىشئُ٘ اىَصرٌخ أٗىٌ٘خ
 )6أػزجر اى٘ػً اىطٍبضً اإلجزَبػً أٗىٌ٘خ
 )7ال ٌْجغً ػيى اىَ٘اطٍِْ أُ ٌْزظرٗا ٍِ
اىحنٍ٘خ حو ٍشبمو ٍجزَؼبرٌٖ
 )8أّب أصْغ فبرق ٗإخزالف فً ٍجزَؼً
 )9اىَطبَٕخ فً ٍجزَؼً ًٕ أٗىٌ٘زً
 )10أقً٘ ثبىزط٘ع ىيَطبػذح فً حو
اىَشنالد اىَجزَؼٍخ فً ٍصر
 )11إّٖب ٍطؤٗىٍزً أُ أقً٘ ثبىزصٌ٘ذ فً
إّزخبثبد اىرئبضخ اىَصرٌخ فً 2011
 )12إّٖب ٍطؤٗىٍزً أُ أقً٘ ثبىزصٌ٘ذ فً
اإلّزخبثبد اىجرىَبٍّخ اىقبدٍخ
 )13أّب أّ٘ي اإلدالء ثص٘رً فً اإلّزخبثبد
اىرئبضٍخ اىقبدٍخ
 )14أّب أّ٘ي اإلدالء ثص٘رً فً اإلّزخبثبد
اىجرىَبٍّخ اىقبدٍخ
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ٍ٘افق

ٍحبٝذ

غٞش

غٞش ٍ٘افق

ٍ٘افق

جذا

ٍ )5ب ٕ ٜإٌٔ األّببء /األخببس اىخ ٜححذد فٍ ٜصش ٗاىخ ٜعشفج عْٖب ف ٜاّٟٗت االخٞشة .قٌ بزمش خَست
قضبٝب /أخببس
...................................................................................................)1
...................................................................................................)2
...................................................................................................)3
...................................................................................................)4
...................................................................................................)5
 ) 6مٞف عشفج عِ ٕزٓ اىقضبٝب ؟ ٍِ فضيل قٌ بخحذٝذ ٍصذس ٍعيٍ٘بحل ىنو قضٞت ٍِ اىقضبٝب اىخَست ٗارمش
اسٌ اىَصذس (ٍزو :اىبشّبٍج اىخيٞفز ّٜ٘ٝاىح٘اس 90 ٛدقٞقت).
َٝنْل اإلخخٞبس ٍِ ب ِٞحيل اىَصبدس ( ٍجالث ،صحف ،أخببس إراعٞت ،أخببس حيٞفزّٞ٘ٝت ،إّخشّج ،بشاٍج
اىخيفز ُ٘ٝاىح٘اسٝت اىَسبئ ٔٞاىَصشٝت ٍزو ٍصش اىْٖبسة 90 ،دقٞقت أٗ اىعبششة ٍسبءا ،اإلحصبه اىشخص)ٜ
)1
)2
)3
)4
)5

ٍصذر اىقضٍخ أٗ اىخجر األٗه.....................................................
ٍصذر اىقضٍخ أٗ اىخجر اىثبًّ.....................................................
ٍصذر اىقضٍخ أٗ اىخجر اىثبىث.....................................................
ٍصذر اىقضٍخ أٗ اىخجر اىراثغ.....................................................
ٍصذر اىقضٍخ أٗ اىخجر اىخبٍص...................................................

ٕ )7و حقً٘ بَخببعت اىقضبٝب اىخ ٜرمشحٖب ببألعي ٍِ ٚخاله بشاٍج اىخيٞفز ُ٘ٝاىح٘اسٝت اىَسبئ ٔٞاىَصشٝت
ٍزو ٍصش اىْٖبسة 90 ،دقٞقت أٗ اىعبششة ٍسبءا ؟ ٍِ فضيل ضع عالٍت (√) ىنو قضٞت أٗ خبش قَج بزمشٓ
دائَب
)1
)2
)3
)4
)5

أبذا

أحٞبّب

اىقضٍخ األٗىى
اىقضٍخ اىثبٍّخ
اىقضٍخ اىثبىثخ
اىقضٍخ اىراثؼخ
اىقضٍخ اىخبٍطخ

 )8مٌ ٍشة حقً٘ ببإلعخَبد عيٕ ٚزٓ اىَصبدس اإلعالٍٞت ىَعشفت أخببس عِ اىشئُ٘ اىَصشٝت؟ ٍِ فضيل
قٌ ببىخ٘ضٞح عِ طشٝق ٗضع عالٍت (√) ىنو ٍصذس
دائَب
)1
)2
)3
)4
)5
)6
)7

صحف إخجبرٌخ
أخجبر ريٍفسٌٍّ٘خ
ثراٍج اىزيٍفسٌُ٘ اىح٘ارٌخ اىَطبئٍٔ اىَصرٌخ
أخجبر إراػٍخ
ثراٍج ح٘ارٌخ إراػٍخ
ٍجالد
إّزرّذ
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أحٞبّب

أبذا

 ٍِ )9فضيل قٌ ببإلشبسة ٍسخخذٍب ) √( ىخ٘ضح ٍذٍ٘ ٙافقخل اٗ عذً ٍ٘افقخل ٍع مو ٍِ اىعببساث
اىخبىٞت عِ اإلّخخبببث اىبشىَبّٞت اىَصشٝت اىقبدٍت
ٍ٘افق
جذا
)1
)2
)3
)4
)5
)6
)7
)8
)9
)10
)11
)12
)13
)14
)15
)16
)17
)18
)19
)20
)21
)22

اىقٍ٘د اىحنٍٍ٘خ اىحبىٍخ ػيى اإلػالً اىخبص ىٍص
ىٖب ػالقخ ثبإلّزخبثبد
اإلّزخبثبد اىجرىَبٍّخ اىقبدٍخ ضزْؼقذ ثْسإخ
ٍرشح٘ اىحسة اى٘طًْ اىذٌَقراطً ٍِ اىَز٘قغ
أُ ٌْبى٘ا ٍؼظٌ اىَقبػذ فً اىجرىَبُ
اىرقبثخ ٗاإلشراف اىقضبئً أٍر ٕبً ىَْغ رسٌٗر
اإلّزخبثبد
ٍِ اىَز٘قغ أُ رنُ٘ اإلّزخبثبد ضيٍَخ
ٍِ اىٌَٖ أُ ٌنُ٘ ْٕبك ٍراقجٍِ ٍطزقيٍٍِ
ٍرشحً األحساة اىَؼبرضخ ضٍنُ٘ ىٌٖ رَثٍو
ق٘ي
ٍرشح٘ اإلخ٘اُ اىَطيٍَِ ضٍرحت ثٌٖ ىخ٘ض
اإلّزخبثبد ٍِ قِجَو اىحنٍ٘خ
الثذ أُ ٌنُ٘ ْٕبك رَثٍو ٍزطبٗي ىيْطبء فً
اىجرىَبُ
اىَطٍحٍُ٘ األقجبط الثذ أُ ٌنُ٘ ىٌٖ رَثٍو فً
اىجرىَبُ ثْطجخ رسٌذ ػِ  10ثبىَئخ ٍِ اىَقبػذ
حسة اى٘فذ اىَؼبرض ٍِ اىَز٘قغ أُ ٌف٘ز ثَؼظٌ
ٍقبػذ اىَؼبرضخ فً اىجرىَبُ
أصذرد اىحنٍ٘خ ٍؤخرا قٍ٘د ػيً اإلػالً
اىخبص ثطجت اإلّزخبثبد
اإلّزخبثبد ىِ ٌزٌ إّؼقبدٕب ثْسإخ ٗػذه
ٍرشح٘ اىحسة اى٘طًْ اىذٌَقراطً ٍِ اىَز٘قغ
أُ ال ٌْبى٘ا ٍؼظٌ اىَقبػذ فً اىجرىَبُ
ىٍص ٍِ اىٌَٖ أُ ٌنُ٘ ْٕبك رقبثخ ٗإشراف
اىقضبئً ىَْغ رسٌٗر اإلّزخبثبد
ٍِ اىَز٘قغ أُ رنُ٘ اإلّزخبثبد ػٍْفخ
ىٍص ٍِ اىٌَٖ أُ ٌنُ٘ ْٕبك ٍراقجٍِ ٍطزقيٍٍِ
ٍرشحً األحساة اىَؼبرضخ ىِ ٌنُ٘ ىٌٖ رَثٍو
ق٘ي فً اىجرىَبُ
ٍرشح٘ اإلخ٘اُ اىَطيٍَِ ضٍفرض ػيٌٍٖ قٍ٘د
ىخ٘ض اإلّزخبثبد ٍِ قجو اىحنٍ٘خ
اىزَثٍو اىْطبئً الثذ أُ ٌحذد ثبىْطجخ اىزً ٌفرضٖب
رئٍص اىجَٖ٘رٌخ
اىَطٍحٍُ٘ األقجبط الثذ أُ رجقى ّطجزٌٖ فً
اىجرىَبُ  10ثبىَئخ ٍِ اىَقبػذ مبىَؼزبد
حسة اى٘فذ اىَؼبرض ىٍص ٍِ اىَز٘قغ أُ ٌف٘ز
ثَؼظٌ ٍقبػذ اىَؼبرضخ فً اىجرىَبُ
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ٍ٘افق ٍحبٝذ

غٞش
ٍ٘افق

غٞش ٍ٘افق
جذا

 )10اىْ٘ع:

أ -أّثى

ة -رمر

ٍ )11ب ٕ ٜاىَْطقت اىخ ٜحعٞش بٖب؟ ٍِ فضيل قٌ بئخخٞبس إجببت ٗاحذة فقظ
ٍ )1صر اىجذٌذح
ٍ )2ذٌْخ ّصر
 )3اىقبٕرح اىجذٌذح /اىقطبٍٍخ
ٍ )4ؼبدي
 )5دقً
ٍْٖ )6ذضٍِ
 )7زٍبىل
ٕ )8رً
 6 )9أمز٘ثر
 )10آخر ٍِ ،فضيل قٌ ثبىز٘ضٍح......................................
 )12مٌ عَشك؟ ٍِ فضيل قٌ بئخخٞبس إجببت ٗاحذة فقظ
 )1أقو ٍِ 18
29-18 )2
41-30 )3
53 -42 )4
65 -54 )5
 )6أمجر ٍِ 65
ٍ )13ب ٕ ٜجْسٞخل؟ ٍِ فضيل قٌ بئخخٞبس إجببت ٗاحذة فقظ
ٍ )1صري
 )2آخر ٍِ ،فضيل قٌ ثبىز٘ضٍح...................................،
ٍ )14ب ٕ٘ ٍسخ٘ ٙحعيَٞل؟ ٍِ فضيل قٌ بئخخٞبس إجببت ٗاحذة فقظ
 )1طبىت جبٍؼً
 )2حبئس ػيى شٖبدح جبٍؼٍخ
 )3طبىت دراضبد ػيٍب
 )4حبئس ػيى درجخ اىَبجطزٍر
 )5حبئس ػيى درجخ اىذمز٘رآ
 )6آخر ٍِ ،فضيل قٌ ثبىز٘ضٍح..................................،
ٍ )15ب اإلخخٞبس اىَالئٌ اىزٝ ٛصف دخيل اىشٖشٛ؟ ٍِ فضيل قٌ بئخخٞبس إجببت ٗاحذة فقظ
 )1أقو ٍِ  10000جٍْٖب ٍصرٌب
 - 10000 ٍِ )2أقو ٍِ  30000جٍْٖب ٍصرٌب
 - 30000 ٍِ )3أقو ٍِ  50000جٍْٖب ٍصرٌب
 -50000 ٍِ )4أقو ٍِ  70000جٍْٖب ٍصرٌب
 -70000 ٍِ )5أقو ٍِ  90000جٍْٖب ٍصرٌب
 -90000 ٍِ )6أقو ٍِ  110000جٍْٖب ٍصرٌب
 110000 ٍِ )7جٍْٖب ٍصرٌب فَب أمثر
شنشا جزٝال عيٕ ٚزٓ اىَشبسمت اىقََ ّٞت 
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APPENDIX C: Codebook for the Open-Ended Survey Questions
A. Topic Number: ________________
B. Topic:________________________
C. Sub-topic:______________
1. Topic (1): Political
1. Parliamentary elections
2. Presidential elections
3. President Mubarak‟s meetings/visits/communications
4. Political participation
5. Political representation
6. Opposition (e.g. arrests of MB..etc)
7. Government (problems, corruption, emergency law)
8. Demonstrations/strikes
9. Achievements/Celebrations (6th of October)
10. Foreign affairs
2. Topic (2): Economic
11. Minimum wages
12. Government spending
13. National debts
14. Investments
15. General Inflation
16. Rising food prices
17. Taxes
18. Unemployment
19. Poverty
20. Development
21. Shortages in food and supplies
3. Topic (3): Social
22. Workers issues
23. Women issues
24. Religious rights
25. Family issues (marriages, divorce)
26. School violence (sexual abuse, beating up children…etc)
27. Other,_______________
4. Topic (4): Environmental
28. Pollution (air, water, garbage)
29. Water shortage
30. Endangered species
31. Energy resources
32. Natural disasters
33. Other, (Nile water protection and agreements)

197

5. Topic (5): Health
34. Health care/awareness
35. Diseases
36. Health insurance
37. Drugs
38. Negligence and corruption
6. Topic (6): Education
39. Problems in quality of education
40. Higher education
41. School education
42. Illiteracy
43. Education development
44. University violence and security
7. Topic (7): Criminal
45. Court sentences and trials
46. Arrests
47. Police brutality
48. Thefts
49. Embezzlements
50. Murders
51. Right to own a gun
52. Terrorism
53. Crime control
54. Illegal acquisition of public properties (e.g. lands)
55. Other,(hit and run accidents/ building collapse, shooting)
8. Topic (8): Human interest
56. Ordinary peoples success stories
57. Ordinary peoples ordeal stories
58. Other,_______________
9. Topic (9): Religion
59. Religious preaching
60. Sectarian tension (and instigating tension)
61. Religious discrimination
62. Pilgrimage
10. Topic (10): Sports
63. Matches
64. Fan tension
65. Achievements
66. Other,__________

11. Topic (11): Arts & Culture
67. Profiles (actors, singers, writers, directors…etc)
68. Drama reviews
69. Cinema reviews
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70. Galleries, concerts
71. Antiquities
12. Topic (12): Media
72. Freedom of expression
73. Censorship
74. Mergers and acquisitions
75. Jailing journalists/trials
76. Firing journalists/Dostour crisis
77. Suspension of programs or newspapers or channels
78. Future of media (online media…etc.)
79. Media ethics and law
80. Media regulations vs restrictions ahead of the parliamentary
elections
81. Privately owned media
13. Topic (13): Science & Technology
82. Inventions
83. Scientific research
84. Science projects
14. Topic (13): Miscelaneous
85. Electricity issues (problems, regulations, new rules)
86. Traffic issues (traffic jams, accidents)
87. Underground metro issues
88. Closing shops early
90. Fires (metro fire, explosions…etc)
91. Charity
92. Loss of the Egyptian satellite
93. Wikileaks (Iraqi warlogs)
94. Gaza aid
95. Islam and the West
96. World News
D. MAIN SOURCE OF TOPIC
1. Newspapers
2. TV news
3. Tv talk shows
4. Radio News
5. Radio Talk shows
6. Magazines
7. Internet
8. TV talk shows among other sources
9. Personal Communication
10. Miscelaneous
11. SMS service
E. Name of Sources Cited by Respondents
1. Al Ashera Masa‟an tv talk show
2. Masr Ennaharda tv talk show
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3. 90 Dekeeka tv talk show
4. 48 Sa‟a tv talk show
5. Not Applicable
6. Al Masry Al Youm newspaper
7. Al Ahram newspaper
8. Al Akhbar newspaper
9. Al Wafd newspaper
10. Al Youm Al Sabe‟a online newspaper
11. Masrawy website
12. Twitter
13. Al Shorouk newspaper
14. Al Jazeera TV channel
15. Al Qahera Al Youm tv talk show
17.Akhbar Baladna
18. Men Qalb Masr tv talk show
19. AlJazeera.net
20. Al Shorouk online
21.Al Tab‟a Al Akheera news program
22. Facebook
23. Ahram online
24. Sabah Dream tv talk show
25. Nogoum FM
26. Radio Masr
27. Teen Stuff magazine
28. MSN news
29. Al Hayat Al Youm tv talk show
30 Business Today magazine
31. Al Arabeya.net
32. Baladna Belmasri tv talk show
33. Youtube.
34. Al Tab‟a Al Oula news program
35. BBC.

F. Exposure to talk shows with regards to each topic
1. Always
2. Sometimes
3. Neutral
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APPENDIX D: Coding Sheet for Open-Ended Survey Questions

TOPIC
NO

TOPIC

SUBTOPIC

Source

201

Name of
source

Talk Show
Exposure to
Topic

APPENDIX E: Codebook 1: First-level Agenda Setting
G. Coder
1. Sara
2. Sahar
H. Talk show
1. Al Ashera Masa‟an
2. Masr Ennaharda
3. 90 Deqeeqa
I. Broadcast Day
1. Saturday
2. Sunday
3. Monday
4. Tuesday
5. Wednesday
J.
K.
L.
M.

Broadcast Date:_________________
Topic Number: ________________
Topic:________________________
Sub-topic:______________
15. Topic (1): Political
82. Parliamentary elections
83. Presidential elections
84. President Mubarak‟s meetings/visits/communications
85. Political participation
86. Political representation
87. Opposition (e.g. arrests of MB..etc)
88. Government (problems, corruption, emergency law)
89. Demonstrations/strikes
90. Achievements/Celebrations (6th of October)
91. Other, (foreign affairs, deaths of political figures)______________
16. Topic (2): Economic
92. Minimum wages
93. Government spending
94. National debts
95. Investments
96. General Inflation
97. Rising food prices
98. Taxes
99. Unemployment
100. Poverty
101. Development
102. Other,(food shortage, gas canisters,
consumers)_______________
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17. Topic (3): Social
103. Workers issues
104. Women issues
105. Religious rights
106. Family issues (marriages, divorce)
107. School violence (sexual abuse, beating up children…etc.)
108. Other,_______________
18. Topic (4): Environmental
109. Pollution (air, water, garbage)
110. Water shortage
111. Endangered species
112. Energy resources
113. Natural disasters
114. Other, (Nile water protection and agreements)
19. Topic (5): Health
115. Health care/awareness
116. Diseases
117. Health insurance
118. Drugs
119. Other,(Negligence, corruption)
20. Topic (6): Education
120. Problems in quality of education
121. Higher education
122. School education
123. Illiteracy
124. Education development
125. Other,(university violence and security, e.g. Ain Shams
University)
21. Topic (7): Criminal
126. Courts (sentences, trials)
127. Arrests
128. Police brutality
129. Thefts
130. Embezzlements
131. Murders
132. Right to own a gun
133. Terrorism
134. Crime control
135. Illegal acquisition of public properties (e.g. lands)
136. Other,(hit and run accidents/ building collapse, shooting)
22. Topic (8): Human interest
137. Ordinary citizen success stories
138. Ordinary citizen personal ordeal stories
139. Other,_______________
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23. Topic (9): Religion
140. Religious preaching
141. Sectarian tension (and instigating tension)
142. Religious discrimination
143. Other, (Pilgrimage)_____________
24. Topic (10): Sports
144. Matches
145. Fan tension
146. Achievements
147. Other,__________
25. Topic (11): Arts & Culture
148. Profiles (actors, singers, writers, directors…etc.)
149. Drama reviews
150. Cinema reviews
151. Galleries, concerts
152. Other,_(Antiquities, books …)_________
26. Topic (12): Media
153. Freedom of expression
154. Censorship
155. Mergers and acquisitions
156. Jailing journalists/trials
157. Firing journalists/Dostour crisis
158. Suspension of programs or newspapers or channels
159. Future of media (online media…etc.)
160. Media ethics and law
161. Media regulations vs. restrictions ahead of the parliamentary
elections
162. Other,(evaluation of privately owned media)____________
27. Topic (13): Science & Technology
82. Inventions
83. Scientific research
84. Science projects
28. Topic (13): Miscellaneous
85. Electricity (problems, regulations, new rules)
86. Traffic problems (traffic jams, accidents)
87. Underground metro drilling problems
88. Closing shops early
90. Fires (metro fire, explosions…etc.)
91. Charity calls
92. Loss of the Egyptian satellite
93. Wikileaks (Iraqi war logs)
94. Gaza aid convoys
95. Islam and the West
96. World Affairs
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APPENDIX F: Codebook 2: Second-level Agenda Setting
Overall frames of advance parliamentary elections‟ coverage
Coding Instructions: The statements below are meant to measure how talk shows
portray the Egyptian parliamentary elections. Pick the number in each column that
best represents how they portray the elections in their coverage/discussions. 3=
Mentioned, 2 = Neutral, and 1=Not Mentioned. (A topic is neutral if the opposite
frames are covered within the same story and if the story was balanced).
1 2 3
1 2 3
1)The government‟s restrictions on
private media have nothing to do
with the elections
3)The elections will be fairly
conducted
5)Judicial supervision is important
to prevent fraud
7)The elections are expected to be
peaceful
9)It‟s important to have independent
monitors
11)Opposition party candidates will
have a powerful representation
13)Muslim brotherhood candidates
will be welcomed to run in the
elections by the government
15)Women must have equal
representation in parliament

2) The government issued restrictions
on private media because of the
elections
4) The elections will be unfairly
conducted
6)Judicial supervision is not important
to prevent fraud
8)The elections are expected to be
violent
10)It‟s not important to have
independent monitors
12)Opposition party candidates will
have a week representation
14)Muslim brotherhood candidates will
be restricted from running in the
elections by the government
16)Women representation should be
restricted to the quota set by the
president
18)Coptic Christians should hold the
usual current 10 percent seats in
parliament
20)The NDP is not expected to hold the
majority of seats in parliament
22)The Wafd opposition party is not
expected to hold most opposition seats
in parliament

17)Coptic Christians should hold
more than the current10 percent of
parliament seats
19)The NDP is expected to hold the
majority of seats in parliament
21)The Wafd opposition party is
expected to hold most opposition
seats in parliament
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APPENDIX G: Coding Sheet: First-Level Agenda Setting

Talk show news coverage

C
O
D
E
R

S
D
H
DAT
A
O
E
Y
W

T
O
P
I
C
N
O

T
O
P
I
C

S
U
B
T
O
P
I
C

TOPIC
KEY WORDS
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COMMENTS

APPENDIX H: Coding Sheet: Second-Level Agenda Setting
Frames of advance election coverage
T
o
p
i
c
n
o
.

CO SH
DE O
R W

D
A
Y

D
A
T
E

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2
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APPENDIX I: Inter-Coder Reliability
The Holsti Formula was used to calculate inter-coder reliability as follows:
R = 2M
__________
N1 + N2
M = total number of coding decisions agreed upon by the two coders
N = total number of coding decisions in the subsample tested for reliability by each
coder (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006).

The total sample of 676 stories included 4,596 coding decisions. A subsample
including 719 coding decisions, representing 15.6 % of the total sample was re-coded
by a second coder to test inter-coder reliability.

The results are as follows:
R = 2(714)
__________
719 + 719

R = 1428
__________ = 0.99
1438
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APPENDIX J: Coding Dates:
The following table shows the dates included the content analysis sample which
ranged from Oct. 6 to Nov. 10.

Dates /2010
Nov.10
Nov.9
Nov.8
No.v.7
Nov.6
Nov.3
Nov.2
Nov.1
Oct.31
Oct.30
Oct.27
Oct.26
Oct.25
Oct.24
Oct.23
Oct.20
Oct.19
Oct.18
Oct.17
Oct.16
Oct.13
Oct.12
Oct.11
Oct.10
Oct.9
Oct.6
Total
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APPENDIX K: Cross Tabulations for Table 5.13: between each statement
measuring civic engagement attitudes in question (4) with exposure:
Voting Priority
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total
Discussing Sociopolitical Affairs
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total
Informed About Egyptian Affairs
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total
Sociopolitical Awareness Priority
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total
Community Contribution A
Responsibility
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
My Responsibility To Vote Presidential

Television Talk Shows Exposure
Always
Sometimes Never
27
38
1
32
48
0
45
32
0
21
21
2
9
10
0
134
149
3
Television Talk Shows Exposure
Always
Sometimes
Never
38
30
0
45
62
1
31
38
1
18
14
1
2
5
0
134
149
3
Television Talk Shows Exposure
Always
Sometimes
Never
71
59
1
46
75
2
13
8
0
3
5
0
1
2
0
134
149
3
Television Talk Shows Exposure
Always
Sometimes
Never
58
52
2
44
68
0
22
20
1
8
5
0
2
4
0
134
149
3
Television Talk Shows Exposure
Always
Sometimes
Never
40
31
1
61
71
2
27
32
0
5
11
0
1
4
0
Television Talk Shows Exposure
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Total
66
80
77
44
19
286
Total
68
108
70
33
7
286
Total
131
123
21
8
3
286
Total
112
112
43
13
6
286
Total
72
134
59
16
5
Total

Elections
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total
My Responsibility To Vote
Parliamentary Elections
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total
Citizens Should Not Wait For
Government
To Solve Problems
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total
Opinion Expression Through Media
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total
Opinion Expression To Public
Officials
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total
Make A Difference In My
Community
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total
I Volunteer To Solve Community

Always
Sometimes
Never
29
47
0
40
43
0
42
30
0
13
18
1
10
11
2
134
149
3
Television Talk Shows Exposure
Always
Sometimes
Never
26
35
0
38
41
0
40
39
0
18
24
1
12
10
2
134
149
3
TV Talk Shows Exposure
Always

Sometimes

Never

43
56
1
40
48
1
17
18
0
19
16
0
15
11
1
134
149
3
TV Talk Shows Exposure
Always
Sometimes
Never
10
11
0
32
32
1
46
30
0
33
52
1
13
24
1
134
149
3
TV Talk Shows Exposure
Always
Sometimes
Never
6
9
0
25
28
0
36
37
1
53
52
1
14
23
1
134
149
3
TV Talk Shows Exposure
Always
Sometimes Never
25
31
1
55
47
1
38
41
0
13
18
0
3
12
1
134
149
3
TV Talk Shows Exposure
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76
83
72
32
23
286
Total
61
79
79
43
24
286
Total
100
89
35
35
27
286
Total
21
65
76
86
38
286
Total
15
53
74
106
38
286
Total
57
103
79
31
16
286
Total

Problems
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total
Intend To Vote In Presidential
Elections
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total
Intend To Vote In Parliamentary
Elections
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Total

Always
Sometimes Never
27
33
1
47
49
0
47
42
2
11
20
0
2
5
0
134
149
3
TV Talk Shows Exposure
Always
Sometimes Never
31
38
0
34
35
0
30
31
0
25
28
2
14
17
1
134
149
3
TV Talk Shows Exposure
Always
Sometimes Never
19
21
0
32
32
0
39
42
0
30
35
2
14
19
1
134
149
3

212

61
96
91
31
7
286
Total
69
69
61
55
32
286
Total
40
64
81
67
34
286

APPENDIX L: Significance in Relationships between Exposure and Civic
Engagement Attitudes for Table 5.13a
Television Talk Shows Exposure

Civic Engagement Attitudes

(Always & Sometimes)

(Strongly agree & Agree)

Ratio

%

Comparison*

Informed about Egyptian affairs

251 / 286

87.8%

a

Sociopolitical awareness priority

222 / 286

77.8%

ab

Community contribution responsibility

203 / 286

71.0%

bc

Citizens should take action and not wait for
government

187 / 286

65.4

bcd

Discussing sociopolitical affairs

175 / 286

61.2%

cde

Responsibility to vote at presidential elections

159 / 286

55.6%

de

Making a difference in community

158 / 286

55.2%

de

Volunteer to solve community problems

156 / 286

54.5%

de

Voting priority

145 / 286

50.7%

e

Responsibility to vote at parliamentary elections

140 / 286

48.9%

ef

Intention to vote at presidential elections

138 / 286

48.3%

ef

Intend to vote at parliamentary elections

104 / 286

36.4%

fg

Opinion expression through media

85 / 286

29.7%

g

Opinion expression to public officials

68 / 286

23.8%

g

Calculated Least significant difference (lsd) between any two attitudes = 14.4% (at
p=<0.05). Any two attitudes are significantly different if the difference is more than
14.4%.
* Based on the lsd, percentages followed by the same letter are not significantly
different.
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